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INTRODUCTION: NATURAL LAW 
The immediate impetus to this symposium has been a revived in-
terest in natural law theory. Although the scholarly interest in natural 
law has been on the upswing for some time, popular interest in the 
theory has been sparked most recently by the Clarence Thomas confir-
mation hearings. Clarence Thomas had declared allegiance to natural 
law theory, leading many lawyers and laypersons to inquire as to the 
content of natural law theory. 
Many usages of the phrase natural law are perfectly idiomatic 
within legal or philosophical discourse. Nonetheless, I shall pick one 
of these and treat the phrase as referring to a position about law that 
has two essential theses: (1) there are objective moral truths; and (2) 
the truth of any legal proposition necessarily depends, at least in part, 
on the truth of some corresponding moral proposition(s). For ease of 
reference, let us label the first the moral realist thesis and the second 
the relational thesis. 
The phrase natural law has often been used to refer to one or the 
other of these theses alone. In legal literature, for example, it is com-
mon for natural law to denote only the moral realist thesis, so that an 
adherent to "natural law" is an objectivist about moral values who 
need not connect such objective moral truths to law. In this sense of 
the phrase, a legal positivist like John Austin could be called a natural 
lawyer, since he believed in the objective rightness of a utilitarian mo-
rality even though his legal positivism separated law from such objec-
tive rightness.1 
1. 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (London, Murray 5th ed. 1885); see 
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 601-02 & 
n.25, 625-29 (1958) (separating the law/morals relational claim of both natural lawyers and legal 
positivists from any metaethical stance). 
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Analogously, the phrase is sometimes used to refer to any theory 
that asserts the relational thesis about the connection of law to moral-
ity, even if the morality to which law is said to be connected does not 
consist of objective moral truths. Ronald Dworkin is often construed 
to be this sort of "natural lawyer," given his linkage of the truth of 
legal propositions to idealized constructions of moral conventions.2 
Jeremy Waldron is another example of this kind of "natural lawyer," 
since he sees a connection between law and morality while denying 
that morality is any more than our own individual projections.3 
In addition to these partial "natural law" views, people often use 
the phrase to refer to one of two species of moral realism. Natural law 
is often taken to refer to that kind of objectivism about values that 
regards moral truths as being truths about human nature. This is the 
"wired in" view of natural law, maintaining the existence of a univer-
sal and discrete human nature, a nature which determines the content 
of what is morally right. This human nature may be teleological, cast 
as the natural function of humankind, 4 or it may be a more contempo-
rary anthropology, using only nonteleological descriptions of universal 
human traits. In addition, human nature may be thought to possess 
epistemic power within each human being, providing each with natu-
ral access to moral truth; or it may be thought to possess motivational 
power within each human being, so that each can not only see the 
good, but has some natural inclination to pursue it.5 We might call 
2. Dworkin has flirted throughout his career with conventionalism about the morality to 
which law is related. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 73 (1986); RONALD M. 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 95, 125-26, 129, 134-35, 159-66 (1978); Ronald M. 
Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law - Observations Prompted by Professor Fuller's Novel 
Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 668, 688-90 (1965). I and many others have noted this conventional-
ism. See Larry Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin 's 
Theory of Law, 6 LAW & PHIL. 419 (1987); John Finnis, On Reason and Authority in Law's 
Empire, 6 LAW & PHIL. 357 (1987); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 
58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 298-300 (1985) [hereinafter Moore, Interpretation]; Heidi M. Hurd, 
Note, Relativistic Jurisprudence: Skepticism Founded on Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV, 1417, 
1458-59 (1988); Michael S. Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Legal Theory, 60 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 453 (1987) (reviewing RONALD M. DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE (1985)) [herein-
after Moore, Metaphysics]. To the extent Dworkin is a conventionalist about the morality to 
which law is related, he is not a natural lawyer in my sense, despite occasionally labeling himself 
in these terms. See Ronald M. Dworkin, ''Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 
(1982). For another example of law's being linked to conventionalist morality in this manner and 
also being called a "natural law" view, see generally THEODORE M. BENDIIT, LAW As RULE 
AND PRINCIPLE (1978). 
3. See Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 
. 158, 176-78 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). 
4. See ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea (Nicomachean Ethics), in BASIC WORKS OF ARIS-
TOTLE 928 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); I-II THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fa-
thers of English Dominican Province trans., 1952). 
5. On the motivating versus epistemic aspect of human nature as it relates to following the 
natural law, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23-50 (1980). 
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any and all of these variations human nature naturalism. 
An alternative usage of natural law refers to that species of objec-
tivism about morality associated with many religious traditions. 6 On 
this view, the nature of a moral quality like goodness is given by its 
having been commanded by God. 
Despite the widespread acceptance of these usages of natural law 
both within and without the legal academy, my own usage is one that 
commits the natural lawyer to both the moral realist and the relational 
theses. Such usage, moreover, commits the natural lawyer to the 
moral realist thesis generically; a natural lawyer in my sense need not 
believe in either human nature naturalism or religious-based objectiv-
ism in ethics, although he may. 
Both the moral realist and the relational theses need clarification 
and motivation as much as they need defense. Because I have recently 
focused on the relational thesis,7 in this article I shall focus on the 
moral realist thesis. I shall ask three questions about the thesis. First, 
what does the thesis assert? This is a matter of clarifying what one 
means when one either asserts or denies that moral values are objec-
tive. Second, why should we care whether the moral realist thesis is 
true or false? I shall examine this question both in terms of the impact 
the truth or falsity of the thesis may have on our personal lives and in 
terms of its impact on how we should design and administer legal in-
stitutions. Third, what reason do we have to believe that the moral 
realist thesis is true? Over a decade ago I canvassed the reasons many 
have advanced for thinking the moral realist thesis to be false. 8 Now I 
wish to make explicit the positive case for moral realism that was 
largely implicit in the earlier article. 
l. DEFINING THE MORAL REALIST THESIS OF NATURAL LAW 
A. The Criteria for a Good Definition of Moral Realism 
Although I have separated my first question about moral realism 
from my second, in fact one must have some idea of the answer to the 
second before one can answer the first. For the main guidepost to 
follow in seeking a good definition of moral realism is the preservation 
of a debate (between moral realists and moral antirealists) that matters 
to us, both personally and institutionally. Moral realists and their op-
6. See, e.g., Kai Nielsen, The Myth of Natural Law, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 122, 129 
(Sidney Hook ed., 1964) ("lfthere is no God ... [then] the classical natural law theory is absurd . 
. . . "). 
7. See Michael S. Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY, supra note 
3, at 188. 
8. See Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 1061. 
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ponents, in other words, should be characterized in a way that main-
tains the relevance of their disagreement both to our personal lives and 
to questions of institutional design. Otherwise we end up with a de-
bate that is academic in the pejorative sense of that word. 
Three subsidiary considerations should also guide any definition of 
moral realism.9 One is to end the parochialism that generally has 
characterized ethics within philosophy over the past century. As an 
example of this parochialism, consider the longevity of G.E. Moore's 
"open-question" argument against all forms of naturalist moral real-
ism.10 Moore argued that it was always an open question whether 
goodness was pleasure, happiness, or anything else - in a way that 
the question, is a bachelor an unmarried man?, was not open. From 
his observation that analytic truths never foreclosed such questions 
about goodness, Moore derived the conclusion that no form of ethical 
naturalism could be right. Goodness could not mean "pleasurable," 
"happiness-producing," or anything other than "goodness." 
This argument has had a surprisingly long period of respectability 
in light of movements in the philosophy of language and of mind that 
outflanked it a generation or more ago. 11 The Quinean attack on ana-
lyticity, 12 Wittgenstein's apparent development of a "criteriological" 
theory of meaning, 13 Geach's (and Quine's) discovery of attributive 
(Quine's "syncategorematic") adjectives, 14 the new-found respectabil-
ity of nonanalytic type-identity relations, 15 the separation of meaning 
from the linguistic competence of individual native speakers,16 the sep-
aration of the meaning of an expression from that expression's illocu-
9. For suggestions in this regard, see Geoffrey Sayre·McCord, Introduction: The Many 
Moral Realisms, in EssAYS ON MORAL REALISM 1, 5 (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988). 
10. See GEORGE E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 1-37 (1903). 
11. See William G. Lycan, Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge, 24 S.J. PHIL. 79, 80 (Supp. 
1986) ("My real complaint about the Open Question Argument is that it presumes that identifi-
cation of properties must be motivated a priori, by the established synonymy of the predicates 
expressing those properties. And this presumption has been known to be false at least since the 
1950's ..• • ");see also WILLIAM G. LYCAN, JUDGEMENT AND ]USflFJCATION 200 (1988). 
12. See Willard V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20 (1951). 
13. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVEsr!GATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 1953). For explication of criteriological theories, see Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of 
Judging, 54 s. CAL. L. R.Ev. 151, 218-21 (1981). 
14. See Peter T. Geach, Good and Evil, 17 ANALYSIS 33 (1956); see also WILLARD v.o. 
QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 103, 126, 132, 138, 175 (1960). 
15. See DAVID M. ARMSfRONG, A MATERIALISf THEORY OF THE MIND (1968); Herbert 
Feigl, The ''Mental" and the "Physical," in 2 MINN. STUD. PHIL. Sci. 370 (Herbert Feig) et al. 
eds., 1958); U.T. Place, Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, 47 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 44 (1956); J.J.C. 
Smart, Sensations and Brain Processes, 68 PHIL. REV. 141 (1959). 
16. See HILARY PUTNAM, The Meaning of ''Meaning,,, in MIND, LANGUAGE, AND REAL· 
!TY 215 (1975). 
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tionary act-potential, 17 and the Kripke-Putnam defense of a causal 
theory of reference18 all combined to make Moore's "open question" a 
useless technique for demonstrating the "fallacy" of inferring moral 
conclusions from factual premises. That Moore's arguments survived 
- at least as standard staples to be taught in ethics courses - evi-
dences the unfortunate parochialism within philosophy under which 
ethics long suffered. 
A way to avoid such parochialism is by forcing the debate between 
moral realists and their opponents (generically, moral antirealists) into 
the mold of the debates between metaphysical realists and antirealists 
about other sorts of things. "Realists" debate "instrumentalists," for 
example, about the reality of theoretical entities posited by successful 
scientific theories. 19 Similarly, "realists" debate "phenomenalists" 
about the reality of ordinary observables like tables and chairs.20 
Likewise, "realists" about common sense psychology debate "elimina-
tive materialists" about the reality of mental states of intention or be-
lief, 21 and "realists in mathematics" debate "intuitionists" about the 
ontological status of numbers, sets, and classes. 22 Though notoriously 
difficult to pin down, a sense exists that realists and antirealists in all 
fields share a common form of debate. Moral realism should be so 
defined that asserting or denying it frames a debate that is an instance 
of this general form. 
A second, supplementary consideration guiding the definition of 
moral realism more openly accommodates the traditional discussions 
within ethics (as opposed to philosophy more generally). It is to define 
moral realism in a way that fruitfully displays the various metaethical 
positions that philosophers of ethics have actually adopted. In chart-
ing the history of Anglo-American ethical philosophy in this century, 
we must accommodate four main metaethical nich~s. First, we must 
accommodate the kind of ethical naturalism against which G.E. 
Moore took himself to be arguing. To use Moore's own example, such 
17. The locus classicus is J.L. Austin's 1955 William James Lectures at Harvard, printed in 
J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 94-107 (1962). 
18. See SAUL H. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980); HILARY PUTNAM, Explanation 
and Reference, in MIND, LANGUAGE, AND REALITY, supra note 16, at 196. 
19. See, e.g., LARRY LAUDEN, SCIENCE AND RELATIVISM 136-38 (1990); BAS c. VAN 
FRAASSEN, THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGE 204-15 (1980). 
20. See, e.g., GILBERT HARMAN, THOUGHT 8-9 (1973). 
21. See, e.g., p AUL M. CHURCHLAND, SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND THE PLASTICITY OF MIND 
(1979); DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE (1987); STEVEN P. STICH, FROM 
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE: THE CASE AGAINST BELIEF (1983); Daniel c. 
Dennett, Beyond Belief. in THOUGHT AND OBJECT (Andrew Woodfield ed., 1982). 
22. See, e.g., HARTRY H. FIELD, REALISM, MATHEMATICS, AND MODALITY (1989); HAR-
TRY H. FIELD, SCIENCE WITHOUT NUMBERS (1980). 
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ethical naturalism would include utilitarianism (when the utilitarian 
principle is taken to be an analytic truth about the meaning of good). 
Second, we must accommodate Moore's own metaethical position, 
which became known as nonnaturalism or intuitionism. On this view, 
words like good, when used to make moral evaluations, referred to a 
simple property, goodness. Such a simple property was not definable 
at all, certainly not in terms of natural properties. It was a nonnatural 
property, and it had to be discovered accordingly: not by observation, 
using the five senses, but by using the special faculty of moral 
intuition. 23 
Third, we must find a niche for the noncognitivist reaction to 
Moore's intuitionism. The emotivists like A.J. Ayer24 and C.L. Ste-
venson25 agreed with Moore that moral expressions using words like 
good did not refer to natural properties. Unlike Moore, however, they 
also denied that such expressions referred to nonnatural properties. 
Rather, expressions like you are bad had no descriptive use, and thus 
the words within such expressions did not refer to any property, natu-
ral or nonnatural. Rather, the emotivists believed, such statements 
express our emotional reaction to the subject named (much as typical 
uses of ouch express painful sensations but do not describe such sensa-
tions or anything else). "Prescriptivists" following R.M. Hare subse-
quently joined this noncognitivist reaction to Moore,26 diverging in 
two respects from their emotivist predecessors. First, they allowed 
that moral expressions had some "descriptive meaning" (namely, such 
expressions presupposed universalizability). Second, they chose as the 
nondescriptive speech act performed in ethical discourse the prescrip-
tion to others to act in certain ways, as opposed to the emotivists' 
expression of attitudes. 
Finally, the taxonomy of metaethical stances created by a defini-
tion of moral realism must accommodate the cacophony of voices in 
the metaethics of the past two decades. Such voices include a strong 
resurgence of ethical naturalism,27 the continued assertion of various 
23. See MOORE, supra note 10. Other prominent intuitionist works have included HAROLD 
A. PRICHARD, MORAL OBLIGATION (1949); w. DAVID Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 
(1930). 
24. See ALFRED J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC 102-20 (Dover Publications 
1952) (2d ed. 1946). 
25. See CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944). 
26. See RICHARD M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1963); RICHARD M. HARE, THE 
LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952). 
27. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 8. In that article, published in 1982, I refused to choose 
between naturalism and nonnaturalism as the label for the version of moral realism there de-
fended. Nonetheless, as I then recognized, my realism was (and remains) naturalistic in the same 
sense that functionalism about mental states is physicalistic in the philosophy of mind. Since 
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forms of intuftionism, 28 the revival of noncognitivism,29 and the revi-
val of a kind of conventionalist or relativistic metaethics that has al-
ways been well received in anthropology.30 
The third subsidiary consideration guiding a fruitful definition of 
moral realism is to preserve a line between metaethics and ethics, a 
line traditionally conceived in the following manner. Substantive eth-
ics studies what is good and bad, right and wrong, at various levels of 
abstraction. Arguments that this abortion is the wrong thing to do, or 
that abortion in general is always wrong, or that what makes any ac-
tion right or wrong is a function of the good or bad consequences of 
that action, all are arguments made within substantive ethics. By con-
trast, arguments that wrong does not describe a property, or that no 
statement using wrong can possess a truth value, or that no argument 
about abortion can have a determinate resolution, are all metaethical. 
Metaethics, as the name suggests, is about ethics just as ethics is about 
morality. 
To preserve this line between substantive ethics and metaethics, we 
should not define moral realism so that its adoption compels the fore-
closure of otherwise appealing positions within substantive ethics. 
More concretely, one should be able to argue for or against utilitarian-
ism, ethical hedonism, consequentialism generally, or various deonto-
logical alternatives, no matter which metaethical position one adopts. 
1982 there has been a veritable cavalcade of naturalistic moral realisms. See generally DAVID 0. 
BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1989); Richard N. Boyd, How to 
be a Moral Realist, in EssAYS ON MORAL REALISM, supra note 9, at 181; David 0. Brink, 
Externalist Moral Realism, 24 S.J. PHIL. 23 (Supp. 1986); David 0. Brink, Moral Realism and 
the Skeptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness. 62 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 111 
(1984); Lycan, supra note 11; Peter Railton, Moral Realism, 95 PHIL. REv. 163 (1986); Peter 
Railton, Naturalism and Prescriptivity, in FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL AND POLIDCAL PHILOSO-
PHY 151 (Ellen F. Paul et al. eds., 1990); Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Moral Theory and Explana-
tory Impotence, in EssAYS ON MORAL REALISM, supra note 9, at 256; Nicholas L. Sturgeon, 
Moral Explanations, in MORALITY, REASON, AND TRUTH 49 (David Copp & David Zimmer-
man eds., 1984); Richard Werner, Ethical Realism, 93 ETHICS 653 (1983); Richard Werner, 
Ethical Realism Defended, 95 ETHICS 292 (1985). For a summary of this decade of American 
moral realism, see ROBERT L. ARRINGTON, RATIONALISM, REALISM, AND RELATIVISM 182-91 
(1989). 
28. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 5. 
29. Most notably, SIMON BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD (1984); see also Waldron, 
supra note 3. 
30. Almost too many variations exist to cite. Two contemporary relativists are BERNARD 
WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985), and GILBERT HARMAN, THE NA-
TURE OF MORALITY (1977). The constructivism of Ronald Dworkin is also in this camp, see 
sources cited supra note 2, as is the constructivism of the 1980s John Rawls. See John Rawls, 
Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985) [hereinafter 
Rawls, Justice]; John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 11 J. PHIL. 515 (1980) 
[hereinafter Rawls, Kantian Constructivism]. Wittgensteinians about ethics also belong here. 
See, e.g., SABINA LoVIBOND, REALISM AND IMAGINATION IN ETHICS (1983); John McDowell, 
Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, in WITTGENSTEIN: To FOLLOW A RULE (Steven Holtz-
man & Christopher Leich eds., 1981). 
2432 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2424 
This does not mean that metaethical positions make no difference in 
the arguments available to sustain a given view in ethics, nor that 
metaethical positions make no difference to the plausibility of any ethi-
cal views. That metaethics should leave open questions of substantive 
ethics does not mean that metaethics has no influence on those 
questions. 
B. What Is Metaphysical Realism? 
To avoid the somewhat parochial isolation of ethics within philos-
ophy, we should define moral realism as a species of metaphysical real-
ism. We therefore must ask what a metaphysical realist generically 
believes before we apply those realist commitments to morality. 
Metaphysical realism, as I use the phrase, consists of a related set 
of ontological, semantic, and epistemic theses. These theses may apply 
to mental states and the discourse which describes them, mathematical 
entities and the discourse that describes them, theoretical entities in 
science and the scientific discourse about them, and so forth. My 
nonparochial hypothesis is that the metaphysical realist position is the 
same irrespective of the domain of discourse. Of course, one who is a 
realist about some class of entities need not be a realist about all other 
classes. Indeed, staunch realists about the physical world are com-
monly antirealists about morality. Similarly, nothing requires that a 
realist about both the physical world and morality also be a realist 
about either numbers or aesthetic qualities like beauty or taste. 
Defining metaphysical realism generically invites as much contro-
versy as defining moral realism particularly. Both Hilary Putnam31 
and Michael Dummett32 have caused many contemporary philoso-
phers to characterize metaphysical realism as a semantic theory about 
the meaning of truth. A metaphysical realist about some class of enti-
ties, on this construction, asserts that is true, predicated upon some 
sentence, means correspondence truth. Truth for such a realist does 
not mean "warrantedly assertable within this language game" or "best 
coheres with everything else believed" or "best coheres with every-
thing an idealized knower would believe," nor does is true simply re-
dundantly allow one to reassert the sentence of which it is predicated. 
Rather, correspondence truth, when predicated upon some sentence, 
means that the sentence corresponds to some objective reality. Corre-
31. See HILARY PUTNAM, MEANING AND THE MORAL SCIENCES 2·3 (1978); HILARY PUT-
NAM, REALISM AND REASON at xvi-xviii (1983). 
32. See MICHAEL A. DUMMETT, TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS 146 (1978); Michael Dum-
mett, Realism, 52 SYNTHESE 55 (1982). 
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sponds, in turn, is unpacked in terms of some objective theory of refer-
ence that reveals how words "hook onto" the world. 
Such truth-based definitions of metaphysical realism are not wrong 
so much as they are misleading. 33 For much of the work of describing 
what is distinctive about metaphysical realism is performed by the no-
tion of objective reality to which true sentences correspond. Meta-
physical realism is less misleadingly characterized when its ontological 
commitments are put up front. I accordingly characterize metaphysi-
cal realism primarily by its distinctive ontological commitments and 
only secondarily by its truth-related, semantic, and epistemic 
commitments. 
The ontological theses of the realist are two: first, an existential 
thesis that asserts the existence of the entities in question, be they 
numbers, legal rights, mental states, or moral qualities; second, an in-
dependence thesis that asserts the mind-independence of the entities in 
question. 34 This second thesis asserts that, for example, electrons 
would exist even if we had no thoughts about them and, indeed, if we 
did not exist. 
These ontological theses of the realist fruitfully taxonomize his op-
ponents. The antirealist who denies the existential thesis about some 
class of entities I shall call a skeptic. A skeptic might be a noncogni-
tivist, believing that we lose nothing when we deny the existence of the 
entities in question. We lose nothing, according to the noncognitivist, 
because careful attention to the discourse in question will reveal that 
the language used was nonreferential, so the question whether the enti-
ties purportedly referred to in fact exist does not arise. Alternatively, 
a skeptic might be a cognitivist, maintaining that the terms used pur-
portedly refer to some existents. What makes this cognitivist a skeptic 
is his error thesis: while conceding the apparently referential use of 
certain language, he denies that the entities allegedly referred to actu-
ally exist. 35 Our common thoughts about this class of entities, in other 
words, are in error, and thus the name for this sort of skeptic. We can 
describe the difference between these two kinds of skeptics in terms of 
their attitude in reaction to the common denial that some class of enti-
ties exists: the cognitivist is disappointed by the nonexistence of enti-
33. This is the principal point of Michael Devitt's book on realism. See MICHAEL DEVITI, 
REALISM AND TRUTH 3 (1984). 
34. See id. at 12-21; see also Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A 
Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. R.Ev. 871, 874-81 (1989). In the latter article, I give a some-
what more authoritative defense of the views of both metaphysics and metaphysical realism than 
I set forth here. 
35. On these two kinds of skeptics, see Sayre-McCord, supra note 9, at 9-14. 
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ties his discourse requires; the noncognitivist is not, because we never 
were committed to the existence of such entities. 
The antirealist who admits the existential thesis but denies the in-
dependence thesis should be termed an idealist. Idealists may be fur-
ther subdivided between those who think that the existence of the 
entities in question depends on the thoughts of each individual mind, 
considered separately (subjectivists), and those who think that the 
existence of the entities in question depends on those shared mental 
states of a group of persons we call conventions (conventionalists). 
We thus end up with the following taxonomy of antirealists, based 
on which of the realist's two ontological theses the antirealist denies 
and on which ground she bases the denial: 
1. Skeptics 
a. Noncognitivists 




Because it has become controversial whether realism is or can be 
committed, across the board, to the mind-independence thesis,36 we 
need to enquire more precisely what is meant when the realist asserts 
that some class of entities is "mind-independent." This enquiry has 
the added benefit of clarifying why subjectivists and conventionalists 
are not realists. 
To begin with, the metaphysical realist is not committed to deny-
ing the causal dependence of certain aspects of the world on our 
mental states or social conventions. As Elliot Sober notes: 
A realist about physical objects might be happy to grant that mental 
states can exert causal influence on physical things. And if it should tum 
out that thinking about geometry can warp the curvature of space-time, 
this too need pose no problem for the realist. Causal or nomic depen-
dence are fine; but there is another kind of dependence which the realist 
cannot tolerate. 31 
This other type of dependence is either an analytically or metaphysi-
cally necessary dependence.38 For a realist, it cannot be part of the 
36. See id. at 6; Elliot Sober, Realism and Independence, 16 NoOs 369, 369-70 (1982). 
37. Sober, supra note 36, at 375. 
38. Whether the necessity here is analytical or metaphysical depends on one's theory of 
meaning. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50. If the meaning of a word is given by a set of 
criteria, then the necessity is analytic (or conceptual). The realists' independence thesis becomes 
the claim that the concepts of cat, mat, on, etc., do not include in their criteria any mental 
properties of individuals or groups. If the meaning of a word is given by the essential nature of 
the thing to which the word refers, then the necessity is metaphysical: the essential properties of 
catness, matness, on-ness, etc., do not include any mental properties of individuals or groups. 
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truth conditions of the sentence The cat is on the mat that any individ-
ual or group has thoughts about the cat or its placement on the mat, or 
that any individual or group has words or concepts with which to 
think about, or refer to, cats and mats, or that any individual or group 
has minds or conventions at all. A sentence is true or false indepen-
dently of such mental states of individuals or groups. 
Some qualifications are needed to make this kind of conceptual/ 
metaphysical independence plausible. To begin with, the realist is not 
committed to denying a trivial conventionalism about language. That 
in English the symbol cat is used to refer to cats is a convention that 
easily could have been otherwise; other languages use other symbols 
for this purpose to equally good effect. To assert, as the realist does, 
that electrons would exist in the absence of our beliefs and conventions 
about them, need not assert any independence of the appropriateness 
of using the word electrons from the social conventions of English. 
Whether one label rather than another is used, or whether any label 
exists in a given language, is not involved in the realist's assertion that 
the item labeled exists independently of us. 39 
Second, the realist's mind- and convention-independence thesis 
does not assert the independent existence of all things from all mental 
states of individuals and groups. There are realist construals of the 
sentences of psychology and sociology, for example, and realism about 
the entities referred to by these sentences cannot sensibly be thought to 
require the independence of these items from all minds and conven-
tions. After all, the entities to which the sentences of psychology and 
sociology refer are just the mental states of individuals and those 
shared mental states we call conventions; these entities can hardly ex-
ist independently of themselves.40 
Two distinctions are required to construe the independence thesis 
around this worry. The first is between beliefs, on the one hand, and 
all other mental states of individuals and groups, on the other. The 
independence thesis should be limited to the claim that the existence of 
any item is independent of anyone's belief in its existence. That allows 
realistic construals of sentences about an individual's intentions or 
about a societal convention without requiring independence from the 
very items being talked about. At the same time, the independence 
criterion still denies what realists want to deny: that the existence of 
something depends on whether someone (or some group) believes that 
it exists. 
39. See Hilary Putnam, The Refutation of Conventionalism, in SEMANTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 
215, 227 (Milton K. Munitz & Peter K. Unger eds., 1974). 
40. See Sober, supra note 36, at 371. 
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Even so restricted, the independence thesis is still not narrow 
enough. For psychology surely must study beliefs as well as other 
mental states, and a realist construal of sentences about beliefs cannot 
be mind-independent even when it is construed to be limited to belie/-
independence. So we need a second distinction to make sense of a 
realist-antirealist debate very much alive in psychology, that between 
realists about beliefs versus "eliminative materialists," "pragmatists," 
and other antirealists about beliefs.4t 
We must distinguish between the holders of beliefs in order to nar-
row properly the independence criterion. To give the sentence A be-
lieves p a realist construal, we need not assert that A's belief would 
exist without A's belief. Rather, we need only assert that A's belief 
would exist even if we, the observers, had no beliefs about A's belief 
that p. The belief-independence characteristic of realism only refers to 
the beliefs of observers, not to the beliefs of the subject being observed. 
The independence criterion of realism, when thus construed, renders 
the description of realism as "the view from nowhere" apt because it is 
not a view relativized to anyone's beliefs.42 Construing the indepen-
dence criterion this way allows one to salvage what is intuitively realist 
and permits one to be a realist about psychological states and social 
conventions. 
Subjectivism about some class of entities x then becomes the view 
that x's existence depends on the belief of the observer that x exists; 
conventionalism becomes the view that x's existence depends on the 
belief of the observer that x exists when that belief is shared by enough 
other members of the observer's society. Both of these forms of ideal-
ism can then be clearly distinguished from a type of realism that 
makes the existence of x depend on the beliefs of subjects who are not 
observers. For example, suppose a kind of religious realism, according 
to which entities x exist only if God thinks of them. This is a kind of 
realism, despite the mind-dependence of x's, because the "mind" on 
which they depend is not the observer's, but that of some other being. 
Having tidied up the ontological theses distinctive of realism, it 
remains to examine other theses about truth, meaning, and knowledge 
to which the realist should be committed. The realist is committed at 
a minimum to a negative thesis about truth: the realist cannot think 
that the phrase is true only means "warrantedly assertable in light of 
other beliefs, available evidence, or social conventions." Realism re-
quires, for any given assertion about the world, the possibility both 
41. For the eliminative materialist-realist debate, see sources cited supra note 21. 
42. This is Tom Nagel's description. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 
(1986). 
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that the assertion is warrantedly assertable (justifiably believed) and 
that it is false nonetheless. 
So at a minimum a realist must divorce her theory of truth from 
her theories of warranted belief or assertion. Moreover, the realist 
who interests me divorces her theory of truth even from idealized justi-
fication, not merely from the actual justification historically situated 
individuals may possess. Such a realist asserts that the phrase is true 
does not mean "what a fully rational agent with complete information 
would believe or would be warranted in asserting." My realist reads 
Putnam's "internal" or "pragmatic" realist out of the club because she 
thinks it is possible that the ideally rational human knower can get it 
wrong. 43 Put another way: it is possible that there are truths not gras-
pable by the human mind, even at the limit of its perfection. 
Secondly, a realist may also be committed to a more positive thesis 
about truth. This is the correspondence theory of truth that I men-
tioned earlier, according to which is true means "corresponds with 
some mind-independent reality." Some proposition can correspond to 
how things are even if we have no grounds to believe it (and even if an 
epistemic idealization of us would have no grounds to believe it).44 
A third thesis about truth follows from a coupling of the corre-
spondence theory with a vision of reality as gapless. This is the biva-
lence thesis, which holds that for any proposition p within some 
discourse, p is either true or false. Although some observers, such as 
Michael Dummett, would make the bivalence thesis definitional of re-
alism, 45 the thesis is not nearly so essential to realism as that. A fair 
interpretation of both Aquinas and Finnis, 46 for example, is that they 
hold the ontological and correspondence theses distinctive of realism 
about morals and yet maintain that there are some propositions of mo-
rality that are neither true nor false. Indeed, this feature of moral 
reality seems to leave room for one of the functions of human law for 
such natural law theorists, namely, to fill in where natural law is silent. 
Nonetheless, the realist as I shall define him is committed to the biva-
lence thesis as well, for it either takes peculiar views of reality - it 
43. See HILARY PUTNAM, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM 70-71 (1987); PUTNAM, MEAN-
ING AND THE MORAL SCIENCES, supra note 31, at 123-38. 
44. The realist who has already asserted the two ontological theses distinctive of realism may 
be able to get by with a redundancy reading of is true in Tarski sentences, in the sense that even a 
redundancy reading may divorce is true from any epistemic conditions. If so - and I leave the 
issue open - then the realist does not need a correspondence theory of truth. He would only 
need the negative thesis that is true does not mean "warrantedly assertable." See Hartry Field, 
Realism and Relativism, 79 J. PHIL. 553 (1982). 
45. See DUMMETI, supra note 32, at 14. 
46. See 2 AQUINAS, supra note 4, at 1044-45; FINNIS, supra note 5, at 284-89. 
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comes with gaps - or Wittgenstein-like views of meaning47 - our 
words do not refer to determinate classes but to overlapping classes 
clustered into groups - not to embrace bivalence if one accepts the 
correspondence and ontological theses. 
The realist should also be construed as committed to two semantic 
theses about meaning. The first concerns the meaning of sentences, 
about which the realist holds some form of truth conditional theory. 
The realist thus consigns to pragmatics - the study of the conditions 
of appropriate utterance - all forms of deviant utterance unconnected 
to the truth of the propositions uttered. The realist's semantics are 
quite austere: only the conditions that must obtain for a sentence to be 
true provide that sentence's meaning. 48 
The realist's adherence to the ontological and correspondence the-
ses commits him to a truth conditions theory of meaning for sentences. 
His ontological theses compel him to recognize certain entities whose 
existence does not depend on our minds or our conventions; his corre-
spondence thesis compels him to recognize a relation (correspondence) 
between sentences and the mind-independent world whenever a sen-
tence is true. He now needs a theory about what sentences mean that 
allows them to stand in this correspondence relation to a mind-in-
dependent world. The truth conditions theory of meaning provides 
such a theory, for it strips meaning of all convention of utterance and 
of all psychological conditions of graspability. Neither conventions of 
appropriate utterance nor even the limitations of the human mind af-
fect meaning on a truth conditions theory. Thus, sentences, being the 
bearers of such (mind- and convention-independent) meaning, can 
correspond to a mind- and convention-independent reality. 
The second semantic thesis the realist requires concerns the mean-
ing of words and phrases within sentences. Specifically, to allow for 
the fact that the meaning of a sentence is a function of the meaning of 
sentence components (words), the realist holding a truth conditions 
theory of meaning for sentences must also hold a theory of meaning for 
words that connects that meaning to the world and not to the conven-
tions or ideas of individuals or groups. The "causal theory" of mean-
ing for words supplies such a theory.49 The causal theory suggests 
47. For an example of a metaphysical realist about both science and morality who nonethe-
less does not accept bivalence, see Boyd, supra note 27, at 196-99, 212-14, 217-18. Boyd urges 
that some of our moral and scientific predicates have an ineliminable vagueness even though they 
refer to something like a natural kind, namely, a cluster of properties that hang together as an 
explanatory entity even though the cluster has no uniform nature other than its causal role. 
48. See MARK PLATIS, WAYS OF MEANING (1979). 
49. See generally Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 291-301, 322-38; Moore, supra note 
13, at 204-26. 
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that the meaning of a word is not given by "what's in the head" of 
some linguistic community that uses the word (and certainly not by 
what's in the head of some individual speaker within that community). 
These sources are too subjective and conventional for the realist. 
Rather, the meaning of a word is a function of the nature of the thing 
to which the word refers. The referent of the word, in other words, 
determines its meaning, and the referent exists in the world and not in 
the mind. 
Such a theory of meaning is "causal" in two senses. First, it ac-
counts for the choice of a particular symbol to represent a particular 
thing in causal terms: gold names gold because early users of English 
so baptized the metal and by so doing caused later users to maintain 
the symbol. Second, it accounts for there being any symbol represent-
ing that thing in causal terms: existence of a natural kind that is gold 
caused us to invent some symbol with which to refer to that kind. 
So long as the realist applies this theory of meaning to general 
predicates, and not just to singular terms, he commits himself to the 
existence of natural kinds. When he does so, his realism becomes the 
opponent of nominalism as much as of idealism. The realist who in-
terests me makes such an application of his causal theory of meaning 
because he desires a mind- and convention-independent theory of 
meaning for words generally, not just for definite referring expressions. 
Finally, my realist subscribes to certain epistemic theories. A real-
ist, like anyone else, needs a theory of justification, a theory of discov-
ery, and a theory of understanding. Such theories, respectively, 
concern: when a rational agent is justified in believing some proposi-
tion to be true; the best means of discovering the truth of some propo-
sition; and what conditions must be satisfied before an agent can be 
said to understand that some proposition is true. A realist may hold 
any of a wide variety of each of such theories and still assert the 
· nonepistemic theses about truth distinctive of realism. He may, for 
example, hold some foundationalist view of justification, of either the 
rationalist or empiricist sort. Or he may hold a more contemporary 
nonfoundationalist view, one according to which realism about some 
class of entities may itself be part of the best explanation for why we 
have the experiences we do. 
The only truly distinctive epistemic theses the realist must hold are 
the negative theses introduced earlier regarding truth. The conditions 
of rational belief, of discoverability, or of comprehensibility do not de-
fine is true. No test for truth, recipe for discovery, or requirement for 
understanding comprises truth itself. 
Our interest in the realist theses for a given area of discourse may 
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depend on our belief that we can or do possess knowledge of some of 
the truths for that area. Thus we might add a very weak, positive 
epistemic thesis that a realist must hold to be interested in his realism: 
some true propositions in an area of discourse must be susceptible of 
rational justification, discoverability, and graspability by the human 
mind, and some of us must actually justify, discover, and grasp some 
such true propositions. so Otherwise, realism could have little interest 
for us, even if true about some area of thought. 
C. The Moral Realist's Metaphysical Commitments 
The moral realist as I shall define him holds these ontological, 
truth-related, semantic, and epistemic theses distinctive of metaphysi-
cal realism generally, and he holds them with respect to moral quali-
ties and moral discourse. The most obvious example of a moral realist 
was the nonnaturalist realism we can construct out of the views of 
G.E. Moore himself.51 Moore held that goodness exists as a non-
natural quality, that something like beauty would possess this quality 
irrespective of human perception, and that good referred to this mind-
independent quality. We could fill out the rest of the realist theses for 
Moore, turning him into a modem metaphysical realist. 
Nonnaturalist moral realism is the kind of moral realism most peo-
ple picture when they first think about moral realism. The reason for 
this lies in the clarity of the nonnaturalist's ontological commitments 
to the existence of moral qualities. This clarity is due to two extreme 
features of nonnaturalist realism. First, there is the separate realm 
hypothesis: moral qualities exist in their own separate ("nonnatural-
ist") realm of being. This hypothesis makes the nonnaturalist's onto-
logical commitment to distinct moral qualities very plain, whereas the 
naturalist realist is always open to the charge that his only ontological 
commitments are to those nonmoral, natural qualities on which moral 
qualities (for him) in some sense depend. Secondly, there is what 
might be called the "uniformity of reference" hypothesis: not only are 
50. See Brink, Extemalist Moral Realism, supra note 27, at 24; William Tolhurst, Superve-
nience, Extemalism and Moral Knowledge, 24 S.J. PHIL 43, 44 (Supp. 1986). 
51. That G.E. Moore's ontological commitments were in fact not so clearly dualist is re-
vealed in his reflections later in life about his nonnaturalism: 
I should never have thought of suggesting that goodness was "non-natural" unless I sup-
posed it was "derivative" in the sense that, whenever a thing is good ... its goodness ... 
"depends on the presence of certain non-ethical characteristics" possessed by the thing in 
question: I have always supposed that it did so "depend," in the sense that, if a thing is 
good ..• then that it is so follows from the fact that it possesses certain natural intrinsic 
properties ...• 
G.E. Moore, A Reply to My Critics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF G.E. MOORE 588 (Paul A. Schilpp 
ed., 1942). Depending on how one reads Moore's "derivative,'' "depend," and "follow,'' this 
suggestion could easily be interpreted as one of a modern supervenience-naturalist. 
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relatively specific terms like cruel, courageous, and distributively just 
taken to refer to moral qualities, but even the terms of most general 
commendation or condemnation, such as good, bad, right, wrong, just, 
and unjust, are taken to refer to such moral qualities. The nonnatural-
ist takes the entire range of what is commonly regarded as moral dis-
course to be referential, whereas a more cautious naturalist may be 
more selective about which terms are used referentially in evaluative 
speech acts. 
Nonnaturalist moral realism is not ultimately my interest in this 
article, since the version of moral realism that I shall defend in Part 
III is a naturalist realism. Nonnaturalism presents a convenient con-
trast, however, for the clarity of its ontological commitments reveals 
some lack of clarity in the ontological commitments of naturalist 
moral realism. Can my more cautious naturalist be a moral realist at 
all? Consider the first problem, the lack of a dramatically separate 
(i.e., "nonnatural") ontological commitment by the naturalist. As is 
well known, the naturalist in ethics is committed to the existence of 
some intimate relation between nonmoral qualities (such as an action's 
being an intentional infliction of pain on another) and moral qualities 
(such as the action's being wrong). The relation to which Moore took 
the naturalist to be committed was an analytic one: wrong means, in 
part, "intentional infliction of pain in another." A more modem natu-
ralist eschews analytic relations linking wrong and words naming non-
moral properties but might think there is a scientifically established 
type-identity between, say, wrongful action and an act of intentionally 
inflicting pain on another. In such a case, the identity is analytically 
contingent because established by moral and scientific theory, not ana-
lytically necessary because established by the very meaning of the 
words. An even more modem naturalist might eschew broad type-
identities as well, holding only that moral properties supervene on non-
moral properties in the same way that mental states may plausibly be 
thought to supervene on physical states (i.e., even though not type-
identical, there can be no change in one without a change in the 
other). 
In any case, however the intimate relation between moral proper-
ties and nonmoral properties is construed, one might charge the natu-
ralist with commitments only to nonmoral properties. Yet a moment's 
reflection will show that this is not so, even for analytic and type-
identity naturalists. To believe that water is type-identical to H20, or 
even that water means "H20," is not to believe that there is no such 
thing as water. We discover more about water when we discover 
2442 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2424 
(either by science or by analytic entailments) that it possesses a certain 
chemical structure; we do not discover that water does not exist. 
This is even more clearly true of the supervenience naturalist. 
Such a naturalism - the kind of moral realism I have defended - is 
very much like functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Such a natu-
ralist is only a reductionist about moral qualities in a weak sense: 
although there are no analytic entailments between words naming 
nonmoral qualities and words naming moral qualities, and although 
there are no type-identities between moral qualities and nonmoral 
qualities, there are identities between a moral quality as it is present on 
some occasion and some nonmoral qualities. The wrongness of an ac-
tion, for example, may on some occasion(s) simply consist in its being 
a piece of deliberate cruelty. Such specific identities (sometimes mis-
takenly called token-identities) are consistent with supervenience natu-
ralism, much as such specific identities (e.g., between pain at t for 
Jones, and C-fibre stimulation in the central cortex of Jones' brain at t) 
are consistent with functionalism in the philosophy of mind. 
In both cases the essence of the moral quality (or mental state) is 
not given by such specific identities to nonmoral qualities (or brain 
states). Thus, in neither case could one believe one has eliminated 
one's ontological commitments - to moral qualities or mental states 
- by adherence to naturalism or functionalism. 
The second problem for picturing the naturalist in ethics as a 
moral realist stems from a double vagueness about metaphysical real-
ism itself that we have hitherto ignored. There is a vagueness in speci-
fying the borders of a "domain of discourse" or a "domain of entities" 
over which a realist makes his ontological commitments. What ex-
actly counts as a mathematical entity, a mental state, or a moral qual-
ity? Numbers, beliefs, and justice all seem central in their respective 
domains, but what about classes, physical pains, and cruelty? Does a 
metaphysical realist about mathematics, minds, or morals have to 
commit to the existence of these latter items in order to be a mathe-
matical, mental, or moral realist? 
Even if we settle this "borders" question, there is a second vague-
ness in the "how much" question: must one commit to all the entities 
seemingly posited to exist within some domain of discourse in order to 
be a realist over that domain? Or can one be a more cautious moral 
realist, for example, committing to the existence of justice, coura-
geousness, and culpability, but not to goodness or to rightness? 
These are not very interesting questions, because any answer to 
them would be a matter of stipulation. Such questions demonstrate, 
however, the abbreviation inherent in such labels as scientific realist, 
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realist about minds, or moral realist. The labels scientific realist, 
mental realist, and moral realist are only handy tools with which 
vaguely to indicate the directions of one's ontological commitments. 
There is nothing in the label moral realist that requires Moore's kind 
of blanket commitment to even the most abstract of moral qualities. 
A moral realist as I comprehend the phrase might well think that good 
names no quality in the world, natural or nonnatural, and that a stan-
dard commendatory use is all that justifies having such a word in our 
language. The ontological commitments distinctive of moral realism 
may well lie in more particular qualities, such as courageousness, cul-
pability, and the like.52 
With these caveats, the naturalist moral realism that I defend is a 
species of metaphysical realism over the domain of moral discourse. 
Some believe that moral realism, when defined as an instance of meta-
physical realism, presents an impossible position. 53 The argument is 
that the independence thesis of the metaphysical realist is thought to 
be unsatisfiable by moral entities and qualities. The worry is that mo-
rality is person-centered so that it makes little sense to think that it 
could exist independent of our thoughts and conventions. 
Yet this is a nonworry for ethics, as it was a similar nonworry for 
psychology and sociology. One can be a realist in psychology, sociol-
ogy, and ethics without the absurdity of suggesting that mental states, 
social conventions, and moral rights exist independently of persons 
and their minds. For all three sorts of realisms, the independence de-
finitive of realism is not independence from all mental states of all 
persons. Realism requires only independence of the beliefs of the ob-
server(s). The realist's independence thesis does not exclude the beliefs 
of subjects from the possible truth conditions of psychological, socio-
logical, or moral statements. 
For example, my own natural law view54 regards legal rights and 
duties as depending in part on the existence of certain institutional 
conventions. Such conventions are part of what is observed. Yet legal 
rights, legal duties, and so forth, are convention-independent for the 
natural lawyer or "legal realist" (i.e., metaphysical realist about law) 
52. For suggestions along these lines, see PLA TI'S, supra note 48, at 246; Moore, supra note 8, 
at 1145-46; Mark Platts, Moral Reality and the End of Desire, in REFERENCE, TRUTH, AND 
REALITY 69 (Mark Platts ed., 1980). 
53. See Sayre-McCord, supra note 9, at 6, 14-22. 
54. See generally Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 107 (1989) [hereinafter Moore, Constitution]; Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2; Michael 
S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 183 (Lau-
rence Goldstein ed., 1987) [hereinafter Moore, Precedent]; Michael S. Moore, Three Concepts of 
Rules, 14 HARV. J.L. & Pua. POLY. 771 (1991). 
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in the sense that the conventions of the observer(s) are not relevant to 
the existence of legal rights. Legal rights could exist in some society 
even if the observer raising the question had no conventions constitut-
ing a concept of law and, indeed, even if he did not exist. 
Analogously, the moral realist as I define him is not committed to, 
for example, moral rights' existing independently of the person whose 
rights they are, nor to such rights' existing generally in the absence of 
people. Although a realist about possible worlds could make sense of 
even these positions, the moral realist as I have defined him needs 
nothing so extreme. The independence criterion only requires that 
moral qualities exist independently of the observers' minds or conven-
tions. The existence of moral rights may depend on there being per-
sons to possess them, and, for certain of those rights (for example, of 
property and contract), on there being certain conventions in place 
among those possessing such rights. This is not inconsistent with 
moral realism because such moral rights exist independently of my (or 
any other observer's) thoughts about them and independently of there 
being a convention in my (or any other observer's) society. 
This interpretation of the independence criterion results in the 
classification of both moral subjectivism and moral conventionalism as 
antirealist positions. The subjectivist believes that a moral quality or 
entity exists only if he judges that it does. ss While a subjectivist grants 
this moral sovereignty to each person when she is an observer, the 
subjectivist does not think that some designated individual exists (say 
the person whose moral right or duty it is) who can make something 
right by believing that it is right. The latter would be a kind of realist 
position, albeit a crazy one, that asserted that moral entities exist as a 
kind of mental state of some one designated person. The subjectivist 
as I would understand him does not view morality this way. Rather, 
moral entities exist, but only relative to the judgment of each observer, 
himself included, that they exist. 
Thus, subjectivism is an antirealist position on a metaphysically 
realist definition of moral realism. Conventionalism is also most fruit-
fully so defined. The conventionalist about morals believes that a 
moral entity or quality exists relative to the judgment of some group of 
persons that it exists. So construed, conventionalism is an antirealist 
position. Were a conventionalist to hold that a moral entity existed as 
a kind of shared mental state of some designated group then it too 
would be a (crazy) kind of realism. But conventionalism (or relativ-
SS. Compare the different conceptions of subjectivism and conventionalism in Sayre-Mc· 
Cord, supra note 9, at 14-22 and in BRINK, supra note 27, at 21. 
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ism) as I understand it does not grant some one group's conventions 
the power to determine what is right for everyone, itself included. 
Rather, each group of observers' conventions will constitute what is 
right, recognizing that for other groups (as observers of the same be-
havior of the same subjects) other judgments will be correct. This is 
relativism, and it is antirealist in its convention-dependent existence 
conditions for morality. 
I earlier offered four criteria for a good definition of moral realism. 
The second criterion was that moral realism should be defined so that 
it is not parochial vis-a-vis metaphysical realism in other fields. The 
above definition, instantiating metaphysical realism as it does, plainly 
satisfies this criterion. Whether the definition satisfies the first crite-
rion - preserving a debate we have reason to care about - must 
await the discussion in the next section. Preliminarily, however, we 
can already see one intuitively desirable feature of this definition: this 
concept of moral realism places subjectivists and conventionalists in 
the same (antirealist) camp as the noncognitivists and other skeptics.56 
The third criterion of a successful definition of moral realism is 
that it display in a natural way the main metaethical currents in moral 
philosophy. My definition of moral realism amply satisfies this crite-
rion as well, even if it runs a bit roughshod over various self-pro-
claimed "moral realists" in contemporary ethical philosophy. The 
various naturalists against whom G.E. Moore took himself to be argu-
ing are realists by this definition, as is Moore the nonnaturalist him-
self. 57 The emotivism of A.J. Ayer58 and C.L. Stevenson,59 together 
with the prescriptivism of R.M. Hare, 60 fit nicely into the noncogni-
tivist branch of skepticism, while the more contemporary "error-the-
ory" of John Mackie61 is an instance of the other sort of moral 
skepticism. 
Within contemporary ethical philosophy, many people who call 
themselves moral realists cannot be card-carrying members of the club 
but are more fruitfully taxonomized in other niches by my definition. 
Simon Blackburn's "quasi-realism"62 is one of the first to go, since 
acceptance of his "projectivist" metaethic is clearly a skeptical 
56. Compare Sayre-McCord, supra note 9, whose differing definition of moral realism makes 
subjectivists and conventionalists kinds of realists. 
57. See MOORE, supra note 10. 
58. See AYER, supra note 24. 
59. See STEVENSON, supra note 25. 
60. See sources cited supra note 26. 
61. See JOHN L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 35, 48-49 (1977). 
62. See BLACKBURN, supra note 29. 
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noncognitivism, despite his label. Jeremy Waldron's very similar 
"quasi-skepticism" is also noncognitivist, with a somewhat more accu-
rate label. 63 John Rawls' "constructivism," as he himself has recently 
construed it, is obviously conventionalist and thus antirealist. 64 Ron-
ald Dworkin's "interpretivism" about morals is also ultimately con-
ventionalist in its metaethics, despite its occasional realist 
appearances. 65 Gilbert Harman's conventionalist naturalism is also 
plainly antirealist, as he himself would freely admit. 66 Sabina 
Lovibond's Wittgensteinian construal of moral realism is also ulti-
mately conventionalist,67 as is John McDowell's Wittgensteinian intui-
tionism. 68 Bernard Williams' "objectivist" opponent in ethics69 also 
fails to qualify as a metaphysical realist; to the extent such "objectiv-
ists" mean nothing more in saying that values are "objective" than 
that a convergence of belief and desire in persons can be expected 
given their nature, they eschew the ontological commitments distinc-
tive of realism. Even Hilary Putnam's "internal" or "pragmatic" real-
ism 70 fails to duplicate the consequences of a true metaphysical 
realism, given the internal realist's denial that there could be moral 
facts beyond the ken of an idealized human knower. 
My fourth criterion for a successful definition of moral realism was 
that moral realism should not be conceived so that adoption of that 
metaethical position would foreclose otherwise plausible theories in 
substantive ethics. This criterion gives rise to particular concern with 
respect to theories, like ethical hedonism and preference-utilitarian-
ism, that make goodness dependent on certain sorts of mental states. 
Yet the independence thesis of realism, as I have construed it, does not 
preclude a realist from holding these substantive theories. An ethical 
hedonist holds that human pleasure is good, whereas a preference-util-
itarian holds that satisfaction of human desire is good. Despite the 
dependence of goodness on various mental states of pleasure or desire, 
a moral realist could easily hold such substantive theories, for neither 
makes the goodness of a state depend on any observer's belief in the 
goodness of such a state. 
63. See Waldron, supra note 3. 
64. See Rawls, Justice, supra note 30; Rawls, Kantian Constructivism, supra note 30. 
65. See supra note 2. 
66. See HARMAN, supra note 30. 
67. See LOVIBOND, supra note 30. 
68. See McDowell, supra note 30. 
69. See WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 152-55. 
70. See sources cited supra note 43. 
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II. WHY THE TRUTH OF MORAL REALISM MATTERS 
A. What Is the No-Difference Criticism? 
2447 
William James once complained that the reaction to pragmatism 
within professional philosophy went through three stages: first, it was 
denounced as being so obviously false as to be "absurd"; second, even 
while it was admitted to be true, it was patronized as a trivial theory 
because the question that it purported to answer was not interesting or 
important; and only eventually and thirdly, James noted, did anyone 
concede that pragmatism was both true and important.71 
Much of the criticism of moral realism is at the first of James' three 
stages of criticism. This is the issue I shall examine in the last part of 
this article, which is whether we have good reason to believe that 
moral realism is true. A significant amount of the criticism of moral 
realism has remained fixated at the second level, finding the theses 
definitive of moral realism to be without interest because they make no 
difference in our lives or our institutions. I wish to examine this "it 
makes no difference so who cares?" criticism in this part of the article. 
This question relates to the issue of the truth of moral realism in 
the following way. As we shall see in Part Ill, to argue for the mind-
independent existence of moral qualities is to argue that such qualities' 
existence better explains other facts that we believe to be true than 
competing skeptical or idealist explanations. Put more simply, moral 
qualities have real world effects, and those effects provide our evidence 
for the existence of those moral qualities. 
To this extent, the question whether moral realism is true raises 
the identical issue posed by the question whether moral realism makes 
any difference, namely, do moral qualities have any causal effects? Yet 
those asserting the "it makes no difference" criticism of moral realism 
have a narrower set of differences in mind than the range of effects 
that the moral realist takes to demonstrate the existence of moral qual-
ities. Rather, this form of criticism urges that of all the alleged effects 
moral qualities produce, none would make any difference to how we 
lead our own lives or how we design social institutions. This is a dis-
tinct criticism, one that I propose to examine in this section. 
Even thus clarified, the "no-difference" criticism is still unfortu-
nately fraught with ambiguity. One ambiguity is the extent to which 
we are supposed to hold the actual beliefs, attitudes, and inferences of 
historical persons constant versus the extent to which we are to ideal-
ize such beliefs, attitudes, and inferences. Consider a series of exam-
71. See WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINK-
ING 198 (1949). 
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ples. As a matter of psychological fact, some people's beliefs in a 
skeptical metaethics are causally connected to their beliefs in: (1) the 
truth of utilitarianism,72 (2) the desirability of democracy;73 (3) the 
desirability of liberal tolerance of others' conceptions of the good;74 (4) 
the legal positivist view that laws have value-free pedigrees;75 and (5) 
the legal formalist view that judges should not resort to values in adju-
dicating cases.76 I am willing to grant that the inferences in each of 
these cases are either outright fallacious or at least easily avoidable by 
the substitution of premises other than the premise of metaethical 
skepticism. After all, how can it follow from the premise that nothing 
is objectively right, fair, or good, that either the summing of equally 
arbitrary preferences, or the allowance of each to have an equal polit-
ical voice, or the toleration of others' views, is right, fair, or good? 
Likewise, one can make more plausible arguments for the desirability 
of legal positivist theories of law and legal formalist theories of adjudi-
cation than those that depend upon a skeptical metaethics. 77 
The ambiguity of the no-difference criticism lies in how much we 
should idealize the beliefs, attitudes, and inferences of the people to 
whom the metaethical issues allegedly make no difference. If we do 
not idealize people's beliefs at all, then the no-difference criticism is 
obviously false: as a matter of historical and psychological fact, many 
people become utilitarians, democrats, liberals, legal positivists, and 
legal formalists because they believe that moral realism is false. 
On the other hand, if we fully idealize the beliefs, attitudes, and 
inference patterns of the people to whom the truth or falsity of moral 
realism allegedly makes no difference, then the no-difference thesis 
loses all of its supposed practical bite. After all, no one holds only true 
beliefs, feels only appropriate emotions, and makes only valid infer-
ences; so, if we fully idealize persons, the no-difference criticism only 
says that the truth of moral realism makes no difference to some 
72. I explore this topic in Moore, supra note 8, at 1067-71. 
73. For an example of moral skepticism motivating a belief in democracy, see Robert H. 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 41 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); see also 
Michael S. Moore, Robert Bork: A Contradiction in Terms, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1987, Part II, 
at 5. 
74. See Michael S. Moore, Sandelian Antiliberalism, 77 CAL. L. REV. 539, 544 (1989). 
75. Both Hans Kelsen and Oliver Wendell Holmes, for example, were motivated to their 
legal positivism by their metaethical skepticism. See Moore, supra note 8, at 1066-67 & nn. 10-
13. 
76. Both "plain-meaning" and "original-intention" approaches to value-free legal adjudica-
tion are often motivated by metaethical skepticism. Robert Bork is an example of the latter, see 
supra note 73, and former Chief Justice Warren Burger is an example of the former. See Moore, 
supra note 8, at 1065 n.3. 
77. Both H.L.A. Hart and Jeremy Waldron have noted this possibility. See Hart, supra note 
1, at 624-29; Waldron, supra note 3, at 159-62. 
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Peircean knower. Not only would this not be much of a criticism of 
moral realism, but it might not any longer be distinct from the criti-
cism that moral realism is false because moral qualities have no real 
world effects. 78 
As another example of this ambiguity, consider the emotional de-
jection many people experience if they come to believe the truth of 
moral skepticism. If we do not idealize such emotional reactions, the 
no-difference criticism is obviously false: as a matter of documentable 
psychological fact, some persons do have this reaction.79 The older 
noncognitivists like Ayer and Hare were willing to idealize the emo-
tional reactions people should have when they learn the truth of 
noncognitivist skepticism: once people see that they never really were 
committed to the mind-independent existence of moral qualities (be-
cause the surface grammar of their evaluative speech acts misled 
them), then people should not feel dispirited. 80 Existential anguish, 
they might say, is a useless passion that should not be felt. 
This noncognitivist refusal to give us permission to weep does not 
reveal the extent to which the noncognitivists were willing to idealize 
our emotions. May we feel disappointment only if we initially had a 
reasonable basis for expecting something to be true? Or should we 
idealize further: Is disappointment itself always a sort of crying over 
spilt milk? We can neither change the past, square the circle, nor 
make the world always conform to our wishes, and feelings of disap-
pointment cannot change these facts. Therefore, should we always 
eliminate feelings of disappointment, like feelings of guilt, from our 
emotional life? 
Again, if the noncognitivist continues very far down this path, he is 
in danger of asserting the no-difference criticism only about Kant's 
noumenal beings, that is, about a purely rational being with no emo-
tions -which is none of us. Yet once one starts to idealize emotional 
reactions, where is the no-difference critic to stop? 
If the no-difference criticism is going to be advanced with the prac-
78. The collapse of the "no-difference" criticism into the "moral-realism-is-false" criticism 
would certainly occur if the antirealist were to idealize all of our beliefs, including our metaethi-
cal beliefs. For then moral realism could have no interest for us (idealized knowers), because it 
would be so obviously false. For just such a collapse, see Joel J. Kupperman, Moral Realism and 
Metaphysical Anti-Realism, 18 METAPHIL. 95, 102 (1987), where Kupperman finds moral real-
ism (as I have defined it) of no practical interest because "hard-headed people" should regard it 
as "preposterous." 
79. Arthur Leff, whose moral skepticism dispirited him sometimes to the point of debilita-
tion, provided a well-known example in the legal academy. See, e.g., Arthur A. Leff, Unspeak-
able Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229. 
80. For discussion of this noncognitivist tack, see JAMES R. FLYNN, HUMANISM AND 
IDEALOGY 1-52 (1973). 
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tical bite advertised, it must severely curtail the degree to which it 
idealizes the beliefs, attitudes, and inference patterns that people actu-
ally have. The most sensible response would be to idealize only to the 
extent that people could realistically be expected to change their be-
liefs, attitudes, or inferences upon realizing their fallaciousness, irra-
tionality, or inappropriateness. This is a vague line, but at least it does 
not threaten complete collapse of the no-difference criticism. Even so 
construed, the no-difference criticism depends on the completion of a 
successful educational program by those with the inferior feelings or 
inferences for the criticism to be true in the real world. 
A second ambiguity in the no-difference criticism inheres in what 
it is that the moral realist believes and in what it is that his opponents 
believe. There are different species of moral realism, as we have seen, 
and there are several different antirealisms as well. What practical dif-
ference it makes whether moral realism is true depends on what oppo-
sition one has in mind. For example, the moral realism that takes 
moral qualities to give each rational agent subjective reasons for ac-
tion81 will have a different implication for our practical reasonings 
than will the moral realism that assumes moral qualities do not neces-
sarily motivate actors to pursue them. 82 Likewise, if the alternative to 
moral realism is some form of noncognitivism, the falsity of moral 
realism will have quite different implications than it will if the alterna-
tive is some form of conventionalism. 
The moral realism that interests me is the moral realism that I 
defined in the previous part of this article and that I have defended as 
true. 83 I shall accordingly examine the no-difference criticism with 
that supervenience-naturalist, nonfoundationalist, externalist, bivalent, 
antinominalist as well as antiidealist moral realism in mind. I shall 
further assume that the most plausible and widely held antirealisms 
are noncognitivism and conventionalism. I shall accordingly examine 
the no-difference criticism primarily with respect to these two antireal-
isms, noting the differences between them when it matters; I shall sec-
ondarily treat subjectivism and error-theory skepticism when it seems 
appropriate. 
There is a version of the no-difference criticism that rejects all of 
these metaethical positions, antirealist as well as realist. I refer to 
81. Mark Platts is one such moral realist. See generally PLATI'S, supra note 48. 
82. My own version of moral realism holds that neither the existence of a moral quality nor 
an actor's belief in the existence of a moral quality need subjectively motivate that actor to act in 
accordance with that moral quality. See Moore, supra note 8, at 1122-23. David Brink has come 
to call this position "externalist moral realism." BRINK, supra note 27, at 37-50. 
83. See Moore, supra note 8; see also infra Part III. 
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those who deny sense to the metaethical debate between the realist and 
his various antirealist opponents - and a debate that lacks sense also 
lacks significance to the practical concerns of rational persons. Rich-
ard Rorty, for example, has said that Allan Bloom and I are the only 
two people in America silly enough to think that the denial of moral 
realism matters to anything we care about. 84 Stanley Fish has likewise 
deployed his familiar no-theory theory to urge that my moral meta-
physics can have no import for our practical affairs. 85 Perhaps most 
familiarly, Ronald Dworkin has throughout his career pooh-poohed 
all moral metaphysics as amounting to no more than redundant win-
dow-dressing, rhetorical devices for repetition and emphasis of our 
substantive moral claims but otherwise without impact on those 
claims.86 
Rorty, Fish, and Dworkin all have rested their version of the no-
difference criticism on their "interpretivist" or "pragmatist" rejection 
of all metaphysics, moral metaphysics included. What I sought to 
show in an earlier article87 is how all of them are closet idealists; they 
are not outside a debate between realists and antirealists that involves 
no sense, but very much within that debate. Moreover, within the 
metaphysical debate they are not on the side of the angels, for their 
idealist arguments seek to establish the falsity of moral realism on 
their way to concluding that the truth or falsity of moral realism 
makes no difference. 88 I thus put aside this "interpretivist" or "prag-
84. See Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and, the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1811, 1813 (1990). 
85. See Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1781-85 
(1987). 
86. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 2, at 81-82; RONALD M. DWORKIN, A MATIER 
OF PRINCIPLE 172 (1985). 
87. Moore, supra note 34. 
88. This is particularly clear with Ronald Dworkin's version of interpretivist pragmatism. 
As we have seen, see supra note 86, Dworkin believes that a moral realist's metaphysical state-
ments are only redundant ways of giving emphasis to substantive moral claims. If Dworkin were 
right about this, so that such redundancy were all that the moral realist's metaphysics came to, 
then of course metaphysics could make no difference in how we think or act. Yet why should we 
think that the moral realist's metaphysical assumptions all reduce to redundancy devices, useful 
only for emphasis? On their face, the ontological, truth-related, and semantic theses definitional 
of moral realism do not seem to be first order, substantive moral judgments, like the judgment 
that slavery is unjust. On their face, such theses seem to be about such first order, substantive 
moral judgments - to mention, not to use, moral concepts like justice. 
Dworkin's only stated reason for reconstruing the moral realist's metaethical claims into first 
order ethical claims is his skepticism about metaethical claims unless they are so reconstrued. 
Dworkin urges, for example, that moral realists' correspondence theory of truth is 
a mysterious and highly blurred idea of "real" truth, which [moral realists] express only in 
metaphors, and which I doubt can be expressed in any other way. They can say that a 
proposition is "really" true only if it accurately describes facts that are "out there," or part 
of "the fabric of the universe," or "locked into" an "independent reality" or something of 
this sort. 
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matist" version of the no-difference criticism, since it is not separate 
from the criticism that moral realism is false. 
I shall examine the no-difference criticism as a genuinely separate 
criticism of moral realism. I shall do so first with regard to the differ-
ence the truth or falsity of moral realism makes to each of us. I shall 
then examine what difference the truth or falsity of moral realism, or 
one of its four opposed antirealisms, makes to the design of legal 
institutions. 
B. The Debate's Importance to Personal Moral Experience 
As persons who make moral judgments, we should care about the 
debate about moral realism for several reasons. First, the outcome of 
that debate determines the "tone" given to our moral experience. If 
moral qualities do not "exist" but are merely "projections" of our 
emotional needs, or if the existence of moral qualities depends on per-
sonal or group judgment, then we do not discover anything when we 
reason morally. The psychological cost to each of us of so viewing our 
morals is the nausea the existentialists were so at pains to depict, a 
nausea out of which we must wearyingly pull ourselves in order to 
create value for a world that is otherwise without it. 
Second, the outcome of the moral realism debate affects the ques-
tion of whether one can be mistaken in his moral judgments. The 
moral realist defined above can easily account for our sense that we are 
fallible moral reasoners; antirealists of all stripes have a much more 
difficult time, since on their views there is nothing we (individually, or 
at least collectively, for conventionalists) could be wrong about. 
Third, moral realism carries implications for the desirability of 
(Marshall Cohen ed., 1984). Elsewhere Dworkin urges that moral realists create "incomprehen-
sible metaphors" whenever they press their ontological theses "that the injustice of slavery is part 
of the furniture of the universe that it is really 'out there' in some way." DWORKIN, A MATTER 
OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 86, at 172. For literally, Dworkin thinks, it is "absurd" for the realist 
to claim "that moral values are 'out there' ••.. " DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 2, at 83. 
Dworkin also reconstrues the moral realist's semantic theses, because he thinks that, taken liter-
ally, they are absurd. According to Dworkin, "moral ..• judgments have the sense and force 
they do just because they figure in a collective human enterprise," and this is the best construnl of 
such judgments, because "such judgments cannot have a 'real' sense and a 'real' truth value 
which transcend that enterprise, and somehow take hold of the 'real' world." DWORKIN, A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 86, at 174. 
These quotations should make very clear that Dworkin has no "no difference" argument to 
advance against moral realism that stands at all independent of his arguments against the truth of 
moral realism. Only by flatly denying the moral realist's ontological, truth-related, and semantic 
theses can Dworkin justify reconstruing them into the trivial redundancy readings that he pre-
fers. And only by trivializing the metaphysical claims of the moral realist into redundant first 
order moral claims can Dworkin deny significance to the debate about the truth of moral realism. 
I thus put aside Dworkin's no-difference argument, for, like Rorty and Fish, he advances no 
argument that does not presuppose the falsity of the very theses whose truth or falsity was not 
supposed to matter. 
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maintaining consistency in one's moral beliefs. On the realist view, 
consistency is desirable in moral beliefs for the same reason that it is 
desirable in scientific beliefs - namely, because two inconsistent be-
liefs cannot both be true. Why an antirealist would seek to maintain 
consistency in his moral beliefs is more of a puzzle. The noncogni-
tivist might not like the "feel" of opposed emotional reactions - to 
love and hate the same object, for example, may be hard on one - but 
this dislike of emotional conflict could as easily become an acquired 
taste. The same is true for the subjectivist: why should she desire 
consistency in her moral beliefs when on her view those beliefs are not 
about anything but the thoughts of the person who believes them? 
The conventionalist should have even less concern for keeping consis-
tent the conventions of his society that for him constitute morality; 
after all, given the shifting pattern of moral beliefs between persons in 
any society, why should the most popular beliefs not conflict? 
Fourth, the moral realism debate impacts upon our experience of 
difficult moral dilemmas. Antirealists view moral dilemmas as con-
flicts of emotional responses (noncognitivism), conflicts of belief (sub-
jectivism), or conflicts of social convention (conventionalism). On any 
of these views, there will be many conflicts that are not only practi-
cally insoluble (we cannot find the answer) but also theoretically insol-
uble (there is no answer). To the extent one can be confident that one 
faces a theoretically insoluble dilemma, the antirealist thus ought to 
quit attempting to reason his way to a solution. Since on his view of 
morality there is nothing to be said for one solution over another, the 
antirealist ought to be morally indifferent to what he chooses, and thus 
his decision-procedure can be as arbitrary as he pleases. The moral 
realist (as I have defined him to adhere to the bivalence thesis) can 
never justify such indifference, since moral reality never "runs out" or 
otherwise fails to dictate a theoretical solution to the hardest moral 
dilemmas. 
Fifth, another practical reason to care whether moral realism is 
true involves our ability to disagree with a majority or even the whole 
of a society about some moral concern. This experience of solitary 
personal conviction is a fundamental aspect of our experience as moral 
decisionmakers. Yet if realism is false, and if conventionalism is true, 
this experience must be an illusion. After all, if moral judgments only 
make sense relative to some set of social conventions, to purport to 
make such judgments independently of such conventions is senseless. 
These five consequences of one's metaethical stance matter to each 
of us personally because they touch on important facets of our moral 
experience. Yet the critics of moral realism who insist that metaethics 
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makes no difference either wish to deny that metaethical beliefs do (or 
should) have these consequences or to convince us that such conse-
quences are insignificant. 
1. The Difference to the Phenomenology of Value 
Consider first the attitudinal consequence of metaethical beliefs. 
Jeremy Waldron seeks to deny that whether we are moral realists or 
antirealists matters to our attitudes about our own moral judgments. 89 
Since Waldron is responding to my earlier depiction of this attitudinal 
difference, that depiction is worth repeating here: 
The personal difference it makes to each of us is in the attitude we 
adopt regarding our own values. A skeptic will regard his own values 
with embarrassment, for they hold out a promise on which he thinks he 
cannot deliver. His value judgments, that is, purport to be descriptive in 
form. For example, he may say such things as, "killing is wrong," a 
statement that seems capable of being true or false. Moreover, others 
expect that when he says these things, he has reasons with which he can 
demonstrate the truth of such propositions, reasons that others will find 
persuasive. Yet his skepticism tells him that none of this is true. He is 
merely playing a peculiar form of language game when he makes his 
value judgments. Accordingly, when he wishes to engage in honest de-
bate and not merely to issue propaganda, he will qualify his value judg-
ments with "I think," or "of course, it's only my opinion." He will try 
to cancel the promissory note as he issues it, because he believes he can-
not otherwise pay it. 
The psychological consequence of this for the skeptic is to devalue 
his own values. Even those things that he most cherishes he will regard 
on a par with his taste, e.g., for watermelon: a purely subjective, arbi-
trary preferences. He will think that the difference between preferences 
regarding watermelons and preferences regarding concentration camps 
will only be one of relative strength. Ultimately, he must conclude, the 
only thing to be said about either watermelons or concentration camps is 
that some people like them and some people don't. 
The effect of regarding one's own value system in this manner is dev-
astating. This skeptical attitude does not mean one should cease making 
value judgments, such as those condemning concentration camps; in the 
skeptic's world, if there is nothing ultimately to be said in favor of such a 
value judgment, there is equally nothing to be said against it. So one 
may as well retain the value judgments one has made. Yet dumb inertia 
is not the sort of reason one wants as a justification of one's most cher-
ished ideals. If nihilism is not the consequence of skepticism, neither is 
the kind of passionate commitment to one's ideals possible only if one 
believes that they are right. 90 
Waldron has a number of things to say in response to this attitudi-
89. See Waldron, supra note 3, at 167-71, 175-76. 
90. Moore, supra note 8, at 1063-64 (footnote omitted). 
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nal effect of metaethical belief. One is a kind of tu quoque response to 
moral realists: 
[S]ince they [moral realists] are quite unable to "demonstrate the truth" 
of their judgments or show how they correspond to moral reality, they 
should be the ones in all honesty to qualify them with "of course, it's 
only my opinion" and so on. For though they insist that there is some 
fact of the matter, they offer us nothing which would help distinguish a 
mere arbitrary opinion from a well-grounded belief.91 
Yet this attempt to equate the attitudes of the honest realist to that of 
the honest skeptic presupposes that realists have no method of demon-
strating their moral truths to others or even to themselves. Since this 
premise is crucial to Waldron's assertion of the no-difference thesis in 
questions of institutional design, I shall defer dealing with it until the 
next section. 
Waldron's main response is to deny that belief in moral skepticism 
- at least of the noncognitivist variety - should have the attitudinal 
effect that I describe. Like Rorty, who accuses me of an unwarranted 
fear that his "pragmatist" rejection of realism "is dangerous to the 
moral health of our society,"92 W-aldron thinks that I and other moral 
realists "panic" needlessly about the attitudinal effects of adopting a 
noncognitivist metaethic.93 Waldron weaves together several strands 
in his therapeutic effort to relieve moral realists of their "panic . . . 
about the consequence of adopting an emotivist approach."94 Two of 
these strands I have no quarrel with. Waldron grudgingly concedes 
that no one, least of all a moral realist, should wish (or even find con-
sistent with his realism) to adopt an attitude of infallibility toward 
one's own moral judgments. Not being dispirited cannot mean, for the 
realist, "being unwilling to budge - in debate and argument - from 
the moral claims one makes, sticking with one's judgments, refusing to 
countenance the possibility of changing one's view, and so on."95 
Moral realism, at least when coupled with a nonfoundationalist episte-
mology, can hardly require such a stubbornly obtuse posture. 
Waldron is also correct to point out that simple ejaculations like 
"boo!" and "hurrah!" cannot accurately portray the emotional reac-
tions to whose expression the emotivist-noncognitivist reduces moral 
judgments. One of the better things to happen in the moral psychol-
91. Waldron, supra note 3, at 176. 
92. Rorty, supra note 84, at 1813. 
93. See Waldron, supra note 3, at 167-71. 
94. Id. at 167. 
95. Id. Waldron curiously asserts that this is "what the realists have in mind when they talk 
about being serious about one's moral judgments" before recognizing that "nobody is particu-
larly interested in this form of moral steadfastness." Id. at 167-68. 
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ogy of the past twenty years has been the rediscovery of the subtlety, 
variety, and depth of our emotional experiences.96 Remembering this 
should keep moral realists from caricaturing emotivists' metaethical 
views, rendering emotivism somewhat less obviously dispiriting.97 
Yet neither of these points defuses the dispiriting attitudinal effect 
of adopting either skepticism or idealism as one's metaethical view. 
That effect remains because the antirealists' metaethical belief remains 
even after a more respectful portrayal of our emotions: our values are 
only the expression of our emotions (emotivist noncognitivism), or 
they are the nonexistent referents of our therefore false moral beliefs 
(error-theory skepticism), or they are only our beliefs (subjectivism), 
or they are only those beliefs that we share with others in our society 
(conventionalism). Change those emotions, beliefs, or conventions, 
and what we now think to be true would instead be false. In that 
sense, our value judgments are arbitrary, a clearly dispiriting 
revelation. 
Waldron attempts to blunt this worry, at least with respect to 
noncognitivist skepticism, by reconstruing the counterfactual to which 
the emotivist is committed: 
(1) I only make the moral judgments I do ... because of how I feel. 
If I felt differently I would make different moral judgments.98 
Waldron rightly does not feel at all dispirited by embracing (1). In-
deed, even a moral realist could embrace (1), because (1) says only 
that our moral judgments are influenced by our emotions. As I have 
argued elsewhere in some detail,99 our emotions are our main heuristic 
guide to arriving at true moral beliefs, and there is indeed nothing 
dispiriting about that insight. 
The problem is that (1) does not at all capture the dispiriting as-
pect of emotivism. A different counterfactual better captures that 
aspect: 
(2) Ifl felt differently, the judgments I now make that are now true 
would be false, and different judgments that are now false would be true. 
96. I discuss some of this literature in MICHAEL s. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RE-
THINKING THE RELATIONSHIP (1984), and in Michaels. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribu-
tion, in REsPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 
1987). 
97. On the other hand, this development in moral psychology should not make the emotivist 
too comfortable. After all, much of the recent work on the emotions seeks to reveal a rationality 
of the emotions (in terms of their intentionality, appropriateness, consistency, and the like). It is 
but a short step from there to the view that I defend, that the emotions are the harbingers of 
insight into moral truths. See Moore, supra note 8, at 1135-36; Moore, supra note 96, at 198-
208. 
98. Waldron, supra note 3, at 170. 
99. See Moore, supra note 96, at 198-208. 
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As Simon Blackburn exemplifies (2), "[i]f we had different attitudes 
[about kicking dogs], it would not be wrong to kick dogs." 100 I do not 
see how one can accept (2) and not devalue his own value judgments. 
Waldron and Blackbum try to finesse (2) by distinguishing causal 
from justificatory senses of (2). On the justificatory reading of (2) the 
emotivist would be "committed to saying that her own feelings justify 
the judgments that she makes."101 Waldron and Blackbum rightly 
point out that the emotivist need not think that his aversion to kicking 
dogs is the feature of kicking dogs that makes that act wrong; the 
emotivist like anyone else can think that the pain imposed is what 
makes it wrong to kick dogs. 102 Yet seeing this does nothing to blunt 
the dispiriting import of (2) in a nonjustificatory (what I would call a 
metaphysical) sense: my moral judgments have no truth value in-
dependent of my emotional reactions. 
As is well known, Blackbum tries to avoid a nonjustificatory sense 
to (2). His advice to his fellow noncognitivists is that "[w]e should not 
say or think that were our sentiments to alter or disappear, moral facts 
would do so as well. This would be endorsing the defective 
counterfactuals, i.e. endorsing the wrong kinds of sensibility, and it 
will be part of good moralizing not to do that."103 As Blackburn else-
where puts it: 
Suppose someone said "if we had different sentiments, it would be right 
to kick dogs" . . . . Apparently, he endorses a certain sensibility: one 
which lets information about what people feel dictate its attitude to kick-
ing dogs. But nice people do not endorse such a sensibility.104 
The sticky point for Blackburn here is why the utterer of 
counterfactuals like (2) must "endorse a certain sensibility." Why 
must (2) be meant in its justificatory sense (as a first-order moral judg-
ment) and not in a metaphysical sense (as a second-order metaethical 
judgment)? Blackbum seems to regard as a kind of category mistake 
the conjunction of statements asserting judgments of what is morally 
right or wrong with statements grounding such judgments. But pre-
cisely such a conjoint statement is what makes Blackburn's "projectiv-
ism" a kind of noncognitivism. If Blackbum cannot get outside the 
web· of his own substantive moral judgments to assert counterfactuals 
like (2) in their metaphysical sense, then he is no noncognitivist or 
100. Simon Blackburn, Rule-Following and Moral Realism, in WrrrGENSTEIN: To FOLLOW 
A RULE, supra note 30, at 179. Blackburn concludes, however, that this is an "absurd moral 
view." Id. 
101. Waldron, supra note 3, at 171. 
102. Blackburn, supra note 100, at 179; Waldron, supra note 3, at 171. 
103. BLACKBURN, supra note 29, at 219 n.21. 
104. Id. at 218. 
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"quasi-realist" - he is a moral realist. Yet the whole idea of "projec-
tivism," even for a Blackburnian "quasi-realist," is that we can get 
outside to see that the truth or falsity of judgments like "kicking dogs 
is wrong" depends on how we feel about it. That is noncognitivism, 
and it is (and should be) dispiriting to one's moral commitments. 
Blackbum has recently recognized this accusation (of willful blind-
ness to dispiriting interpretations of counterfactuals like (2)) but sticks 
to his guns: 
The crucial question ... is whether the projectivist wilfully refuses to 
hear the external reading [of (2)] .... There would be an external reading 
if realism were true. For in that case there would be a fact ... whose rise 
and fall and dependency on others could be charted. But antirealism 
acknowledges no such state of affairs, and no such issue of depen-
dency .... Talk of dependency is moral talk or nothing. tos 
In other words, since no moral judgments are really true or false on 
the noncognitivist account, nor are they really judgments about inde-
pendently existing states of affairs, there is literally no thing that can 
depend on our feelings. Thus the continued denial of any "external" 
or metaphysical reading of (2). 
It escapes me how this last maneuver prevents the dispiriting atti-
tudinal effects of noncognitivism. We were supposing that whether 
there are mind-independent moral facts is a live issue between the real-
ist and the noncognitivist. The criticism we are here considering is 
that this issue makes no attitudinal difference to us. What this last 
maneuver by Blackbum reveals (yet again) is how much the no-differ-
ence criticism depends on the metaethical issue that is supposed to 
make no difference: assuming that moral realism is obviously false, 
Blackbum purrs, then its falsity cannot dispirit us because we cannot 
make metaphysical sense of counterfactuals like (2). Yet to those of us 
who may be more open-minded on the metaethical issue, counterfactu-
als like (2) make perfectly good metaphysical sense, and they would be 
disquieting if they were true in that sense. 
Even supposing that I am completely wrong about this last point, 
it is clear that noncognitivism still bas a dispiriting effect. That is, 
suppose that the Blackbum/Waldron noncognitivist can finesse hav-
ing to assert counterfactuals like (2): they succeed in their denial of 
any sense to (2) except the first-order, justificatory sense, and in that 
sense they deny (2) on the grounds that (2) is immoral. Even so, their 
noncognitivism commits them to exclusive explanations of our moral 
judgments in terms of our sentiments and what cause them. They are 
105. Simon Blackbum, How To Be an Ethical Antirea/ist, 12 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 361, 
367-68 (1988). 
August 1992] Moral Reality Revisited 2459 
committed in such causal explanations to more than counterfactuals 
like (1). They say that the only explanation of our believing that kick-
ing dogs is wrong is that we feel negatively toward causing animals 
pain in general and toward kicking dogs in particular; they say that 
the only explanation for our negative feelings in this regard is the man-
ner of our upbringing, and so forth. But however either of these expla-
nations is fleshed out, the noncognitivist can admit no causal role for 
the wrongness of dog-kicking in our feelings or beliefs, because no 
such quality of wrongness exists to play a causal role. 
Unlike Waldron, Blackbum admits that the omission of moral 
qualities in the explanation of our moral feelings and beliefs "is apt to 
leave a residual unease": 
People feel uncomfortable with the idea that this is the true explanation 
of our propensity to find and to respect values, obligations, duties, and 
rights. . . . This unease is located in a tension between the subjective 
source which projectivism gives to morality, and the objective "feel" that 
a properly working morality has. It is this objective feel or phenomenol-
ogy which people find threatened by projectivism .... 106 
Having made this concession, however, Blackbum seeks to discount it 
by reforming this part of people's sensibilities. People should not feel 
this way, Blackbum urges, any more than they should try to smother 
their sense of humor were they to accept a projectivist denial of funni-
ness as a quality causing laughter. A projectivist thus "may be per-
fectly rational to accept the projectivist account of morality, and to 
maintain his resolve just as forcefully as before."107 This normative 
judgment about how people should feel leads Blackbum to deny that it 
is his projectivist metaethics that dispirits people: 
[I]t is not the explanation of the practice per se which has the sceptical 
consequence. It is only the effect of the explanation on sensibilities 
which have been brought up to respect only particular kinds of things. 
So when people fear that projectivism carries with it a loss of status to · 
morality, their fear ought to be groundless, and will only appear if a 
defective sensibility leads them to respect the wrong things. 108 
Blackbum concludes that "[o]ne should not adjust one's metaphysics 
to pander to such defects." 109 
Blackbum, like the older noncognitivists, is obviously willing to 
engage in a quite extensive idealization of the feelings and beliefs peo-
ple should have in order to salvage the no-difference thesis. Many 
106. Simon Blackburn, E"ors and the Phenomenology of Value, in MORALITY AND OBJEC-
TIVITY 1, 6 (fed Honderich ed., 1985). 
107. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
108. Id. at 10. 
109. Id. at 11. 
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people's sensibilities would not meet with Blackburn's approval, and 
for those quite real people, whether moral realism is true makes a lot 
of difference in how they feel about their own moral convictions. 
2. The Differences to the Fallibility and the Consistency 
of One's Moral Beliefs 
The difference our metaethical beliefs can make to how we feel 
about our moral convictions has importance beyond the dispiriting of 
our projects. I consider here two further effects. The first involves the 
degree to which we will be motivated to see ourselves as fallible in our 
own moral judgments. No matter how certain one might be about a 
particular moral belief, a moral realist will know that she could be 
wrong in such a belief; she will accordingly maintain the same sort of 
epistemic modesty about her moral beliefs that she does about her sci-
entific beliefs. 
The most obvious response to this alleged consequence of 
metaethics is that made by Simon BlaC?kbum. 110 He notes that we 
often have what we might call second-order emotions - that is, emo-
tions whose objects are other (i.e.,first-order) emotions. We may loath 
our own feelings of pity, hate our hatreds, be pleased at our generous 
impulses, and so forth. Something like moral fallibility can be con-
structed, Blackbum contends, by seeing that our own moral attitudes 
of approval and disapproval are themselves always the potential ob-
jects of second-order attitudes of approval or disapproval. So we 
might well be "attitudinally modest" - that is, willing to withdraw 
some first-order disapproval - just as the realist is epistemically mod-
est about her beliefs. 
I have two doubts about this response, paralleling my two doubts 
about the Blackbum/Waldron response to the question of what attitu-
dinal difference metaethics makes to the phenomenology of value. 
First, as before, I doubt whether Blackburn's "quasi-realist" project 
can keep his metaethical skepticism from giving rise to counterfactuals 
of the sort we earlier examined. That is, if the noncognitivist must 
acknowledge the truth of statements like If I felt differently about 
kicking dogs, then kicking dogs would not be wrong, 111 then what room 
110. See BLACKBURN, supra note 29, at 194; Simon Blackbum, Moral Realism, in MORAL· 
ITY AND MORAL REASONING: FIVE EssAYS IN ETHICS 101, 122 (John Casey ed., 1971); Black-
bum, supra note 100, at 174-76. 
111. Nick Sturgeon, while finding Blackburn's finessing of the counterfactuals to be as im-
plausible as do I, nonetheless does not think that Blackbum should "think of values as dependent 
on us." Nicholas Sturgeon, What Difference Does It Make Whether Moral Realism Is True?, 24 
S.J. PHIL. 115, 141 n.58 (Supp. 1986). Sturgeon would rather have the noncognitivist acknowl-
edge that values are not dependent on anything since values do not exist. See also Blackbum, 
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remains for fallibility in one's deepest attitudes? Even though I could 
change any of my first-order attitudes, and even though I could regard 
the change as an improvement, ultimately, as Blackburn concedes, 
"these [second-order] evaluations of dispositions are themselves 'sub-
jective': they are ours."112 I could of course recognize that even these 
deepest, second-order attitudes might change and "improve";113 yet 
mustn't I acknowledge that until these deepest attitudes do change, 
they cannot be wrong? 
The other problem with this response of Blackburn's is its lack of 
motivation. Granted, one might adopt such a deferential stance to-
ward one's potentially changing, second-order attitudes, but why 
should one? Since there is nothing to choose between one's present 
second-order attitudes and one's (potentially different) future second-
order attitudes, why go to the trouble of change? Why not adopt Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes' attitude toward his own moral attitudes: they 
are only his, having no objective validity, but since they were his, he 
would hang on to them.114 
A moral realist has an answer here: moral beliefs are not simply 
attitudes, but are beliefs that might be false (in the sense of failing to 
correspond to how the world actually is); accordingly, epistemic mod-
esty is essential. The moral antirealist, by contrast, 
must confine all comparisons of his actual views to other views, held by 
himself, other persons, or himself somehow improved. This means that, 
while the realist admits that, under certain circumstances, it would be 
quite unreasonable for him to hold on to his beliefs (if they did tum out 
to be false), the moral irrealist could always, without being unreasonable, 
stick to his present beliefs, declaring that he does not care about the 
views of others or himself improved.11s 
This last problem reveals that it is the noncognitivist who may well 
be "unwilling to budge ... from the moral claims one makes, sticking 
with one's judgments, refusing to countenance the possibility of chang-
ing one's view" - precisely the moral stubbornness Waldron in an 
uncautious moment attributes to the realist. 116 Such inertia and resist-
ance to change makes the noncognitivist a quite different moral rea-
supra note 105. This reading also forces the noncognitivist to think that, ultimately, he is infalli-
ble, at least in the sense that his ''judgments" cannot be wrong. 
112. Blackburn, supra note 100, at 176. 
113. Cf Blackburn, Moral Realism, supra note 110, at 122: "I can envisage a mistake in my 
standards .••• I can envisage, at least as a bare possibility, that some argument, or someone, or 
some event, should come along and show me that I am mistaken ...• " 
114. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918). 
115. Torbjorn Tiinnsjo, The Moral Significance of Moral Realism, 26 S.J. PHIL. 247, 258 
(1988). 
116. See Waldron, supra note 3, at 167. 
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saner than the moral realist. It may even make the noncognitivist as 
wooden in his reasoning as the moral conventionalist, who purports 
always to be doing sociology in his moral reasonings.117 
Metaethics also impacts on the degree to which a noncognitivist 
will be motivated to render his moral reasoning consistent. This con-
sequence of metaethics for personal moral experience is not based on 
some caricature of 1930's style emotivism, where the emotivist is cast 
as the fellow who thinks that the nonsensical, nonstatements of moral 
discourse can have no truth values and hence, no logical relations to 
one another, and thus denies the human capacity to reason about mo-
rality. Noncognitivists have long conceded that statements in moral 
discourse can and do have at least disquotational truth values and logi-
cal relations with one another. The consequence pinpointed is motiva-
tional: the realist is motivated to keep his moral beliefs consistent on 
the usual, truth-seeking ground that at most one of a contradictory 
pair of propositions can be true. The antirealist lacks any similar mo-
tivation for logical hygiene, for his moral beliefs are not about any-
thing. If he wishes to keep free of contradiction in the realm of 
morality, his motives must be found in his own aesthetic self-image, 
not in some principle of rationality. us 
Again, skeptics could develop a second-order attitude disapproving 
of inconsistent first-order attitudes. Thus, skeptics could morally con-
demn inconsistency in moral beliefs to match the realist's epistemic 
condemnation. But the consequence of metaethics isolated previously 
will remain: the realist has a natural motivation, truth seeking, to con-
demn inconsistency in his moral beliefs, whereas the skeptic can create 
such a condemnatory attitude in himself but has no reason to do so. 
3. The Differences to Our Experiences of Moral Dilemmas and 
Moral Disagreements 
An examination of the last two differences moral realism can make 
to our personal moral experience requires a change in focus. The pre-
vious two differences contrasted realism and noncognitivist skepticism 
(particularly the most sophisticated kind of noncognitivism repre-
sented by Simon Blackbum and Jeremy Waldron). Now I wish to 
contrast moral realism with moral conventionalism. Two additional 
117. I ignore other responses by the noncognitivist to the charge that his metaethic would 
make people infallible in their moral reasonings. For a discussion of the older noncognitivist 
response - that mistakes are possible about/acts but not about the evaluations people base on 
those facts - see Sturgeon, supra note I I I, at 127-29. 
118. See Tiinnsjo, supra note 115, at 255. 
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differences beyond those just explored should make the debate be-
tween the moral realist and the moral conventionalist matter to us. 
The first is the way in which we regard and deal with difficult 
moral dilemmas. Moral dilemmas differ from inconsistency in our 
moral beliefs. Moral beliefs are inconsistent either when we accept 
both a proposition and its negation (a contradiction) or when we ac-
cept two or more propositions that conjointly imply a contradictory 
pair of propositions.119 
Moral dilemmas are not cases posing choices between a pair of 
inconsistent moral beliefs. The latter are cases of simple uncertainty. 
Moral dilemmas, by contrast, are cases where two or more noncon-
tradictory moral beliefs cannot be simultaneously satisfied. E.M. For-
ster provides a well-known example: I in general believe that I should 
not betray either my friends or my country, but sometimes I can only 
not betray the one by betraying the other.120 
There are actually three sorts of moral dilemmas. The first is the 
most typical: we believe two or more moral principles to be true, yet 
we face a situation where both cannot be satisfied. A second sort of 
moral dilemma involves only one moral principle, but one that points 
in two different directions. For example, I believe that promises 
should be kept, yet I promise Mary to join her for dinner on Tuesday 
without remembering that I earlier promised John I would sup with 
him. A third sort of moral dilemma arises either because we hold no 
controlling moral belief that bears on the issue, or because the moral 
belief we have is too vague to be of any help. Some philosophers, for 
example, report that horrific choices are "beyond" their moral princi-
ples, which deal only with less awful altematives. 121 
As with consistency, the issue here is not whether the existence of 
experienced moral dilemmas argues in favor or against the truth of 
moral realism.122 On that issue, I have aligned myself with Kant ("a 
119. These situations, respectively, describe explicit and implicit inconsistency. See CHRIS-
TOPHER CHERNIAK, MINIMAL RATIONALITY 16 (1986). 
120. See E.M. FORSrER, What I Believe, in Two CHEERS FOR DEMOCRACY 67, 68 (1951). 
121. The most famous are Elizabeth Anscombe, Tom Nagel, and Bernard Williams. For 
citations and discussion, see Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISRAEL L. 
REV. 280, 337-38 (1989). 
122. For this debate, see Philippa Foot, Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma, 80 J. PHIL. 379 
(1983); Samuel Guttenplan, Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma, 80 PROC. A~ISTOTELIAN 
SocY. 61 (1980); Ruth B. Marcus, Moral Dilemmas and Consistency, 77 J. PHIL. 121 (1980); 
Bernard A.O. Williams, Consistency and Realism, 40 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOCY. 1 (Supp. Vol. 
1966); Bernard A.O. Williams, Ethical Consistency, 39 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SocY. 103 (Supp. 
Vol. 1965). Again, one cannot always easily separate the issue of whether moral realism is true 
from the issue of whether it matters whether moral realism is true. Bernard Williams, for exam-
ple, urges that at least one feature of our experience with moral dilemmas is inconsistent with 
moral realism (namely, the emotional "tail" that is left even when we are sure we have chosen 
2464 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2424 
conflict of duties and obligations is inconceivable"), 123 so that our ex-
perience of apparent moral dilemmas is not inconsistent with moral 
realism. 124 The issue here is whether the truth or falsity of moral real-
ism makes any difference in how we experience moral dilemmas. 
If one adopts my version of moral realism for discussion - a ver-
sion that includes bivalence for moral discourse - then a major differ-
ence with moral conventionalism should be apparent. My moral 
realist regards all experienced moral dilemmas as only apparent moral 
dilemmas; there is always an answer to such dilemmas, hard as it may 
be to find. In the case of dilemmas of the first kind, such answers may 
exist in terms of a lexical priority between our principles, as in For-
ster's apparent lexical ordering of friendship over patriotism. Or such 
answers may exist in terms of exceptions to be found in our principles 
so that, when carefully formulated, the demands that each makes do 
not conflict. In the case of dilemmas of the third kind, such answers 
may be found in our more particular intuitions about the nature of the 
moral quality referred to by the vague predicate in the principle that 
we believe to govern the situation. 
Prima facie, the conventionalist can buy none of this about there 
being right answers to the hardest moral dilemmas. Morality for the 
conventionalist consists of a set of moral conventions, and conven-
tions, unlike reality, inevitably run out or conflict in the face of novel 
situations.125 J.L. Austin's aphorism, "fact is richer than diction," 126 
nicely captures the latter point. After all, conventions develop only in 
response to situations that have either recurred with sufficient fre-
quency in the past, or are foreseeable enough to occur in the future, 
that they can either accrete gradually or be laid down by some conven-
tionmaker. Unless one believes that the universe of possible moral di-
lemmas is so impoverished in variety that they either have all occurred 
or are all foreseeable, conventions must be insufficient to resolve all 
moral dilemmas. 
Suppose a novel about a fictional character is identical to a work of 
the best of two compelling options). Id. at 107-08. One can equally well use this claim ofincon· 
sistency to argue that moral realism is false or to argue that whether moral realism is true or false 
makes no real difference to us. 
123. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF Jusr1cE 25 (John Ladd trans., 
1%~ . 
124. See Michael S. Moore, Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 
845-48 (1989); Moore, supra note 8, at 1116 n.130, 1149-52. 
125. I argue at some length for the impossibility of maintaining a right answer thesis while 
being a conventionalist in Moore, Metaphysics, supra note 2. To like effect, see also M.B.E. 
Smith, Rights, Right Answers, and the Constructive Model of Morality, 5 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 
409, 411-15 (1980). 
126. J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 51 PROC. ARISfOTELIAN SocY. 1, 21 (1956). 
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biography about an actual, historical person. Both texts will either be 
silent or have contradictory implications about a large number of mat-
ters, such as what type blood the character may have. The novel 
surely holds no answer to these questions, because its text is silent on 
them and has no real-world referents. By contrast, there is an answer 
to these questions in biography because there is a real historical person 
that the biography is about. The same is prima facie true of the con-
ventionalist and realist approaches to morality. Although the "texts" 
. of social convention and of the moral realist's known moral truths 
could be identical, only the latter has recourse to a reality whose detail 
outstrips the "texts." 
I am familiar with only two ways for the conventionalist to avoid 
this implication. One is to believe that moral conventions contain cer-
tain special conventions we might call default rules. Everything that is 
not clearly prohibited, is permitted is an oft-mentioned candidate for 
such a moral default rule.127 Conventional morality with such a de-
fault rule becomes very much like Anglo-American criminal law, with 
its principle of legality backed by its substantive presumptions in favor 
of liberty and its procedural concern that a would-be criminal have the 
opportunity to know that the action he contemplates is prohibited. 
Two problems keep this response from being very plausible. One is 
the doubt whether the moral conventions of our (or any other) society 
contain such a default rule. Do we regard our moral norms like a 
would-be criminal who is only concerned with how close to the line (of 
the sufficiently clearly prohibited) he can come without stepping over? 
Or do we not internalize such norms at least to the extent of asking 
whether the act we contemplate does or does not violate them, without 
benefit of an artificial presumption that, if our act would not clearly 
violate the moral norm, nothing about the act is troubling? 
The second problem is that, even if our moral conventions in-
cluded such default rules, there still would be no right answer in some 
range of cases. The default rule itself is vague in its attempt to remedy 
vagueness: When is a prohibition unclear enough in its application to 
a particular action that the default rule is triggered? Just as there will 
be penumbra! instances where a moral convention either may or may 
not apply, so there will be penumbra! instances where the penumbra 
begins and the clearly prohibited ends.12s 
127. See BLACKBURN, supra note 29, at 202, 209. For the legal analogies, see DWORKIN, A 
MATIER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 86, at 129-30 & n.3. 
128. Joseph Raz makes this point in response to Dworkin's use of default rules to argue for 
Dworkin's formerly held right answer thesis. See JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 73-74 
(1979). 
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The other conventionalist rejoinder is to imagine that new conven-
tions can always be added to deal with cases otherwise indeterminate 
under existing conventions. The conventionalist taking this line might 
think that a new convention comes into being the moment a consensus 
develops about a novel situation, yielding a determinate answer. Yet 
this response ignores the obvious: at the time of the novel act, there 
was no consensus, no convention, and thus no answer to the question 
whether the action was right. After-arising consensus is of no help to 
an actor in the throes of a moral dilemma since he is struggling with 
the question of what is right to do now. 
I conclude that on the conventionalist metaethical view we ought 
to experience moral dilemmas differently than we do. We ought not to 
be so anguished about our inability to be confident of our decisions in 
such cases. After all, if we have diligently searched for the relevant 
conventions, and they yield no answer, then there is no answer and we 
are free to do as we please. Since whatever we decide is equally good 
and equally bad - because equally beyond conventional morality -
we might as well flip coins with a light heart. 
Some conventionalists have urged that the lack of a determinate 
answer where conventions conflict or run out does not create this dif-
ference in how we experience moral dilemmas. A conventionalist, the 
argument goes, can urge the right answer thesis (that is, bivalence) as 
a regulative ideal even if conventions are not sufficiently complete to 
make the thesis true. As Simon Blackburn puts this argument: 
[L]egal and moral reasoning are sufficiently open-ended for it never to be 
a matter of certainty that we are at a node in the tree - that a proper 
decision could go either way . . . . So it seldom becomes rational to stop 
arguing as though there were just one right answer .... 129 
Yet surely this answer gains its only plausibility through an illicit 
fuzziness in the conventionalist's ideas about how conventions' impli-
cations for a particular case are indeterminate. Suppose conventions 
"run out" because their predicates are vague, so that some applica-
tions are "penumbra!." We may divide such penumbra! applications 
between those that are clearly penumbra! and those that are only 
penumbrally penumbra!. For any given predicate (e.g., unjust), there 
will thus be some cases where it is clear that the application is penum-
bra!.· These clearly penumbra! cases are where we know that the con-
ventional meaning of the predicate at hand holds no answer. In such 
129. BLACKBURN, supra note 29, at 207.08; see also Blackburn, supra note 100, at 177. That 
Blackburn should treat his own projectivism as if it had to make this defense of a right-answer 
thesis is puzzling. I should have thought that if Blackburn's quasirealist project succeeded - in 
the sense that the quasirealist never admits that his judgments depend on his attitudes - then he 
could assert the right-answer thesis as a thesis of which he would morally approve. 
August 1992] Moral Reality Revisited 2467 
cases where we have this knowledge, how can the conventionalist jus-
tify his regulative ideal for moral dilemmas? 
Alternatively, suppose moral conventions are indeterminate in the 
sense that two or more of them clearly apply to a given situation but 
conflict in their recommended actions. Since conventions constitute 
morality for the conventionalist, how can the conventionalist doubt 
whether morality answers this dilemma? But if there can be no doubt 
so that the conventionalist can be certain that morality does not an-
swer such dilemmas, how then can he justify the attitude toward hard 
moral dilemmas that makes them so agonizing for most of us, the atti-
tude that what one chooses matters so much precisely because there is 
an answer about which one could be wrong? I conclude that the dif-
ference here between realism and conventionalism is important, color-
ing as it does one of the crucial aspects of how we experience moral 
decisionmaking. 
The last difference that adoption of a conventionalist rather than a 
realist metaethics would make lies in our ability to make what I shall 
call revolutionary moral judgments. Conventionalism, to put it 
bluntly, prima facie requires us to toady up to the views of others in 
moral matters. By contrast, the moral realist can make sense of radi-
cal disagreement with all of his fellows, for the truth of what he be-
lieves is not governed by its conformity to social convention. Indeed, 
on this difference the realist and the noncognitivist share common 
cause against the conventionalist. As Simon Blackbum recognizes, 
"one of the essential possibilities for a moral thinker is ... the thought 
that our own culture and way of life leads us to corrupted judgment." 
Yet on the conventionalist metaethic, "there is no room for a concept 
of moral truth which allows that a man who dissents from the herd 
may yet be right." 130 
No conventionalist I know flatly accepts this implication of her 
metaethics. Yet the attempts to dodge this bullet are transparent de-
vices to gamer the practical benefit of realism without having to pay 
its ontological price. Heidi Hurd documents six such dodges of the 
metaethical conventionalist.131 Such a conventionalist can claim: (1) 
that she has insight into some future consensus that trumps an unfa-
vorable present consensus; (2) that she speaks from a past consensus 
that should for some reason be authoritative over a present consensus 
that she dislikes; (3) that only the consensus of our society's "ethical 
130. Blackburn, supra note 100, at 171. For another noncognitivist rejection of convention-
alism, see RICHARD M. HARE, EssAYS ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD 122 (1971) ("Common 
moral opinions have in themselves no probative force whatever in moral philosophy."). 
131. See Hurd, supra note 2, at 1457-59. 
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leaders" counts; ( 4) that consensus is constitutive for some sorts of 
values but not for others; (5) that consensus derives from what people 
would believe if fully informed, not from what they actually believe; or 
(6) that the consensus constitutive of morality is a deep one that must 
be constructed out of the more shallow judgments that people actually 
share. 
All of these should be seen clearly for what they are: an unwilling-
ness to stomach the obvious practical implication of a conventionalist 
metaethic. Consider the sixth by way of illustration. According to 
Rawlsian and Dworkinian constructivism, we are to seek that plateau 
of agreement that makes disagreement possible as we build theories of 
justice or of other moral qualities. In Dworkin's terms, we must inter-
pret a socially created concept of justice in our reasonings about jus-
tice, which interpretations then become our contestable conceptions of 
justice. As Dworkin has most recently put it, ''justice is an institution 
that we interpret" because "it has a history; we each join that history 
when we learn to take the interpretive attitude toward the demands, 
justifications, and excuses we find other people making in the name of 
justice."132 
Now ask such a constructivist this question: what if the history of 
our society is such that its concept of justice marks slavery as just? Is 
there any interpretation of that concept that can make sense of the 
revolutionary judgment that slavery is unjust? If the constructivist-
conventionalist answers "no," then he reveals the tendency of his deep 
conventionalism to toady. If he answers "yes" - as Dworkin does, 
for example - he must abandon his own constructivist conventional-
ism for a different metaphysics. 
C. The Debate's Importance to Questions of Institutional Design 
I now turn to the question whether the truth of moral realism mat-
ters to questions of institutional design. As before, I prefer to separate 
the debates between the moral realist and two sorts of antirealists, 
noncognitivists and conventionalists, because these two debates in-
volve separate practical differences. Since I have been fortunate to at-
tract a sophisticated critic from each of these camps recently -
Jeremy Waldron, a Humean/Blackbumian noncognitivist, 133 and 
Brian Bix, a Wittgensteinian conventionalist134 - I will use their ar-
132. DWORKIN, LA W'S EMPIRE, supra note 2, at 73. 
133. See Waldron, supra note 3. 
134. See Brian Bix, Michael Moore's Realist Approach to Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 
(1992). Another of my recent Wittgensteinian critics is ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION 
AND LEGAL THEORY 85·102, 124-54 (1992). 
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guments in favor of the no-difference thesis as my points of departure. 
In examining the no-difference thesis with respect to their 
metaethical positions, it is helpful to focus the discussion by concen-
trating on particular questions of institutional design. I shall accord-
ingly focus on the theory of adjudication, leaving aside the difference 
moral realism may make to other institutional questions within a gen-
eral theory of law or of legislation.135 Within the theory of adjudica-
tion, we should focus the discussion further. Consider two well-worn 
topics within American constitutional jurisprudence: whether judicial 
review can be justified in an American-style democracy, and how 
American courts should interpret the Constitution. 
1. The Debate's Importance to the Justifiability of Judicial Review 
The perennial issue about judicial review is why judges who are not 
very democratically selected - and particularly U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices - should have the power to declare the output of more repre-
sentative state legislatures and the U.S. Congress null and void be-
cause such output is contrary to the judge's interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
My thesis has long been that the justification of the power of judi-
cial review is more difficult for a moral antirealist than it is for a moral 
realist. 136 My argument has been based on the uncontroversial prem-
ise that constitutional interpretation, whatever else it includes, in-
cludes moral reasoning by judges, in part because the U.S. 
Constitution seems to invite such reasoning by its value-laden phrases 
(due process, equal protection of the laws, free exercise of religion, cruel 
and unusual punishment, and so forth). In light of this fusion of con-
stitutional and moral reasoning, my thesis has been that what status 
one accords moral reasoning matters. If one is an antirealist about 
morality, like the late Art Leff, one will allow for only two possible 
statuses for moral reasoning: (1) the moral conventionalists' sort, 
135. Nick Sturgeon sees one of the implications for the theory of legislation: 
Consider the view that legislators ought to frame laws using only language for the appli-
cation of which there are objective standards. Noncognitivists who accept this principle 
seem to have to view it as condemning all laws framed in moral terms: for example, laws 
providing for the dismissal of officials guilty of moral turpitude . . . . Realists who accept the 
same principle, by contrast, will think that if there is anything wrong with these laws, it 
cannot be due merely to their use of moral language. 
Sturgeon, supra note 111, at 125-26 (footnote omitted). More generally, a moral realist can urge 
a perfectionist theory of legislation and distinguish it from Lord Devlin's (and others) mores-
based theories of legislation. See Moore, supra note 74. 
136. See Michael S. Moore, The Constitution as Hard Law, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 51, 67 
(1989); Michael S. Moore, The Exportability of the Madisonian Compromise, in THE INFLUENCE 
OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ON PACIFIC NATIONS 99 (F.E. Cameron ed., 1988); Moore, Inter-
pretation, supra note 2, at 395; Moore, supra note 8, at 1154-56. 
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where all moral reasoning is no more than teasing out the implications 
of established social convention; and (2) the moral skeptic's sort, 
where all moral reasoning is no more than the assertion of one's indi-
vidual will. 137 Each of these metaethical possibilities should increase 
our discomfort with the idea of judges' having the power of judicial 
review: "[T]he first commits her [the judge] to making conventional 
moral judgments with which she may well disagree, and the second 
commits her to imposing her own personal values in a situation of 
great personal importance to the people before her." 138 Leff believed 
that, with only these sources of moral reasoning, constitutional judges 
"really have no choice but to be arbitrary." 139 
A moral realist will glimpse a third possibility: judges interpreting 
the Constitution are not merely asserting their own will, nor are they 
merely reflecting a societal consensus; rather, when judges decide what 
process is due a citizen, or what equality requires, or when a punish-
ment is cruel, they judge a moral fact capable of being true or false. 
When interpreting the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Civil 
War Amendments, they make judgments about the moral rights per-
sons possess, rights that those Constitutional provisions did not create 
but only named. 140 The realist concedes that any particular judgments 
made about what rights persons possess can be in error, but such judg-
ments are not necessarily arbitrary as they are for a Leff-like skeptic. 
A common criticism of this argument for the legal and political 
relevance of moral metaphysics has proceeded as follows. Moral real-
ism is a metaphysical position. It is not an epistemological theory. 
My own nonfoundationalist epistemology differs not at all from the 
nonfoundationalist epistemology of those with quite different moral 
metaphysics. Therefore, a moral realist judge could not present any 
arguments or evidence to resolve any case that are not equally avail-
able to an antirealist judge, even if the metaphysical claims for the 
arguments differ. Disagreements among judges inter se, and among 
judges, legislators, and citizens, will be as persistent and as irresolvable 
no matter whether we or the disputants think we are disagreeing about 
conventions, our own subjective attitudes, or the true nature of moral-
ity, or even if we are not really disagreeing except in the sense that we 
are expressing opposed attitudes or prescriptions in our moral use of 
language. For political issues like those surrounding judicial review, 
this argument concludes, the real payoffs lie in the ability of judges 
137. See Leff, supra note 79, at 1245-49. 
138. Moore, supra note 8, at 1155. 
139. Leif, supra note 79, at 1249. 
140. Moore, Constitution, supra note 54. 
August 1992] Moral Reality Revisited 2471 
and those who select judges to discover, justify, and convince others of 
the errors of their views (epistemology), not in convincing them that 
there is something about which they could be in error (metaphysics). 
The critics who voice this criticism include Rogers Smith, who 
correctly observes that my moral realist metaphysics is not joined to a 
foundationalist epistemology (with its self-evident, foundational be-
liefs). Therefore: "On Moore's telling, after all, we are still to settle 
on moral beliefs through precisely the same reasoning processes that 
we would use if we viewed those beliefs as our own reasoned conclu-
sions instead of objective entities, wholly independent of our 
minds."141 From this, Smith concludes: 
[H]ow does the assumption that the results of such [nonfoundationalist] 
reflection correspond to moral reality help us decide which substantive 
beliefs to endorse, which views of liberty, of human worth, of justice? ... 
[Moral realism] merely speaks to the ontological label we should pin on 
our substantive values. It offers no guidance whatsoever in discovering 
or judging what they should be.142 
This general criticism - that epistemology, not metaphysics, is 
relevant to political and legal issues - can also be found in the re-
sponses of Stanley Brubaker, 143 Brian Bix, 144 Dennis Patterson, 145 
Steven Burton, 146 Stanley Fish, 147 Richard Posner, 148 and even my fel-
low moral realist in constitutional law, Graham Walker.149 Formu-
lated as generically as I have summarized it, however, the criticism 
hits wide of the mark. A moral realist like me who is also a 
141. Rogers M. Smith, The New Institutionalism and Normative Theory: Reply to Professor 
Barber. 3 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 74, 86 (1989). 
142. Id. 
143. See Stanley C. Brubaker, Conserving the Constitution, 1987 AM. BAR FOUND. REs. J. 
261, 278-79; Stanley C. Brubaker, Republican Government and Judicial Restraint: Response to 
Sotirios Barber. 49 REv. POL. 570 (1987). On Brubaker's metaphysical realism, but epistemolog-
ical skepticism, see Sotirios A. Barber, Epistemological Skepticism, Hobbesian Natural Right and 
Judicial Self-Restraint, 48 REV. POL. 374 (1986). 
144. See Bix, supra note 134, at 1316 ("[T]he metaphysical entity posited ('a complex moral 
fact') does not guide the reasoning process, it merely decorates it."). 
145. See Dennis Patterson, Post-Modernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254, 275 
n.90 (1992). 
146. See STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 149-50 (1992). Burton uses the 
epistemology/metaphysics distinction to urge that it is epistemic indeterminacy in law and mo-
rality that is of practical importance. He uses this conclusion to further his own agenda of 
substituting a procedural ideal ("good faith") for judging in lieu of my, Dworkin's, or Hart's 
result-oriented determinacy ideal. 
147. See Fish, supra note 85. 
148. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 237 (1990). 
149. See GRAHAM WALKER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 51-52, 
130-31, 133 (1990). For a carefully qualified agreement with Walker's criticism of my realism, 
see yet another of my fellow moral realists in constitutional law, SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THEO· 
RIES OF JUDICIAL POWER ch. 6 (forthcoming 1993). 
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nonfoundationalist in his epistemology can by and large agree with the 
criticism without for a moment conceding the no-difference-to-politics 
thesis. Moral realism is a metaphysical position, not an epistemologi-
cal one. As such, it promises no new sources of evidence, no new 
methods of discovery, no new faculties, no new methods of argument 
or proof with which to convince those who disagree with us. Meta-
physical beliefs are only beliefs about what it is the evidence we all 
possess evidences. Moral realists of my (nonfoundationalist) stripe be-
lieve that the various features of our moral experience - our willing-
ness to reason about moral questions, our expectation that moral 
judgments are backed by reasons, our sense that moral judgments give 
reasons for belief as well as for actions, our search for answers in the 
face of indeterminate conventions, the fact that we have moral beliefs 
at all - are best explained by the realist thesis that a mind-independ-
ent moral reality exists. Such moral realists do not contend that they 
have discovered a new kind of experience that, when made known, 
will convince the unbelievers of the goodness of justice, the evil of in-
tolerance, and so forth. The realists' metaphysical contention is sim-
ply that the realists' theses make better sense of the experience of us 
most of the time. Thus, when Ronald Dworkin too criticizes the 
moral realist for his inability to deliver "a thundering knock-down 
metaphysical demonstration no one can resist who has the wit to un-
derstand, "150 or when he construes moral realism to be the view that 
there is "some special kind of evidence . . . or some justification for 
acting on it . . . by showing that atmospheric moral quaverings con-
firm my opinion, for example,"151 he cannot be talking about 
nonfoundationalist moral realism, for it pretends to no such epistemo-
logical claims. 
How, then, can such a metaphysical position make a difference? In 
just the way I earlier indicated: moral realism can make sense of some 
of our adjudicatory practices such as judicial review - and thereby 
give us a reason to continue them, or modify them, as the case may be 
- that moral conventionalism and moral skepticism cannot. With 
regard to the practice of judicial review in American constitutional 
law particularly, moral realism shows that the exercise of judicial 
power is not necessarily arbitrary just because moral reasoning is in-
herent in such decisionmaking. 
Jeremy Waldron's recent criticism of my view advances the argu-
ment from this point. While sharing the common criticism - that 
150. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 2, at 85. 
151. Id. at 80-81. 
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nonfoundationalist moral realism can give no new ways of resolving 
moral disputes -Waldron nonetheless recognizes that the politically 
relevant feature of realism need not lie in some ill-conceived epistemo-
logical advantage that a sensible realism would not claim to possess. 
As Waldron recognizes about judicial power in general, and about ju-
dicial review in particular, "the main misgiving ... is about the arbi-
trariness of moral decision-making by judges .... " 152 Waldron 
helpfully divides the concern about judicial arbitrariness into three 
concerns - unpredictability, irrationality, and democratic illegitimacy 
- and I shall follow the argument through his three concerns. 
Consider first the predictability of judicial decisions. 153 Waldron 
urges that, when we know a judge's attitudes, we can predict her 
moral decisions. This is because her general attitudes, not some moral 
reality independent of those attitudes, cause her particular 
decisions. 154 
In assessing this position, we must be clear about what version of 
moral realism we are discussing. An "internalist'' moral realist, for 
example, believes that the motivating power of moral qualities is built 
into everyone's psychology so that, if one knows some decision to be a 
good one, one also can predict that everyone will tend to reach it. My 
own moral realism is externalist, however, meaning that I deny that 
moral qualities necessarily motivate people (in the sense that such 
qualities necessarily are the objects of desires people actually possess). 
Even so, as I describe in Part III, a naturalist realist should not 
think that moral qualities are causally inert. In particular, such a real-
ist should believe that moral qualities cause moral beliefs. This causal 
relationship will exist for judges no less than for the rest of us, so that 
the injustice of some decision should tend to engender belief that the 
decision would be unjust, which should tend to motivate judicial be-
havior to avoid that result. This provides some basis for the claim that 
moral realism, if true, allows greater predictability of moral decision-
making by judges. 
Three very large caveats keep me from claiming any large incre-
ment of judicial predictability on moral realist suppositions. One 
stems from the fragility of the causal relation between moral quality 
and moral belief. So many other factors intervene to cause false moral 
beliefs by many people that the predictive advantage of one who 
152. Waldron, supra note 3, at 176. 
153. Also worrying about judicial predictability is Tannsjo, supra note 115, at 251. 
154. Waldron, supra note 3, at 178-79. 
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knows the moral truth about some case is bound to be small.155 The 
second caveat concerns the particular route I have defended through 
which moral qualities cause moral beliefs. I refer to the heuristic value 
of our emotions as harbingers of moral insight. 156 Since moral quali-
ties typically cause moral beliefs through emotions, there cannot be 
any large advantage of predictability to the realist, who recognizes the 
entire causal chain, quality-attitude-belief-act, over the noncognitivist, 
who recognizes only the last links. The only difference would be in 
cases where a judge did not yet have the appropriate attitude toward, 
say, an unjust sentence; my sort of moral realist might make a predic-
tion that he would have such an attitude because of the injustice of the 
sentence. 
The third caveat concerns the self-doubt the moral realist observer 
of judicial behavior should have about whether he knows the moral 
truth about some case. To have any predictive advantage, the moral 
realist must have confidence he has identified the moral truth of the 
matter, for possession of that truth supplies his basis for prediction. 
Although there are many occasions where one should be quite confi-
dent he knows the truth of the matter, there are certainly many other 
occasions where uncertainty is the only appropriate attitude. 157 
By irrationality (the second of Waldron's translations of the fear of 
judicial arbitrariness in moral reasoning), Waldron essentially means 
"unsupported by reasoned argument."158 The moral realist might fear 
that an emotivist judge is reduced to a very short chain of argument in 
support of his moral decision - "because that is how I feel" -
whereas a realist judge would offer reasons. But Waldron is right: this 
would be to parody emotivism. Any sophisticated emotivist would 
hardly portray a judge as reduced to introspective reports of how he 
feels as the only reasons that justify his decision. As we discussed 
before, 159 an emotivist judge can give reasons justifying why kicking 
dogs is bad - in terms of the animal's pain - as well as can the 
realist. Moreover, the admission of the nonfoundationalist - that he 
has no new evidence, no new ways of knowing, and so forth - means 
that the emotivist judge need have no fewer reasons than the realist 
judge. In short, there is no difference in arguing for or against judicial 
155. See Moore, supra note 8, at 1091; R.G. Swinburne, The Objectivity of Morality, 5 l PHIL. 
5, 11 (1976). 
156. See Moore, supra note 96, at 198-208. 
157. See Michael S. Moore, A Theory of Criminal Law Theories, 10 TEL AVIV STUD. LAW 
115, 183 (1990). 
158. Waldron, supra note 3, at 179-80. 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 101-04. 
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review in terms of alleged judicial arbitrariness, when arbitrariness is 
translated as unsupported by reasoned argument. 
Things are not so rosy for the conventionalist as for the noncogni-
tivist in this regard. While the conventionalist too can deny that 
judges cannot give any reasons in support of their moral judgments, 
the sort of reasons that she can advance will differ from the sort of 
reasons that both realists and sophisticated noncognitivists think pos-
sible. The sort of reason the conventionalist is ultimately stuck with is 
that others share a certain moral belief or concept. For a convention-
alist, all reasons must either be, or be inferred from, such conventional 
agreement. Recall the two specific differences between the realist and 
the conventionalist at the level of personal moral experience: the real-
ist can, but the conventionalist cannot, countenance the possibility of 
there being right answers to all moral dilemmas and the possibility of 
there being radical disagreements of an individual with her culture. A 
conventionalist judge, unlike his realist counterpart, thus will both run 
out of moral reasons, and eschew some revolutionary ones he other-
wise would have available. In such cases the conventionalist judge 
must judge either arationally or immorally, which is certainly a reason 
not to give judges powers like that of judicial review. 
The main issue is joined with Waldron's third sense of judicial ar-
bitrariness, that of undemocratic judicial imposition. This worry is 
that unrepresentative individuals (judges) can nullify the democratic 
outputs of a more representative body (the legislature) through judi-
cial review. A moral realist answers this worry by stressing the objec-
tive values judicial review can protect that are sometimes of greater 
weight than the value of majority rule. Consider the practice of judi-
cial review of the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments. A 
moral realist can see those Amendments as referring to preexisting 
moral rights all persons possess. When a moral realist judge invali-
dates that expression of majority will that a statute presumptively rep-
resents, he does so in the name of something beyond his power or the 
power of a societal consensus to change. His warrant for going against 
the majority is not that his feelings differ from the majority's or that 
some supermajority's consensus differs from the consensus a statute 
presumptively represents. His justification for judicial review is 
straightforward, and so is his mode of practicing it: he will seek to 
discover the true nature of the rights to which the Constitution refers 
by building the best theory he can muster about the nature of equality, 
the nature of liberty, and so forth. 
The skeptic and the conventionalist both must scramble if they are 
to find any justification for judicial review. The conventionalist judge, 
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if he is a contractarian about the authority of the Constitution, might 
say that the particulars actually present in the minds of the Framers 
can be used to invalidate subsequent legislation, because that was the 
supermajority's "deal." The Equal Protection Clause, for example, is 
then interpreted to prohibit anything closely resembling the Black 
Codes of the Reconstructionist South in 1868 but is otherwise devoid 
of any (nonrace-based) equality-producing meaning. If such judges 
are not contractarians, they must suppose some deep or hidden con-
sensus of today's values that has eluded the legislature and that can be 
used to overturn the express consensus represented by the legislature's 
enactment of a statute. In the use of such present consensus to protect 
minority rights, the conventionalist is open to John Hart Ely's charge 
to conventionalist justifications of judicial review: "[I]t makes no 
sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for 
protecting minorities from the value judgments of the majority."160 
Waldron's favored noncognitivism is also in a difficult justificatory 
stance about judicial review. If Waldron's emotivist judge is a con-
tractarian about the Constitution's authority, he will be like Ely's 
judge who wants to follow the intent of the rulemaker but whose 
rulemaker, believing in ghosts, passes a rule regulating the behavior of 
ghosts. 161 How do you do what contractarians suppose judges to do 
- namely, follow the rulemakers' intended rule - when you, unlike 
the rulemaker, do not believe that ghosts exist? How do you make 
sense of even trying to follow the rule when you know that if the 
rulemaker shared your belief about ghosts he never would have passed 
the rule to begin with? 
Waldron's noncognitivist stands on no firmer ground if he is not a 
contractarian about the Constitution's authority. If a noncognitivist 
judge believes that the Constitution has authority because it essentially 
coincides with his moral intuitions, then his warrant for judicial re-
view is identical to Holmes': granted, Holmes said, these are only my 
feelings, but since no one else's (no matter how numerous) are any 
better, I will impose mine and not theirs. 162 In short, the justification 
of judicial review is a wild and unseemly scramble for any but a moral 
realist. 
Waldron disagrees, believing that the existence of differing opin-
ions about what rights persons possess makes judicial review as prob-
160. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 69 (1980). See Wojciech Sadurski, 
Conventional Morality and Judicial Standards, 13 VA. L. REV. 339 (1987), for a critical examina· 
tion of Ely's argument. 
161. See ELY, supra note 160, at 39. 
162. See Holmes, supra note 114. 
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lematic for the realist as for anyone else.163 Waldron rightly points 
out that legislatures, too, may operate with theories of equality and 
liberty when seeking to legislate in conformity with the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Waldron thus contends that the question of why a 
judge's moral beliefs should control is as pressing for the moral realist 
as for anyone else. 
The answer lies in the moral realist's ability to say that there is 
something, in the nature of equality or of liberty for example, about 
which the judge could be right. That possibility provides an opening 
to argue that selection procedures for judges, and institutional differ-
ences between courts and legislatures, make judges better epistemic 
authorities about constitutionally protected rights than are legisla-
tures. These further arguments are familiar. First, judges are better 
positioned for this kind of moral insight because every day they face 
moral thought experiments with the kind of detail and concrete per-
sonal involvement needed for moral insight. It is one thing to talk 
about a right to privacy in general; it is another to order a teenager to 
bear a child she does not want to bear. One might well think that 
moral insight is best generated at the level of particular cases, giving 
judicial beliefs greater epistemic authority than legislative beliefs on 
the same subject. Second, judicial reasoning is like moral reasoning in 
its focus on principled generality, so that judges might have an advan-
tage even at the most abstract level. Moral rights, on such a view, are 
more safely left in the hands of those who can work out their content 
in a principled manner. Third, the institutional features of judicial 
office - notably job security - make judges better able to focus their 
deliberations on the moral aspect of any problem, putting aside the 
questions of political expediency with which legislators must grapple. 
Thus, only judges can afford to take the long view that moral insight 
demands. Finally, the judicial temperament may be more suited to 
assessing moral questions than the legislative temperament. By tem-
perament, I mean both the actual psychology of those who become 
judges rather than legislators and the culture of each institution that 
inculcates and reinforces that psychology. Evenhandedness, freedom 
from bias, prejudgment, and neutrality are the distinctively judicial 
virtues. They are also the virtues of the "ideal observer" in moral 
theory, that postulate of some moralists about who can best gain in-
sight into moral truths. 
Whatever one thinks of these familiar arguments about the com-
parative epistemic advantages of judges over legislators with respect to 
163. See Waldron, supra note 3, at 180-82. 
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morality, the crucial point is that Waldron's emotivist theorist cannot 
even start this argument. For the emotivist, to inquire whether a court 
or a legislature is better equipped to discover what moral rights per-
sons possess is meaningless because people do not actually possess any 
moral rights. Emotivists like Waldron can certainly express their own 
feelings in terms of rights talk, but the last thing that could justify 
judicial review would be a judicial advantage in discovering Waldron's 
(or anyone's) feelings. 
Waldron's sophisticated emotivism would of course reject this last 
characterization on now-familiar grounds. 164 Waldron would no 
doubt deny that if emotivism is true then those who design legal insti-
tutions cannot make the institutional comparisons suggested. If emo-
tivism is true, Waldron might respond, we can still evaluate positively 
certain states of affairs, express that evaluation in rights talk, and then 
assess how adequately judges and legislatures protect those "rights." 
The problem with this response lies in the simultaneous doublethink 
that it requires. On one hand, those system designing theorists who 
justify judicial review see clearly that judges' "beliefs" about "moral 
rights" are in reality not beliefs about anything; rather, judges merely 
express their emotions in their talk of "moral rights." On the other 
hand, when the beliefs in question are those of the system-designing 
theorists themselves, these are cast as if they were beliefs about rights 
that really exist. It is only with this bifurcation that the emotivist-
system designers can duplicate the moral realist's calculation with one 
of their own: Will the feelings of judges be more likely or less likely 
than the feelings oflegislators to promote ... what? Not Waldron's or 
other theorists' feelings, but the now objectified object of those feel-
ings, described as the moral rights of persons. 
I find this doublethink both psychologically unintelligible and epi-
stemically unjustifiable. Psychologically, how can it be that we see 
only too well the true metaethical status of judges' and legislators' 
moral "beliefs" while not seeing the same metaethical status of our 
own? Epistemically, what could justify inducing such wilful blindness 
in ourselves, even if it were psychologically possible? Is the reason 
that one cannot admit that our own feelings are not about indepen-
dently existing rights that with such admission would come an altera-
tion in how we feel about rights? 
A second possible response (although doubtless not Waldron's) 
would admit that, in making the institutional comparison, we see 
164. Namely, the ground that denies any but an internal, justificatory sense to counterfactu· 
als that link substantive moral truths to the speaker's feelings. See supra text accompanying 
notes 100-06. 
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clearly the metaethical status of our own "beliefs" about "moral 
rights" yet deny that we are in any way demotivated by that metaethi-
cal insight. Granted, these are only our feelings, but that does not 
make us care any less about designing institutions to maximize the 
number of decisions that respect our feelings. Yet this clear-sighted 
emotivist system designer seems to undervalue democracy. Only if, 
like Holmes, we are willing to have our attitudes on these matters pre-
vail in the face of an adverse majority should we design institutions 
that will be more likely to produce outcomes favoring our feelings. 
Yet since these are only feelings, why should we have our way if a 
majority of our fellow citizens have different feelings? We who theo-
rize about the design of legal institutions, like the judges whose power 
of judicial review we are vindicating, need moral realism to make sense 
of our undemocratic impositions. 
Waldron's actual response to this possibility of comparative judi-
cial expertise about moral rights is to deny my nonfoundationa/ist real-
ism the possibility that anyone could be a moral expert. Waldron 
argues: 
Some defenders of judicial review may argue that judges have greater 
expertise in moral matters than ordinary citizens, so that their beliefs 
and their reasoning are more likely to be reliable. But we have already 
noticed that moral realists can produce no epistemology to match their 
ontological commitments. Without an epistemology ... there cannot be 
a theory of expertise.16s 
Waldron's response is in danger of presupposing that realism is 
false on its way to concluding that the truth or falsity of realism is 
irrelevant. The only reason I see for doubting that Nazis, sadists, the 
quick-tempered, the nonempathetic, the nonuniversalizing, and the 
like are worse than their opposites in reaching true moral judgments is 
denial that there are any true moral judgments. By my armchair in-
ductive study, the former groups are obviously worse judges of what 
morality demands because they get it wrong so often. Even if Wal-
dron were right that there is no checking procedure for moral truth as 
there is for scientific truth - which I also deny166 - the ability to 
compare outcomes created by certain persons or procedures allows us 
165. Waldron, supra note 3, at 181-82. 
166. Elsewhere in his article Waldron recognizes that moral realists must at some point come 
up with a "psychology of moral perception." Id. at 178. Yet I fear that Waldron has an unjusti-
fied conception of what such a theory should look like, inherited perhaps from G.E. Moore's 
version of realism. The picture presumes the existence of special properties (nonnatural ones) 
known in a special way (intuition). Waldron then demands that the realist produce some scien-
tific backing for this ability to perceive moral qualities that is strictly analogous to our scientific 
theory of visual or auditory perception - except that it is about a "sixth sense." See Moore, 
supra note 8, at 1133-36. Yet the naturalist realism I defend places a much lesser demand by 
way of producing a theory of moral perception. Given the intimate relation between moral 
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to verify who or what are better harbingers of moral truth. Compare 
our experience with mathematical or musical prodigies, whose reliabil-
ity in producing valid proofs and beautiful music we often can see 
without comprehending how they do it. If Waldron is to deny the 
possibility of making the suggested institutional comparison, he must 
deny that we can ever know any moral truths. What grounds has he 
given us to believe that, except his noncognitivist belief that there are 
no moral truths? 
There is one more point to be made. The more articles that Wal-
dron and other moral skeptics or idealists write in legal contexts, the 
greater the danger that judges will believe that their moral judgments 
are arbitrary - not just in Waldron's three senses, but also in the eight 
senses I have distinguished elsewhere.167 The danger is that, if judges 
become skeptics or idealists about morality, then they will suffer the 
debilitating psychological consequences I described earlier. They will 
seek to evade their responsibility to engage in the moral reasoning that 
makes legal reasoning possible, because they will think that they are 
using the coercive power of the state to foist off either their own 
desires or feelings, or those of some informal consensus, onto hapless 
litigants. Such evasions of judicial responsibility would certainly di-
minish any comparative moral expertise that judges might have over 
the legislature or other citizens, 168 perhaps to the point when judicial 
review does become unjustifiable. 
2. The Debate's Importance to Constitutional Interpretation 
Since judicial review is entrenched in the American legal system, 
the more practical question facing judges on a daily basis is how that 
great power should be exercised. With our written Constitution, the 
issue devolves into the question of how our judges should interpret 
that written text. 169 I have laid out my own answer at some length: 
judges should interpret the Constitution, first, by the ordinary, English 
meaning of the words it contains; second, as modified by any technical 
legal meanings introduced by prior courts' interpretations of the provi-
sion; third, so as to serve the purpose (in the sense of function, not the 
Framers' intention) of the provision; and fourth, so as not to lead to 
absurd or unjust results.110 
properties and natural properties, the perception of the latter will be the perception of the former, 
and that demands no more than the five ordinary senses. See infra Part III. 
167. See Moore, supra note 8, at 1071-72. 
168. See Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 388-96. 
169. See Moore, Constitution, supra note 54, for this argument. 
170. See Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2. 
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Whether moral realism is true makes two practical differences to 
this interpretive schema. First, the truth of moral realism allows one 
to apply this four-part interpretive schema differently than one other-
wise could. Consider the first ingredient in a good legal interpretation, 
fidelity to the ordinary English meaning of the words of the Constitu-
tion. The truth of moral realism allows one to glimpse a possibility of 
what the first ingredient might be that otherwise would seem impossi-
ble. As set forth in Part I, metaphysical realism includes two semantic 
theories: first, a truth-conditional theory of the meaning of sentences; 
and second, a realist or "causal" theory of the meaning of words. The 
first of these theories rules out an ordinary-language-philosophy ap-
proach to meaning, according to which meaning is given by the behav-
ioral test of "what most people would say."171 The second of these 
theories displaces the other conventionalist theories of meaning - the 
criteria!, the criteriological, and the paradigm-case theories. 172 In con-
trast to all four of these conventionalist theories of meaning, the realist 
theory enjoins an interpreter to find the meaning of a word like gold in 
the nature of the kind referred to by the word - not in conventionally 
accepted usage patterns of the symbol, gold, nor in definitions analyti-
cally connecting goldness with certain other properties, nor with para-
digmatic examples of goldness accepted within some linguistic 
community. 
Obviously, one can utilize a realist theory of meaning to interpret 
words only when there is a real thing to which the words could refer. 
To apply the realist theory of meaning to give the ordinary, English 
meaning of words and phrases like liberty, freedom of expression, and 
equal protection of the laws, things like liberty, liberties of expression, 
and equality must exist. The first relevance of moral realism to Amer-
ican constitutional interpretation is that it makes possible the utiliza-
tion of the realist theory of meaning when a Constitutional interpreter 
171. This is because a truth-conditions theory of meaning consigns many of our linguistic 
intuitions - "what most people would say" - to the pragmatics of appropriate utterance, not to 
the semantics of what is uttered. See Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 289-91. 
172. The criteria! theory asserts that the meaning of a word is given by a precise definition, or 
"criteria." The criteria for bachelor, for example, would be three conditions, each individually 
necessary, only jointly sufficient, for the correct application of the word: unmarried, male, per-
son. The criteriological theory asserts that the meaning of a word is given by an imprecise defini-
tion, in that none of the conditions that constitute the criteria for the word are necessary, and no 
clear subset of the criteria is sufficient. Nonetheless, the properties listed as criteria give the 
meaning of the word, and are not mere "symptoms,'' because absence of all of such properties 
precludes correct application of the word and because presence of all of the properties guarantees 
correct application of the word. According to the paradigm case theory of meaning, the meaning 
of bachelor is not given by any definition, precise or imprecise. Rather, words are attached to 
certain particulars in the world, and these particulars become the paradigmatic examples for 
correct application to all other similar things. See id. at 291 n.25. 
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seeks to find the ordinary, English meaning of the words used in the 
Constitution. 
Now consider the other three ingredients in my four-part interpre-
tive schema. As I have argued in detail elsewhere, in order to formu-
late the holding of precedent cases so as to give words a technical, 
legal meaning,173 in order to formulate the purpose of a legal provi-
sion, 174 and in order to assess whether a particular interpretation leads 
to an unjust or otherwise absurd result, 175 judges must make moral 
judgments. The truth of moral realism matters to each of these exer-
cises because it gives judges a third option as to the source of the 
moral component in each of these three judgments: in addition to us-
ing social conventions or his own attitudes, a judge can believe that he 
is judging something independent of both him and societal convention. 
This makes for a difference in the evidence relied upon by a realist 
versus a conventionalist judge, for the realist judge will not be doing a 
sociology of others' moral beliefs and he will be able to make revolu-
tionary moral judgments. This will also make an attitudinal difference 
for the realist judge over the skeptical or the subjectivist judge, for the 
realist will not see his task as simply imposing his own personal will on 
society through the coercive powers of his office. 
The second difference made by the truth of moral realism is to the 
justification, not the application, of a theory of interpretation such as 
my four-part schema. As the enormous literature on constitutional 
interpretation makes abundantly clear, any metaethical position but 
the realist's badly warps theories of constitutional interpretation. The 
outright moral skepticism of Robert Bork,176 Warren Burger,177 Rich-
ard Posner,178 and John Hart Ely179 plainly motivates their alternative 
(intentionalist, plain-meaning, wealth maximizing or utilitarian, and 
representation-reinforcing) theories of interpretation. Moral skepti-
cism's connection to these alternative theories of interpretation is not 
just a contingent fact about the psychology of certain theorists too 
obtuse to see that their skepticism is really irrelevant to their interpre-
tive concerns. 180 Rather, they see well enough how moral skepticism 
173. See id. at 358-76; Moore, Precedent, supra note 54. 
174. See Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 383-86; Moore, supra note 13, at 277-81. 
175. See Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2 at 386-88; Moore, supra note 13, at 278-81. 
176. See Bork, supra note 73. 
177. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); see also Moore, supra note 8, at 1065 n.3. 
178. See POSNER, supra note 148; Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 
MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 103, 110-11 (1979). 
179. See ELY, supra note 160. 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76. 
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undermines the justification for judicial review in a democracy181 and 
draw the obvious inference that since we cannot get rid of the institu-
tion entirely it should be made as free of judicial value-imposition as 
possible. 
Despite the prima facie relevance of the issue of moral realism to 
constitutional interpretation, that relevance has recently been chal-
lenged by Brian Bix182 and others.183 Bix focuses exclusively on the 
first difference of the two that I have just mentioned, and within that 
difference he discusses only the first ingredient of my four-part inter-
pretive schema, the meaning of ordinary, English words.184 Despite 
the narrowness of his focus, Bix's criticism has the potential to rob my 
theory of constitutional interpretation of much of its attractiveness, so 
I shall seek to show why Bix's criticisms are not well-founded. 
A judge's adoption of a realist's semantics makes two differences to 
her judicial interpretations. These two differences stem from two dif-
ferences between realist and conventionalist theories of meaning more 
generally. The first difference is that one runs out of "meaning" 
sooner on conventionalist theories (because one runs out of conven-
tions faster than reality).185 On realist theories, meaning is given by 
the nature of the thing referred to, which is rich enough to support 
bivalence about any area of discourse for which the realist theory is 
appropriate. The second difference is that conventionalist theories im-
ply that there is a change of meaning whenever one must modify or 
abandon an analytically necessary property (or "cqncept") of the thing 
referred to. According to conventionalist theories, whenever we say 
things like he was dreaming, even though he doesn't remember dream-
ing, because he experienced rapid eye movements, we have changed the 
meaning of dreaming because we have applied it even though our old 
181. As I argued supra section 11.C.1. 
182. See Bix, supra note 134. 
183. See BURTON, supra note 146, at 145-51; POSNER, supra note 148; FREDERICK F. 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 215-18 (1991); WALKER, supra note 149; Brubaker, Con-
serving the Constitution, supra note 143; Fish, supra note 85; Steve R. Munzer, Realistic Limits on 
Realist Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 459 (1985); Frederick F. Schauer, Rules and the Rule 
of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 645, 687-88 (1991) [hereinafter Schauer, Rules]; Frederick 
F. Schauer, The Rules of Jurisprudence: A Reply, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 839, 842-44 
(1991) [hereinafter Schauer, A Reply]; see also Dennis M. Patterson, Realist Semantics and Legal 
Theory, 2 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 175 (1989); Dennis M. Patterson, What Was Realism?: 
A Reply to David Brink, 2 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 193 (1989) (putting forward a similar 
criticism of David Brink's moral realism). 
184. Bix focuses on my use of a realist theory of meaning generally in legal interpretation, 
not on my particular use of it with respect to morality. See Bix, supra note 134, at 1299, 1310 
n.70. 
185. See Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 293-94. This point about linguistic conven-
tions parallels my earlier point about the indeterminacy of moral conventions. See supra text 
accompanying notes 125-30. 
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criterion of dreaming - waking memory - is absent. 186 Whereas ac-
cording to the realist theory, there is no change of meaning when we 
say such things, because meaning is given by the nature of dreaming, 
whatever that nature turns out to be.187 Discovery of surprising facts 
about that nature does not result in a change of meaning for the real-
ist, only a greater understanding of what was meant all along. 
These two differences between theories of meaning make several 
differences when those theories are applied to the legal interpretation 
of moral phrases like due process or liberty. First, on the realist view 
there is always a right answer to questions like what process is due a 
citizen or what liberty or liberties he possesses. On a conventionalist 
view of meaning, however, our moral and linguistic conventions either 
run out or conflict, creating "hard cases" requiring judges to exercise 
their discretion. Second, on the realist view, even a clear moral con-
sensus - that, for example, equality does not forbid segregated schools 
- does not foreclose further inquiry into the meaning of equal protec-
tion of the laws, for the thing, equality itself, not social consensus, pro-
vides the meaning of that phrase. On a conventionalist view of 
meaning, however, equal protection of the laws does simply mean what 
most people would say, or what conventionally accepted paradigms of 
equality would suggest, or what definitions of equality implicit in soci-
ety's use of the word would require. On the conventionalist theory, in 
other words, there is no room for a judge's revolutionary judgment 
about the nature of equality to clothe itself as the true meaning of 
equality. To make such a revolutionary judgment, a conventionalist 
judge must thus admit that he is changing the meaning of the word. 
Bix and others seem to deny each of these two differences in vari-
ous ways. The main denial to the right answer difference builds on the 
metaphysics-epistemology distinction of which Waldron also made so 
much. According to Bix: 
Metaphysical realism of this full-blooded platonist type (with meanings 
equated with platonic entities) is thus shown not to help - indeed, not 
to affect - the language user. Even if we posit the existence of these 
strange platonic entities, meaning and usage still come down to human 
judgments and human reactions, not to abstract entities. Moore may 
appear to avoid the force of Wittgenstein's criticisms by joining his meta-
physical realist ontology with a coherence epistemology, but he can do 
so only at the cost of undermining the significance of his approach. 
Once one rejects the claim that we have some direct cognition of the 
186. For an example of this conventionalist view about meaning by one of Wittgenstein's best 
known students, see NORMAN MALCOLM, DREAMING 70-82 (1962). 
187. See Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 293-94. This point about linguistic conven-
tions parallels my earlier point about revolutionary judgments against moral conventions. See 
supra text accompanying notes 129-32. 
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"real," the advantage of metaphysical realism - in explaining how we 
actually behave or in prescribing how we should approach problems of 
meaning - seems to disappear. If what we are to seek are beliefs that fit 
in well with our other beliefs and observations, and our sole criterion for 
accepting a belief is its fit with our other beliefs and observations, then 
the platonist notions about truth and meaning are empty concepts that 
serve no purpose .... [T]he implicit invocation of "reality" and "[meta-
physical] realism" does not affect what the judge should do or think. 
The term "real" here is a disconnected wheel in the machinery: it spins 
but it does no work.188 
With regard to the bivalence of constitutional discourse and its 
moral language, Bix's general observations amount to the claim that 
the realist's belief in the existence of metaphysically right answers has 
no effect if no additional evidence or way of finding those answers is 
available to judges. Steve Burton, starting with a metaphysical-episte-
mological distinction similar to Bix's, draws this inference squarely: 
"It serves no practical purpose to insist that legal results are meta-
physically determinate if members of the legal community can readily 
disagree about an outcome, using all lawyerly skill in good faith, upon 
full adjudication of a case."189 
The error in this charge of irrelevance lies in the assumed equiva-
lence of data about morality being cohered by both the conventionalist 
and the realist. The realist bases her moral judgments on different 
data, and more of it, than does the conventionalist. I do not refer to 
moral reality as the realist's extra data here, for Bix is certainly right 
that without direct peeks at that reality the nonfoundationalist realist 
is limited to his own theory-laden beliefs about it. Rather, the differ-
ent and more plentiful data to which a realist repairs are the realist's 
individual moral beliefs. To think that those beliefs are indeterminate 
wherever society's moral conventions are indeterminate is simply a 
mistake.190 In America today, moral conventions may be so split as to 
be indeterminate with respect to a women's right to an abortion, for 
example; yet my own beliefs on that issue need not (and in fact do not) 
display any similar indeterminacy. The truth of moral realism thus 
makes a difference in the number of knowable right answers available 
to judges. If moral realism is true, and so long as we do not have 
moral lepers on the bench, then judges have the capacity to know con-
siderably more right answers about what process is due than if judges 
188. Bix, supra note 134, at 1309-10 (footnotes omitted). 
189. BURTON, supra note 146, at 150. 
190. Graham Walker, for one, seems to think that my nonfoundationalist epistemology is 
committed to cohering conventions. See WALKER, supra note 149, at 132, 143. Yet a 
nonfoundationalist coheres her own beliefs about a subject so as to get at the truth; cohering 
conventions is only a sociological enterprise. 
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must repair only to the "canons of decency and fairness of English-
speaking peoples,"191 the "evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress. of a maturing society,"192 or some other societal 
convention. 193 
To be sure, if conventionalists could show that they ran out of con-
ventions no more quickly than a realist runs out of reality, they too 
could assert a right-answer thesis. Indeed, what I have called deep 
conventionalism attempts just such a maneuver. 194 But, as I have ar-
gued, deep conventionalism is still conventionalism; at some point it 
191. Felix Frankfurter's phrase in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952), overruled 
by, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
192. Earl Warren's phrase in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
193. Even with respect to the realist/noncognitivist debate, the truth of moral realism still 
matters because of its implications for the existence of metaphysically right answers to hard cases 
of moraVconstitutional interpretation. There is no evidentiary difference between the moral real· 
ist and the sophisticated noncognitivist, so there is no epistemological difference in how many 
knowable right answers there are. Both the noncognitivist and the realist work with their own 
beliefs, not social conventions. But there is the attitudinal difference between them that here 
makes a difference; namely, the only sense the noncognitivist can allow to there being right an· 
swers is that they are the most coherent extensions of his own attitudes. Thinking this about the 
status of "right answers" to hard constitutional cases would change how judges would think 
about, and thus would perform, their task as interpreters of the Constitution. If judges think that 
there is a correct answer to every case that comes before them, no matter how hard, they will feel 
differently about their job than if they see themselves as lawmaking agencies - reflectors of their 
own attitudes - in hard cases. One such difference will appear in their confidence that a mean· 
ingful line can be drawn demarcating their functions from those of legislators. They will not 
necessarily recognize when they are overstepping the line; but belief in the existence of such a line 
will provide an incentive not to overstep it. 
Such self-restraint furthers separation-of-powers ideals, but not because abuses of judicial 
power can be clearly demonstrated and thus made subject to external check - rather, the desira-
ble "checks and balances" exist within the mind of the judge. Such self-restraint also serves the 
democratic ideal: judges who do not see themselves as equivalent in function to legislators will 
tend not to act like legislators. 
Furthermore, if constitutional law can hold out the promise of metaphysically right answers 
in all cases, then judges will work harder even in cases with unattainable answers. For if correct 
answers exist even when one's attitudes are indeterminate, no judge can justify halting an inquiry 
just because his attitudes are in conflict or are otherwise indeterminate. My hunch is that 
noncognitivist judges who perceive that they are only cohering their own attitudes quit earlier 
than do judges who believe a real answer exists. 
This prolongation of the search for an answer by judges who believe it exists has two benefi-
cial consequences. The first is increased demonstrability over time of the existence of right an-
swers. Increased demonstrability breeds greater satisfaction with the rule of law. The law 
becomes more predictable, adjudication becomes more efficient, and so forth. Unknowability 
and undemonstrability are not all-or-nothing characteristics, equally applicable to all persons at 
all times. Hence, "Herculean" judges can move us beyond the limits of our present understand-
ing. A system that motivates judges to search for determinate answers is superior because it 
ultimately advances the rule of law. 
The second beneficial consequence of prolonging a judge's search for right answers is the 
increased equality that success engenders in that search. Searching for answers in hard cases 
forces judges to develop analogies across conventional legal categories. These analogies force 
judges to discern similarities between past and present parties. If a judge thinks that a category 
of cases has no answer, then he will have less of a tendency to stretch for the unconventional 
analogy that may generate true equality. In this way, a system holding out the promise of right 
answers is more likely to enhance the equality any legal system should strive to maximize. 
194. See Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 298-300. My example of a deep convention-
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will run out of those agreements that (according to deep conventional-
ism) make right answers possible in the face of more shallow disagree-
ments.195 Bix in any event eschews this route to defending a no-
difference thesis, taking the line to which I think any conventionalist is 
committed about the hardest of hard cases: for Bix, there is simply no 
answer to be gleaned from conventions.196 
With respect to the differential abilities of a realist versus a conven-
tionalist to oppose a clear consensus on a concept without changing 
the meaning of that concept, Bix appears to have two responses. The 
first stems from his Wittgensteinian conventionalism about meaning. 
This is the "criteriological" or "imprecise definition" theory of mean-
ing, according to which a concept like justice takes its meaning from a 
cluster of properties, no one of which is analytically necessary for the 
concept to be correctly applied. This results in a variety of institu-
tions' being called ''just" with equal propriety, since each such institu-
tion possesses some justicemaking properties even if no two of them 
share the exact same set of such properties.197 Bix describes the mile-
age he hopes to get out of this "family-resemblance" aspect of 
Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as follows: 
There is no sharp divide between a change of beliefs about a concept and 
a change of concepts. The idea of "same concept" is not itself transpar-
ent and self-evident .... In political and moral discourse, it is equally 
bard to show that the disputants are definitely talking about the same 
thing or that they are definitely not talking about the same thing when 
they disagree (e.g., about "justice" or "democracy"). In any attempt to 
analyze disagreement in these areas . . . change in beliefs and change in 
concepts merge.198 
I do not see how Bix's point amounts to any more than a worry 
about there being a kind of vagueness to our concepts, according to 
Bix's conventionalist theory of meaning, and about there being an ac-
alist was Dworkin, who attempted at one time to combine a right-answer thesis with a construc-
tivist version of conventionalism about morals. See Moore, Metaphysics, supra note 2. 
195. See supra text accompanying notes 119-29. 
196. See Bix, supra note 134, at 1303 n.47. 
197. On criteriological theories of meaning, see Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 291 
n.25; Moore, supra note 13, at 218-21. I recognize that some Wittgensteinians would deny that 
Wittgenstein had anything that could be called a theory of meaning, criteriological or otherwise. 
Rather, on this view, people just do "what comes naturally" in extending linguistic criteria to 
novel situations. Bix, supra note 134, at 1306. Such a view radically truncates our ability to 
understand disagreements between people: they are neither disagreeing about the nature of some 
convention-independent thing (realism) nor about the interpretation of some concept that they 
share (conventionalism); they just talk, and such talk sometimes seems to be opposed. 
198. Bix, supra note 134, at 1306-07 (footnote omitted); see also MARMOR, supra note 134, at 
144 (also celebrating Wittgenstein's blurriness about when a concept changes versus when only 
its symptoms or evidence changes). 
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companying vagueness in the idea of concept change.199 I do not see 
how any alleged vagueness in our ideas of concept change eliminates 
the difference between realist and conventionalist theories, inasmuch 
as even vague notions of concept change will allow for clear instances 
where there is no concept change and clear instances where there is. 
On a criteriological theory of meaning, there are clear cases of the 
application of a concept: if all of the properties making up the criteria 
for the concept is present, then the concept indisputably applies; if 
none of the properties making up the criteria for the concept are pres-
ent, then the concept indisputably does not apply. Therefore, if some-
one were to make a revolutionary judgment that the concept applied 
even though none of the criteria were present, or that the concept did 
not apply even though all the criteria were present, he would clearly 
have altered the meaning of the concept on the criteriological theory. 
Since such revolutionary judgments do not amount to a change of 
meaning on the realist theory of meaning, there remains a real differ-
ence between the theories despite the alleged vagueness in any notions 
of concept change. 
This difference between Bix's conventionalism and my own realism 
matters because of the normative force attached to ordinary meanings 
of words in constitutional interpretation. A judge seeking to justify a 
revolutionary judgment about, say, "due process," as a change in the 
meaning of the concept undertakes a substantially greater justificatory 
burden than a judge offering such a judgment as the true meaning of 
the concept. Although the other three ingredients in constitutional 
interpretation can overrule a word's ordinary meaning and so justify a 
change of that meaning the truth of realism would permit judges to 
make revolutionary judgments without undertaking that justificatory 
burden. 
Bix,200 joined here by Steve Munzer,2°1 Dennis Patterson,202 and 
Fred Schauer, 203 disagrees. All of them appear to think that it does 
not matter whether judicial reasoning is described as divining the true 
meaning of a concept like equality or whether that reasoning is seen as 
overruling the ordinary meaning in the name of some other ingredient 
in interpretation such as the purpose of the rule in which the word 
199. I elsewhere call this "combination of condition" or "intensional" vagueness. See 
Moore, supra note 13, at 193-94. 
200. See Bix, supra note 134, at 1315. 
201. See Munzer, supra note 183, at 470. 
202. See Patterson, Realist Semantics and Legal Theory, supra note 183, at 178-79; Patter-
son, What Was Realism?, supra note 183, at 194-95. 
203. See SCHAUER, supra note 183, at 215-18. 
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appears. They all appear to think that judges should and will reach 
the same results in cases no matter how judicial reasoning is described. 
As Bix puts this rejoinder: 
[T]he same judicial action can be characterized so many different ways. 
For example, the judge's refusal to permit the removal of organs from a 
revivable patient on the strength of an outdated statute could be seen as: 
giving effect to the (metaphysically) real meaning of "death" rather than 
a legislative definition thereof; overriding the plain meaning of a statute 
to avoid an unjust or absurd result; interpreting the language of a rule in 
accordance with its purpose; applying the statute in a way that reflects 
what the rulemakers would have provided had they considered the situa-
tion at hand; or any number of similar things.204 
Although Bix later qualifies this argument,205 his fellow-travelers 
do not, so I shall respond to the unqualified version. My response 
stems from my conception of the role of a theory of legal interpreta-
tion. A theory of constitutional interpretation is not a bit of window-
dressing that allows judges to rationalize the results they reach in par-
ticular cases. Judges should not keep ready to hand a list of different 
theories of interpretation, trundling out whichever one suits their pur-
pose in a particular case. 206 A theory of interpretation should have 
more normative bite than that. 
This means that each ingredient in an overall theory of interpreta-
tion should exert some independent normative pull on judges. I have 
previously charted the independent normative pull of ordinary word 
meanings on legal interpretations: enhanced predictability; prevention 
of unfair surprise; following the Framers' presumed semantic inten-
tions; and so forth.207 Thus, contrary to Bix's suggestion,208 I think 
204. Bix, supra note 134, at 1315. 
205. See id. at 1315 n.86. 
206. One of my judge-students, a Chancellor in Equity, suggested this as what he had learned 
from one of my seminars in jurisprudence for judges. For the results of such an attitude, see Karl 
N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How 
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). 
207. Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 313-38. It is this normative pull on judicial 
behavior by each ingredient within an overall theory of legal interpretation that gives the lie to 
the criticism of another of my pro-Wittgenstein critics, Audrei Marmor, No Easy Cases?, in 
WnTGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY 189, 200 (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1992). According to 
Marmor, a theory of meaning fixes what a legal rule means, and all"nonsemantic ingredients 
(such as a rule's purpose) only tell us whether judges are morally obligated to apply the rule to 
the cases before them. Such a view, severing semantic theory from judicial obligation, would 
indeed make my realist semantic theory (as well as all others) legally irrelevant. But Marmor 
offers no reason to think that the various ingredients in a theory of legal interpretation are irrele-
vant to judicial obligation. Indeed, there is every reason to think the reverse. Certainly, Herbert 
Hart never suffered under the confusion that guides Marmor here, id. at 201, i.e., that value-free 
theories of law and of interpretation must be justified in value-free (or conceptual) ways. 
208. See Bix, supra note 134, at 1313, 1314-15. Compare Munzer, supra note 183, at 471, 
who sees clearly that I do not think that the realist theory of meaning should be used by judges 
just because it is a true semantics for natural language. 
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that the realist theory of meaning has independent pull within an over-
all theory of legal interpretation, not out of some naive confusion of 
semantics with ethics, but because certain values justify the greater 
difficulty of interpreting a constitutional provision against rather than 
in harmony with its ordinary meaning. This differential justificatory 
difficulty should significantly affect the right legal answer in a number 
of cases. It thus does matter where we pigeonhole revolutionary judg-
ments by judges, because if we license them as being part of the search 
for the meaning of constitutional language, as does the realist, judges 
ought to make more of them. 
Defenders of the no-difference thesis have offered a second re-
sponse to the heightened ability of realists to make revolutionary judg-
ments. Although it is not Bix's, it is popular, and it goes like this. 
Granted, if moral realism were true, judges could make revolutionary 
moral judgments about moral concepts like "equal protection" with-
out changing the meaning of those concepts, and conventionalists can-
not. Yet judges should not ever make such revolutionary judgments 
even if they could make them. This argument rests on one of two 
grounds: either judges should take my own descriptions of moral falli-
bility seriously and refrain from violating clear moral convention on 
the epistemic ground that the convention is more likely correct than is 
the judge's individual moral judgment;209 or judges should defer to 
moral convention on the moral grounds that the majority has the right 
to be wrong210 and that social peace is so important that we should 
strive to maintain consensus whenever possible.211 
I mention this popular response mostly to put it aside. The an-
swers I have offered before still seem adequate. With regard to the 
epistemic point, my simple intuition is that judges do not come closer 
to the moral truth if they always defer to conventional moral consen-
sus. Judges who defer distance themselves emotionally from the di-
lemmas that should grip them, and such distance cuts them off from 
their own emotional responses, which constitute a much better heuris-
209. See BURTON, supra note 146, at 150; Schauer, A Reply, supra note 183, at 842-44; 
Schauer, Rules, supra note 183, at 687-89. I am uncertain whether David Richards' comparative 
honoring of old conventions (or tradition) is grounded on supposed epistemic advantages or not. 
See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 29-33 (1986); David A.J. 
Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 490, 499 (1985). 
210. This reflects one interpretation of Ronald Dworkin's honoring of "community moral· 
ity" in his theocy of adjudication. See Waldron, supra note 3, at 163 n.6. Sadurski, supra note 
160, more clearly makes the democratic argument on conventional morality's behalf. 
211. This idea is included in John Rawls' justification of his constructivist version of conven-
tionalism. See Rawls, Kantian Constructivism, supra note 30, at 517; cf. Joseph Raz, Facing 
Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 30 (1990) (noting that 
Rawls argues for "overlapping consensus" to assure social peace). 
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tic to moral truth for many people than do social conventions.212 
Fred Schauer urges that, while this answer might suffice as to indi-
vidual judges, system designers who must select and discipline judges 
have a different point of view.213 The best rule such system-designing 
theorists should impose is one that flatly bans revolutionary judgments 
by judges because a ban minimizes their moral mistakes. But why 
can't system designers simply select better judges? To be sure, a sys-
tem-designing theorist who could only place dull or evil people on the 
bench might want to ban them from resorting to their untutored or 
evil emotions. But if judges are not so dull or so evil, or if we can 
think of better selection procedures to improve the bench, then realist 
judges will make fewer moral mistakes than Schauer's wooden-headed 
rule-followers. In such circumstances, a system-designer concerned 
with minimizing moral mistakes should wish to license revolutionary 
judgments by judges, and my realist theory does that better than its 
conventionalist competitors. 
As for the moral version of this popular response, morality simply 
does not demand that judges suppress their own best moral insights in 
favor of social conventions when they seek to interpret the grand 
phrases of the Constitution. On the contrary, to eschew judges' in-
sights into the rights the Constitution protects in favor of the level of 
protection suggested by some present social consensus renders any ju-
dicial enforcement of minority rights under the Constitution very 
problematic. 214 
III. THE POSITIVE CASE FOR THE TRUTH OF MORAL REALISM 
It is time to leave the question whether the truth of moral realism 
matters to our practical concerns for the question whether moral real-
ism is true. I will not recanvass all of the various considerations that 
have been advanced pro and con on this topic.215 Rather, I shall focus 
on one form that the contemporary philosophical debate about moral 
realism has taken, a form that interests me because I share much of 
the general viewpoint that this way of framing the issue presupposes. 
I refer to what I shall call the explanationist debate about moral 
realism. Explanationists share some general views on ontology and 
justification no matter where they come out on the existence of moral 
entities and qualities. An explanationist believes that to discover 
212. See Moore, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 388-96. 
213. See Schauer, Rules, supra note 183, at 687-89. 
214. See supra text accompanying note 160. 
215. I was more ambitious ten years ago. See Moore, supra note 8. 
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whether some particular entity or quality exists is to determine 
whether that thing has a necessary place in the best explanation of 
some features of the natural world that we take (for these purposes) to 
exist. We are justified in believing, for example, that intentions, elec-
trons, or propositions exist just in case our best explanations of human 
behavior, chemical structure, or linguistic behavior commit us to their 
existence. The explanationist question about moral entities such as 
rights, or moral qualities such as justice or culpability, is whether 
there are any natural phenomena (that we are confident exist) that the 
existence of these moral entities or qualities best explains. 
My aim in this Part is to ask this explanationist question with re-
spect to moral entities and qualities. The question interests me both 
because I accept the general epistemological stance of "inference to the 
best explanation" and because I too am an empiricist "one-worlder": 
if moral qualities exist, moral propositions are true, and moral beliefs 
are justified, it will be only in the sense of exist, true, and justified that 
science applies to the natural world. My own nonfoundationalist and 
empiricist epistemological leanings lead me to care about the explana-
tionist question, even though most persons with such epistemological 
leanings undoubtedly deploy the explanationist approach to argue 
against moral realism.216 
I shall proceed, first, by setting forth the views I understand an 
explanationist to hold about existential beliefs. Second, I shall intro-
duce the use of the "inference to the best explanation" strategy in 
moral theory by describing the antirealist arguments of Gilbert 
Harman and John Mackie, the two contemporary philosophers who 
have done the most to shape the explanationist debate within 
metaethics.217 Third, I shall identify the data to which the explana-
tionist strategy should be applied in moral theory. Fourth, I shall ar-
gue that, prima facie, moral qualities play a necessary role in the best 
explanations of the data that I care about, our moral beliefs about 
particular actions, people, or institutions. Fifth, I shall consider the 
relation between moral properties and nonmoral properties, a relation 
216. The most prominent are Gilbert Harman and J.L. Mackie. See HARMAN, supra note 
30, at 9; MACKIE, supra note 61; Gilbert Harman, Is There a Single True Morality?, in MORAL· 
ITY, REASON, AND TRUTH, supra note 27, at 45-46; Gilbert Harman, Moral Explanations of 
Natural Facts - Can Moral Claims Be Tested Against Moral Reality?, 24 S.J. PHIL. 57 (Supp. 
1986) [hereinafter Harman, Moral Explanations]. Others who have used the explanationist 
stance to argue against moral realism include BLACKBURN, supra note 29; Warren S. Quinn, 
Truth and Explanation in Ethics, 96 ETHICS 524 (1986); Frank Snare, The Empirical Bases of 
Moral Skepticism, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 215 (1984); David Zimmerman, Meta-Ethics Naturalized, 10 
CAN. J. PHIL. 637 (1980); David Zimmerman, Moral Realism and Explanatory Necessity, in 
MORALITY, REASON, AND TRUTH, supra note 27, at 79. 
217. See supra note 216. 
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often termed to be one of supervenience. I shall here argue that that 
relation is not itself "queer" and that its existence helps to sustain the 
contention that moral qualities best explain moral judgments. Finally, 
I shall close by considering a seemingly disparate set of objections that 
in fact raise a common question, namely, whether the existence of the 
supervenience relation is itself a necessary part of the best explanation 
of moral judgments such that it too can be justified on explanationist 
grounds. My conclusion (to keep the suspense to a tolerable pitch) is 
that we have good reason to believe that many moral qualities exist in 
the mind- and convention-independent way that satisfies the require-
ment of metaphysical realism. · 
A. Explanations and Ontological Commitment 
Ontological conclusions like "goodness exists" undoubtedly have a 
knock-down ring to them that suggests that there must be some unde-
niably cogent evidence showing such a thing. The suggestion is that if 
we can have some direct experience, particularly of observable objects 
like stones, that is all the proof we need that they exist. Johnson in an 
impatient moment apparently felt this way about the experience of 
kicking such a thing as a refutation of Berkelean idealism. 
Yet our ontological beliefs about what exists are not foundational 
in this way.218 We justify these like any other of our beliefs, by appeal 
to everything else we believe. Our beliefs that stones exist is not suffi-
ciently justified by kicking them and sensing their hard resistance to 
our foot; that experience of pain and resistance could be explained by 
an indefinitely large number of hypotheses which do not require the 
existence of stones. For instance, the experience could have been 
caused by our right foot having kicked our left, heavily booted foot, in 
the circumstance where our brain had previously been surgically split 
and the right cerebral hemisphere so wired that it caused a quick de-
fensive maneuver with our left foot. Our left hemisphere, in such a 
case, would know nothing of the movement of the left foot but would 
experience the pain and the resistance of the right. To rule out such 
competitors as improbable requires all of our other beliefs. The move 
from our kicking experience to the belief that there is a stone is thus 
not a simple read-off of reality by our perceptual apparatus. It is an 
inference we make in light of all else that we believe to be true. In 
light of all such other beliefs, we infer that the best explanation for 
why we had the experience we had was that there was a stone with 
218. For my earlier rehearsal of the standard objections to both empiricist and rationalist 
foundationalism, see Moore, supra note 8, at 1106-16. 
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which our foot came into contact. If such explanation is truly the 
best, then we are justified in believing that there are such things as 
stones. 
This familiar "coherence" or "nonfoundationalist" account of jus-
tifying our beliefs219 importantly includes a more specific account of 
what is needed to justify our ontological beliefs (that is, our beliefs 
about what exists). That a belief in the existence of stones coheres well 
with one's other beliefs is not enough to justify the former ontological 
belief, unless those other beliefs include a belief that there is a causal 
connection between certain of my experiences (like a hurt toe on a 
moving foot) and the existence of stones. Only if I can justify these 
connectionist beliefs (about reliable causal connections holding be-
tween certain experiences as the effects of certain things) am I justified 
in my existential belief that there are such things as stones in the 
world. In the case of the stones and the foot, the necessary beliefs 
involve how our sensory apparatus is put together so that tactile sensa-
tions are reliable indicators of the macroproperties of real world 
objects. 
How do I justify my belief in these kinds of reliable connections 
between my experiences and stones? By answering the same coheren-
tist question: are these connections part of the best explanation of why 
I have particular tactile or other experiences? If so, then I am justified 
in believing in the causal connections posited. If I am justified in that 
belief, then I am justified in believing that stones exist -again, so long 
as this coheres with all my other beliefs. 
This view of justification is rightly labeled both nonfoundationalist 
and empiricist. It is nonfoundationalist in that no belief is to be taken 
as a veridical starting point from which other beliefs are to be inferred. 
There are no self-evident first principles, analytic truths, phenomenal 
reports, or veridical read-offs of reality as postulated by rationalist and 
traditionally empiricist epistemologies. The view is nonetheless empir-
icist in a nontraditional sense, because it holds our ontological beliefs 
hostage to there being some connection, no matter how indirect, be-
tween what we think to exist and what we experience. 
Such a "coherentist" epistemology is not to be confused with what 
219. The classical statements of coherentist epistemology in modem philosophy are 
HARMAN, supra note 20; WILLARD v.o. QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW (1964); 
Gilbert H. Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 14 PHIL. REv. 88 (1965). Modem 
continuations prominently include GILBERT HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW: PRINCIPLES OF REA· 
SONING (1986); LYCAN, supra note 11; PAUL THAGARD, CONCEPTUAL REVOLUTIONS (1992); 
MICHAEL WILLIAMS, GROUNDLESS BELIEF (1977); Paul R. Thagard, The Best Explanation: 
Criteria far Theory Choice, 15 J. PHIL. 76 (1978) [hereinafter Thagard, Best Explanation]; Paul 
Thagard, Explanatory Coherence. 12 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCI. 435 (1989). 
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is sometimes called the coherence theory of truth. 220 Truth is a meta-
physical notion, not an epistemological one.221 A coherentist about 
truth is a metaphysical idealist who believes that a sentence is true 
when it coheres well with other sentences we (either individually or 
collectively) accept as true. A metaphysical realist, by contrast, thinks 
that the test for whether a proposition is true is the coherence of a 
belief with everything else we believe; he does not think that such a 
test captures the nature of truth. 
This last point opens up a large debate we cannot hope to resolve 
here: the debate about whether a coherentist about justification can 
ever cross the "gap" between what he is justified in believing to be true 
(i.e., coherence with his other beliefs) and what is true (i.e., correspon-
dence with a belief-independent reality). No gap exists for the idealist, 
for he adopts what Saul Kripke accurately calls a "sceptical solution": 
the idealist identifies reality as coherent belief. 222 That "solution" is 
unavailable to a realist; thus, the gap persists. 
I cannot undertake here to defuse the detailed arguments of so-
phisticated idealists like Richard Rorty223 and Hilary Putnam. 224 
Such arguments have nothing particularly to do with moral realism, 
but rather deal with the possibility of nonfoundationalist realism about 
the physical world as much as about moral qualities. What I can do 
here is defuse two popular versions of the "gap" worry. Both can be 
framed in terms of a "circularity" objection, but they differ 
nonetheless. 
The first version is the worry that nonfoundationalists never "hook 
onto" reality, because each belief is justified only by its fit with other 
beliefs. No belief, that is, is foundational in the sense of being un-
doubtable in its correspondence with the world. The picture this ob-
jection calls to mind is of a Portuguese Man-of-War, an intricately 
structured creature whose inner lattice-work we can admire greatly 
but whose tentacles never reach the ocean floor. Our beliefs are thus 
pictured as a floating, coherent mass that relate only to each other but 
220. See 2 BRAND BLANSHARD, THE NATURE OF THOUGHT (4th ed. 1964); NICHOLAS 
RESCHER, THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH (1973). 
221. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
222. SAUL A. KRIPKE, WrITGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 66-68 (1982). 
Kripke uses Hume's solution to causation as his example. 
223. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). For a de-
scription of the way that Rorty joins issue with what he calls the "technical realists,'' see Moore, 
supra note 34, at 902-03. 
224. See PUTNAM, MEANING AND THE MORAL SCIENCES, supra note 31; PUTNAM, REAL-
ISM AND REASON, supra note 31; HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH, AND HISTORY (1981). 
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never touching the world. This picture portrays a coherentist in epis-
temology as necessarily an idealist in metaphysics. 
The problem with this picture is that it ignores the content of our 
beliefs. The beliefs that we justify on a coherentist basis are not about 
creatures of fiction or fairy tale. We believe things like: feet hitting 
stones cause us to experience pain; the fact that we have the word pain 
is caused by human beings' in fact having such a mental sensation and 
baptizing that experience with this symbol; and visual perception ac-
curately portrays the world in certain standard lighting conditions. 
That none of these beliefs is self-evidently true is irrelevant to what it is 
we believe when we believe (on whatever grounds) that they are true. 
To justify holding any of these beliefs is thus to justify belief in the 
mind-independent existence of stones, pains, and the visible world, for 
that is what our beliefs are about. It is not merely to justify our belief 
that we believe such things to be true, which would be an idealist 
position. 
The second version is a worry that begins by asking what a coher-
entist means by coherence, explanation, and best explanation. There is 
a variety of ways to define each of these terms and then relate them; 
one is to define coherence as a symmetrical relation between proposi-
tions that, at a minimum, involves freedom from contradiction be-
tween them.225 A sufficient condition of incoherence betweenp and q, 
in other words, is that q either is, or implies, the negation of p. 226 
Explanation was at least at one time standardly thought to involve a 
deductive relation between statements describing what was explained 
and the statements doing the explaining, the latter being a set of prem-
ises that logically implied the former.227 An explanation is best, on 
standard accounts, if at a minimum its statements: (a) cohere (do not 
contradict) with the propositions one already believes to be true and 
with the propositions implied by these; and (b) imply the proposition 
describing the situation or event to be explained. Since Quine's revival 
of Duhem, it is standardly thought that an infinite number of explana-
tions satisfies (a) and (b).228 Therefore, subsidiary criteria of epistemic 
virtue are usually included in what makes an explanation "best," 
225. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 219, at 80-81; Thagard, Explanatory Coherence, supra 
note 219. 
226. That is, p and q may contradict one another explicitly, where q equals not-p, or implic-
itly, where q implies not-p. See CHERNIAK, supra note 119, at 16. 
227. For a history of Carl Hempel's deductivism about explanation over the last four de-
cades, see WESLEY c. SALMON, FOUR DECADES OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1989). I use 
this much criticized notion of explanation simply to allow the critic of explanationism to make 
his second circularity objection. 
228. See Quine, supra note 12. 
August 1992) Moral Reality Revisited 2497 
namely, how simple the explanation is vis-a-vis its competitors, how 
directly testable it is by experiential beliefs, how broad in scope its 
implications, how precise its predictive implications, and the like.229 
Although this is a rough portrait, it allows my objector to frame 
his second objection to any attempt to justify realist metaphysics with 
a coherentist epistemology. The objection is that the coherentist has 
no way of justifying these notions of coherence, explanation, and best 
explanation, except by some foundationalist claim that they are self-
evident or are analytic truths about the meaning of justified belief, or, 
even worse, that these are "aesthetically satisfying" virtues of theory-
construction viewed as a kind of art form. 
A coherentist, of course, can make none of these moves to justify 
his best explanation conception of epistemic justification. His justifica-
tion of some conception of coherence, explanation, and best explana-
tion should be no different from his justification of other beliefs; how 
well does this (coherence) view of justification cohere with everything 
else he believes? More particularly, does this view of justification best 
explain our justificatory practices, and is it part of the best explanation 
for why those practices occur and have the predictive/explanatory 
successes that they seem to have? 
It is because of this response that the second objection should ulti-
mately be seen as a circularity objection. The charge, of course, is that 
the coherentist is using his notion of justification to justify his notion 
of justification as being true. And indeed he is. But whence comes the 
demand for linear thinking: first you must justify this idea of justifica-
tion, and only then can you use this justificatory apparatus to justify 
any other beliefs? This demand is no more than a foundationalist pos-
tulate about how justification must proceed, which a coherentist is free 
to reject as begging the question. A coherentist should admit that his 
theory of justification might be false, either in detail or as a whole. 
But only incremental attacks, based on the inability of this justifica-
tory apparatus to support us in beliefs for which we antecedently be-
lieve we have good evidence, will show it to be false. Coherentist 
conceptions of justification cannot be shown to be false simply by blan-
ket demands for foundationalist justifications of what, after all, are 
nonfoundationalist modes of reasoning. 230 
We should leave the large questions about coherentist justification 
229. See, e.g., LYCAN, supra note 11, at 128-56; Thagard, Best Explanation, supra note 219. 
230. This response by the coherentist calls to mind Quine's coherentist response to the objec-
tion that he had presupposed standard truth-functional logic in his translations of his mythical 
islanders: "our logic ... would beg the question of prelogicality if there were a question to beg." 
QUINE, supra note 14, at 58. 
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for another day. A sharpening of what an explanationist demands in 
order to justify an ontological belief more directly bears on our use of 
explanationism to defend moral realism. We have so far said that, to 
justify our belief that x exists, x must have a necessary place in our 
best explanation of something else, y, that we are more certain exists; 
and, further, that the items best explained by x must include our expe-
rience (observational beliefs) thatx exists. This latter, empiricist crite-
rion demands that the best explanation of why we believe (or 
experience, or observe) that x exists include the fact that x does exist. 
Crucial to our later discussion will be two different readings of this 
empiricist requirement for justified ontological belief.231 The first, 
causal reading requires that x cause our apparent experiences of x. 
Only then is x a part of the best explanation of our experiences, y. The 
second, explanatory reading requires that the fact that x exists ex-
plains the fact that we have certain apparent experiences of x. 
The difference between these two readings is not based on some 
supposition that some explanations may be best even if they are not 
causal explanations. I assume for these purposes the only relevant ex-
planations are causal explanations, so the difference between the two 
readings cannot lie there. The difference rather lies in the distinction 
between the causal relation itself and causal explanations. Descrip-
tions of causal relations, like "x causes y," create what are called ex-
tensional contexts. 232 In extensional contexts, it does not matter how 
x and y are described, because it will remain true (or false) that x 
causes y. That the fire was caused by the electric spark, the presence 
of hydrogen, and the presence of oxygen will remain true no matter 
how we describe the fire, the gases, or the spark, so long as we succeed 
in referring to these same entities, states, and events. 
By contrast, causal explanations create nonextensional contexts. 
The fact that there was a fire is distinct from the fact that the fire was 
very explosive and from the fact that the fire had a certain direction 
and force, even though the event that was the fire is one and the same 
event. Facts are propositional, and they differ from one another even 
though the event that they are about is one and the same event.233 
231. I found Geoffrey Sayre-McCord's Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence particu-
larly helpful here, although how I draw the distinction between the two readings, and the use I 
make of it, differs from his approach. See Sayre-McCord, supra note 27. 
232. For discussion and citation on the much-discussed question of whether causal state-
ments are extensional, see Michael S. Moore, Foreseeing Harm Opaquely, in ACTION AND 
VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW (John Gardner et al. eds., forthcoming 1993); Michaels. Moore, 
Thomson's Preliminaries About Rights and Causation, 63 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 497, 504 n.41 
(1987). 
233. On the distinction between facts and events, see JONATHAN BENNETI, EVENTS AND 
THEIR NAMES (1988); MICHAEL s. MOORE, Acr AND CRIME ch. 4 (forthcoming 1993). 
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Moreover, the truth of an explanation varies depending on which fact 
about the fire is being explained. That there was a fire at all is in part 
explained by the spark, but the spark need not explain that the fire had 
a certain force or direction or color; these facts may be explained by 
the fact that the hydrogen and oxygen were mixed in a certain propor-
tion, or by any number of other facts. 234 
The difference between the two readings of the empiricist require-
ment thus comes down to the distinction between things and facts 
about things. Usually this is a distinction that makes no difference in 
the application of the empiricist requirement. Usually a best explana-
tion of our experience in either sense will suffice to justify an ontologi-
cal belief. That is, if x causes our experience y, then x must exist (on 
the reasonable supposition that nonexistent "things" like omissions do 
no causing).235 Likewise, if the fact that x exists, or the fact that x is 
yellow, explains the fact that we have certain apparent experiences of 
x, then x must exist; for although the fact that x exists or is yellow 
should not be confused with the thing x itself, such facts about x re-
quires that x exist for such facts to be true. 
The two different readings of the empiricist requirement matter 
where we are trying to justify an ontological belief about x's by a fur-
ther (reductive) belief thatx's are really justz's.236 Suppose, for exam-
ple, we are trying to justify to ourselves that there are molecules of two 
hydrogen atoms bonded to one oxygen atom. (These molecules will be 
our "x's.") We make the justificatory claim in the following way: we 
are justified in believing that water (z in this example) exists because 
we have certain experiences (yin this example) that unproblematically 
exist, and these are best explained by the existence of water {z). Since 
we believe that water just is H20 (z = x), then the existence of H20 is 
also part of the best explanation of our apparent experiences of water 
(y). So we are justified in believing that H20 molecules exist too. 
If we are sure of the truth of our reductive hypothesis (x = z), then 
this justification for belief in the existence of x's is impeccable. But 
what if we are as unsure of the reductive hypothesis (x = z) as we are 
of the existence of x's? Surely that reductive hypothesis is also to be 
justified by the empiricist requirement, and now it matters which read-
ing of the requirement we apply. The causal reading of the require-
ment can do no work for us here, because it is blind to different 
234. For another example, see Quinn, supra note 216: "That Jones finished first in the race 
explains why he got the prize. But that Jones finished at some position or other in the race ... 
does not explain why he got the prize." Id. at 536. 
235. I argue for this position in MOORE, supra note 233, ch. 10. 
236. See Quinn, supra note 216, at 527. 
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descriptions of x; if z (or HiO) is just another description that picks 
out the very same thing as x (or water), then on the causal reading of 
the empiricist requirement the latter is satisfied; if not, not.237 But the 
very question is whether the identity is true, and on this the causal 
reading gives us no help. 
On the explanatory reading, however, how the x's are described 
matters to whether the empiricist requirement is satisfied. The explan-
atory reading, in other words, becomes a more stringent test than the 
causal reading.238 For now, x's must best explain our experiences (y) 
under their descriptions as '~'s." If such explanations are made out, 
then we are justified in believing that there are such things as x's. In 
addition, if those things we call x's overlap in enough ways with those 
things we call z's, then we may also be justified in identifying the two. 
To flesh this out with my example of water and H20, suppose that 
some explanations of somethings (y) can only be made in terms of the 
fact that H20 molecules exist, not in terms of the fact that water exists. 
E.g., let y be the fact that we experienced wetness if we were in the 
room (and were still alive where hydrogen gas, oxygen gas, and an 
electric spark were all simultaneously present). The best explanation 
for the fact that we feel wet will not be the fact that water was present, 
if we do not know that water is H20 - for just before the flash of light 
and heat there was no water (and, as Julie Andrews has it, "Nothing 
comes from nothing. Nothing ever could").239 Rather, the best expla-
nation for the fact that we feel wet includes the fact that feelings of 
wetness are caused by H20 molecules and that H20 molecules are 
formed by explosive combinations of hydrogen and oxygen gases. Our 
reductive hypothesis also gains support here, for water in other cir-
cumstances causes these same feelings of wetness; parsimony in ontol-
ogy should therefore incline us to identify water with H20. 
237. Compare Lycan, supra note 11, at 93 n.26, where Lycan considers whether what I have 
been calling "x's" "would have to play their causal as well as their explanatory roles" qua x's, 
that is, as things possessed of the properties described by x. Although Lycan rejects this interpre-
tation of the causal requirement, I should have thought one should reject it on the general 
ground that causal contexts are extensional (so that an object or event is or is not a cause of 
something else tout cour and not qua one description or another). As Peter Railton notes, "be-
cause the form of the reduction of water to H20 is that of an identification, it makes no sense to 
ask of a causal role assigned to water ..• whether the causal work is 'really' being done by water 
or by H20. There can be no competition here •.•. " Railton, Naturalism and Prescriptivity, 
supra note 27, at 161. 
238. In another context, namely, for universals, the causal reading is a more stringent test 
than is the explanatory reading. Scientific laws may have a necessary place in the best explana· 
tion of particular events, but those laws do not cause those events to occur. On the explanatory 
reading, such universals exist, whereas on the causal reading, they do not. See Sayre-McCord, 
supra note 27, at 266. 
239. RICHARD ROGERS AND OSCAR HAMMERSTEIN, THE SOUND OF MUSIC (1965). 
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All of this will eventually become critically important in making 
out the coherentist's argument for the existence of moral qualities, be-
cause the relation between moral and natural properties holds the key 
to the argument. For now, let us simply resolve the ambiguity we 
have uncovered in the coherentist's empiricist requirement by stipulat-
ing that an entity must pass both versions of the requirement before 
we are justified in believing in its existence. 240 
B. The Harman-Mackie Argument Against Naturalist Realism 
Both Gilbert Harman and John Mackie have had a large part in 
fashioning the best explanation strategy so as to defend realism about 
scientific and common sense entities and qualities, including in 
Mackie's case the causal relation itself. 241 Both, however, believe that 
the strategy that they have helped to fashion argues against moral 
realism. 
Harman appears to reach his conclusion about moral qualities by 
relying on a finer-grained analysis than does Mackie. Harman invites 
us to compare particular explanations of our scientific beliefs with par-
ticular explanations of our moral beliefs, Harman's intended conclu-
sion being that such explanations commit us only to the entities of 
science.242 Mackie, by contrast, interposes a preliminary, across-the-
board objection to realist explanations of moral beliefs; namely, that 
they would be bad explanations because they posit the existence of 
"queer" entities, "queer" relations, and "queer" modes of perceiving 
both.243 
Harman's finer-grained analysis juxtaposes particular cases of sci-
entific and mathematical observations, on the one hand, with moral 
observations on the other. Since Harman too accepts the empiricist 
idea that "an observation is evidence for what best explains it, "244 he 
seeks the best explanation of each of these observations in order to see 
whether they can support existential claims about scientific, mathe-
matical, or moral entities. 
Consider three examples. A physicist sees a vapor trail in a cloud 
chamber. Because of his experience, he fo~s the belief, "there goes a 
240. That this is probably too strong a requirement is shown by the causal reading's exclu-
sion of universals. See supra note 238. I shall nonetheless keep both readings before us in my 
consideration of the existence of moral qualities, for if moral qualities can pass both readings, 
their existence is that much more strongly argued for. 
241. For a masterful account of causation that is realist, see J.L. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF 
THE UNIVERSE (1974). 
242. See HARMAN, supra note 30. 
243. See MACKIE, supra note 61. 
244. HARMAN, supra note 30, at 10. 
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proton." Harman thinks that the best explanation for why the physi-
cist believes that there was a proton present is because there was a 
proton present in the cloud chamber. This realist explanation is better 
than a subjectivist explanation - i.e., an explanation couched only in 
terms of the physicist's psychological set - because the latter is an 
implausible explanation of what the physicist believes.245 The subjec-
tivist explanation is implausible, Harman believes, because the physi-
cist's beliefs would not have included the belief that there was a vapor 
trail and that there was a proton if in fact there were no proton 
present. 
The best explanation argument for the existence of numbers is 
somewhat different. Belief in numbers does not arise from observing 
numbers, so the explanandum explained by the existence of numbers 
cannot plausibly be our observational beliefs, such as "there goes a 
number." Rather, numbers exist for Harman because they figure as 
necessary posits in our best explanations of phenomena other than our 
beliefs about numbers.246 
Harman's example of a moral observation is the judgment we 
make when we see children pouring gasoline on a cat and setting it 
afire.247 Observing the children, we come to the belief that what they 
are doing is wrong. Our psychological set, Harman urges, satisfacto-
rily explains this belief: because of our socialization, we are generally 
disposed to believe that deliberate cruelty, to man or beast, is wrong, 
and it is this general disposition that causes us to believe that the act of 
the children is wrong. Such a subjective explanation does not commit 
us to the existence of a moral quality named by wrong. True enough, 
Harman concludes, one can imagine a competing, realist explanation: 
our belief that cat-burning is wrong can be explained by the moral fact 
that the action is wrong. But such a realist explanation, Harman 
rightly perceives, commits us not only to the existence of wrongness as 
a quality, but also to there being a causal relation between wrongness 
and our beliefs about wrongness. Harman sees no way to make sense 
of such a causal connection: "there does not seem to be any way in 
which the actual rightness or wrongness of a given situation can have 
any effect on your perceptual apparatus."248 
Harman is willing to concede a place for realist explanations if we 
change the explanandum. If what we seek to explain is not, "why do 
we believe that setting the cat afire is wrong?" but rather, "why is it 
245. Id. at 6-7. 
246. See id. at 9-10. 
247. See id. at 7. 
248. Id. at 8. 
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wrong to set the cat afire?" the best explanation may well be the realist 
one: because deliberate cruelty to man or beast is always wrong. Such 
explanations, however, presuppose the existence of moral qualities by 
their selection of what needs explaining; for this reason they cannot 
constitute an argument for the existence of moral qualities.249 
John Mackie has advanced two other arguments against moral re-
alism, the argument from relativity and the argument from queer-
ness. 250 Both of these involve inference to the best explanation, but 
since Mackie did not explicitly frame them as such, a bit of exegesis is 
required. 
The argument from relativity eschews particular moral beliefs as 
the facts to be explained and focuses on a more general "fact of an-
thropology": there is a lot of disagreement on moral matters between 
persons in the same culture, between different cultures, and between 
the same persons and cultures at different periods of their histories.251 
Thus, Mackie continues, if moral beliefs are caused by a moral reality 
in the way that factual beliefs are caused by physical reality, one 
would expect a convergence of moral belief identical to that which has 
occurred with scientific belief. Not finding such a parallel, Mackie 
concludes: "the argument from relativity has some force simply be-
cause the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily ex-
plained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the 
hypothesis that they express perceptions ... of objective values."252 
Mackie divides his argument from queerness into two branches, 
one metaphysical and the other epistemological.253 Because of his un-
fortunate choice of the word queer, both versions of Mackie's argu-
ment are easily (mis)interpreted to be nothing more than shocks to 
empiricist sensibilities.254 So interpreted, Mackie's queerness "argu-
ment" is akin to Justice Holmes' famous "argument" against natural 
law: natural law could not exist, Holmes concluded, for if it did exist 
it would be a "brooding omnipresence in the sky," a kind of Aurora 
Borealis sans lights.255 So interpreted, Mackie's queerness argument 
would then be subject to Paul Grice's apt rejoinder to those who 
would be skeptical about mental states on "queerness" grounds: 
249. See id. at 8-9. 
250. See MACKIE, supra note 61, at 35. 
251. See id. at 36. 
252. Id. at 37. 
253. See id. at 38. I discuss Mackie's subdivisions of his queerness argument in Moore, supra 
note 8, at 1086-88, 1117-36. 
254. See, e.g., Platts, supra note 52, at 72. 
255. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917). 
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I am not greatly enamoured of ... a concern to exclude such "queer" or 
"mysterious" entities as souls, purely mental events, purely mental 
properties and so forth. My taste is for keeping open house for all sorts 
and conditions of entities, just so long as when they come in they help 
with the house-work. Provided that I see them at work [in an explana-
tion] ... I do not find them queer or mysterious at all .... To exclude 
honest working entities seems to me like metaphysical snobbery, a reluc-
tance to be seen in the company of any but the best objects. 256 
Mackie's queerness arguments, however, are more than an attempt 
to shock empiricist sensibilities. They are in fact efforts to construct a 
best explanation argument against moral realism. Mackie fastens onto 
two alleged aspects of moral qualities. The first is the necessarily mo-
tivating power that moral qualities allegedly possess. As Mackie puts 
it, 
something's being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it 
and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone 
who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this 
person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just 
because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it.257 
The item about which Mackie is here seeking the best explanation 
is the alleged fact that moral beliefs necessarily motivate their holder 
to certain behavior. A realist who undertook to explain this alleged 
fact must do so in terms of a further fact about moral beliefs: they 
either are, or they are necessarily accompanied by, a desire to further 
that which is believed to be good or right.258 Mackie, like Hume 
before him, finds this explanation to be "queer" in the sense that it 
does not comport with our more general beliefs about how human psy-
chology works. Practical reasoning, we think, is governed by two dis-
tinct types of premises, the motivating (or "pro-attitude") premise and 
the cognitive (or means/end belief) premise. Psychology views beliefs 
as the slaves of the passions in the sense that beliefs cannot by them-
selves motivate people to act. Mackie's true "queerness" objection 
here is that construing moral beliefs to be beliefs - that is, cognitive 
states whose content is about a mind-independent reality - is incon-
sistent with our general psychological theory. Moreover, an antirealist 
explanation of moral "beliefs" is available that does not call into ques-
tion our general psychological theory, i.e., just the explanation that 
Hume gave: moral beliefs are not really beliefs about anything at all; 
they are simply expressions of emotion and, as such, of course are nee-
256. Paul Grice, Method in Philosophical Psychology (From the Banal to the Bizarre), 48 
PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. AssN. 23, 30-31 (1975). 
257. MACKIE, supra note 61, at 40. 
258. See, for example, Platts, supra note 52, for an attempt at this kind of "intemalist'' realist 
explanation. 
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essarily motivating because that is what emotions, as opposed to be-
liefs, do. 
The second aspect of moral qualities that Mackie finds "queer" are 
the relations that would have to hold between moral qualities and nat-
ural qualities. Mackie queries: 
What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece 
of deliberate cruelty - say, causing pain just for fun - and the moral 
fact that it is wrong? ... The wrongness must somehow be "consequent-
ial" or "supervenient"; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cru-
elty. But just what in the world is signified by this "because"?259 
Mackie's point is not simply that he has inventoried his ontological 
commitments about relations and can find none labeled supervenience. 
Rather, the alleged queerness of the supervenience relation is impor-
tant to Mackie because it obstructs the framing of adequate explana-
tions for our moral beliefs. On the realist explanation of those beliefs 
that Mackie is criticizing, we must discern a "mysterious consequent-
ial link" between a natural property and a moral property so that we 
can infer wrongness, say, from cruelty.260 "How much simpler and 
more comprehensible," Mackie urges, "if we could replace the moral 
quality with some sort of subjective response which could be causally 
related to the detection of the natural features on which the supposed 
quality is said to be consequential."261 
Implicit in Mackie's discussion of queer relations is the following 
best-explanation argument against moral realism. 262 The fact to be 
explained is, again, our moral beliefs. For example, I watch children 
burning a cat and I believe that their act is wrong. rhe realist expla-
nation for this belief is that the wrongness of the children's action 
causes my belief that it is wrong. The naturalist realist explanation of 
how this causation works is not the possession of a special faculty ("in-
tuition") capable of sniffing out moral qualities; rather, we infer the 
cruelty of the children's action from certain behavioral clues and we 
infer the wrongness of the action from its cruelty. 
Mackie's "queer relation" objection surfaces as an objection to 
there being any capacity to infer wrongness from cruelty, for how 
could we have such an inferential capacity when the relation is ulti-
mately mysterious? There are no analytic relations between wrong and 
cruel, nor are there causal relations between cruelty and wrongness. 
259. MACKIE, supra note 61, at 41; see Moore, supra note 8, at 1125-33 (discussing Mackie's 
"queer relation" objection). 
260. See MACKIE, supra note 61, at 41. 
261. Id. 
262. See Moore, supra note 8, at 1126. 
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We thus must not be inferring wrongness from cruelty, Mackie con-
cludes; ultimately, the naturalist realist, no less than .his nonnaturalist 
cousin, is relegated to the "lame answer" that humans possess a spe-
cial faculty of intuition by which they directly "see" wrongness.263 
Whereas if wrongness does not name a mind-independent quality, but 
describes or expresses emotional revulsion, then one can explain that 
revulsion in terms of the perception that an action in the world is cruel 
coupled with certain subjective features of our psychology. 
Mackie's "epistemological argument from queerness" is in reality 
no different from the metaphysical arguments from which he nomi-
nally separates it. For the explanandum is again our moral beliefs, 
and Mackie's queerness objection is again interposed against what 
Mackie takes to be the only realist explanation of those beliefs in terms 
of a special faculty of intuition. 
C. In Search of an Explanandum: What Needs Explaining by 
Moral Reality? 
If we sort through these arguments by Harman and Mackie, we 
may usefully distinguish four types of items about which realists and 
antirealists must compete in their explanations. The first has been ex-
plored at some length by Bill Lycan.264 Lycan introduces a distinction 
between intuiteds and intuitings. Intuiteds are what we believe - the 
objects of our beliefs, which are propositions (or sentences) about the 
external world. Intuitings are the mental states we more usually call 
beliefs. Intuiteds are in the world; intuitings are in our head. 
Lycan draws this distinction in order to point up a disanalogy be-
tween Harman's use of the best-explanation strategy in science and 
morality. The debate about scientific realism, Lycan correctly points 
out, often involves efforts to explain intuiteds. For example, scientific 
realists urge that the best explanation of the macrobehavior of gases 
(pressure, volume, temperature, and diffusion rate through a porous 
membrane) is the existence of molecules possessing kinetic energy. 
Antirealists urge that the macrobehavior of gases is better explained 
by the ideal gas theory taken instrumentally, i.e., without ontological 
commitments to things like "kinetic energy." In neither case are real-
ists or antirealists seeking to explain the fact that an observer believes 
that the volume, pressure, and temperature of gas vary in systematic 
ways; rather, the explanation attempts to make sense of the fact that 
gas does behave this way. 
263. MACKIE, supra note 61, at 39. 
264. See Lycan, supra note 11, at 88-89. 
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Why, then, Lycan asks, should one frame a debate about moral 
realism in terms of moral beliefs - intuitings - as the items to be 
explained? Rather, a theory should explain moral facts like the facts 
that slavery is unjust and bullfighting is wrong. 
Harman is surely on solid ground in rejecting Lycan's invitation to 
shift the explanandum from intuitings to intuiteds.265 To do so in the 
context of a debate about moral realism would soundly beg the ques-
tion. The best explanation strategy only does its justificatory work to 
those who agree that the item to be explained unproblematically exists. 
The disanalogy between science and ethics to which Lycan adverts 
is there, but that is because neither side in one of the debates about 
scientific realism disputes the existence of real world objects and their 
primary qualities. Both those who assert the existence of theoretical 
entities in science, such as kinetic energy, and those who deny it 
("realists" and "instrumentalists," respectively) admit the existence of 
gases and their macroqualities such as pressure and volume. Thus, 
those entities and their qualities are eligible to serve as the expla-
nandum realists and antirealists seek to explain. 
Suppose, however, the debate about scientific realism were between 
phenomenalists and naive realists. Since phenomenalists do not think 
that real world objects exist (they are mere "constructions" out of 
sense data), the existence of such objects cannot serve as the expla-
nanda. Rather, one now has to start with perceptual beliefs ("intuit-
ings") and ask whether the best explanation of those items is that they 
are caused by real world objects (realism) or whether they are them-
selves only complex constructions out of more primitive mental go-
ings-on, sense-data (phenomenalism). 
The debate about moral realism is similar to the phenomenalist-
realist debate in science and dissimilar to the instrumentalist-realist 
debate. Antirealists about morality do not concede the existence of 
badness or justice as qualities that apply to bullfighting, slavery, or 
anything else. They deny the existence of moral qualities root and 
branch at any level. They accordingly cannot be persuaded by best 
explanations of more particular moral truths (intuiteds). 
A second item proposed as the relevant explanandum for the real-
ist/antirealist debate in ethics is behavior. Nicholas Sturgeon has 
framed his response to Harman's antirealism in part by producing 
morally realist explanations of behavior.266 Sturgeon claims to have 
discovered "a whole range of extremely common cases ... in which we 
265. By anticipation - see HARMAN, supra note 30, at 8. 
266. Sturgeon also frames explanations of'moral beliefs. Sturgeon, supra note 27. 
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cite someone's moral character as part of an explanation of his or her 
deeds."267 Thus, Hitler did what he did because he was depraved;268 
Midshipman Woodworth (who was in charge of rescue efforts to save 
the Donner party trapped in the snows of the California Sierras in the 
winter of 1846) failed to rescue the Donner party because he "was just 
no damned good."269 Sturgeon also claims to have discovered a range 
of cases where the more general moral attributes of rightness and 
wrongness form part of the best explanation of behavior. Thus, oppo-
sition to slavery took place to a much greater extent in Britain and 
France (including British and French America) in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth Centuries than it did in Spain and Portugal (including 
Latin America), because slavery was much worse (morally) in British 
and French America than it was in Latin America.270 
These accounts seek to explain something that both realists and 
antirealists about morality concede to exist, namely, human behavior. 
Such explanations (if they compete successfully against antirealist ex-
planations) thus have greater promise, for their competitive success 
would constitute a good reason to believe that the entities they con-
template - good and bad character, rightness and wrongness - actu-
ally exist. 
Despite this greater promise, I shall at least initially ignore behav-
ioral examples as the most crucial explananda and rather focus on 
moral beliefs. It is the existence of moral beliefs that the realist must 
explain by inference to mind-independent moral qualities, for until he 
can explain them he cannot satisfy the empiricist criterion for justifica-
tion. That criterion requires an account of how we gather knowledge 
about the world that shows our information gathering technique to be 
reliable. Such an account gives us reason to credit certain of our ex-
periences - what we often call observational experiences - as consti-
tuting evidence of a deeper reality causing them. The causal theory of 
perceptual belief offers such an account for our observations of many 
ordinary (and some not so ordinary) objects in the world. If moral 
qualities also exist, we need some account of the origins of our moral 
beliefs analogous to the causal theory of perceptual belief. Otherwise, 
the realist cannot show our moral observations to be reliable evidence 
of a deeper moral reality. If the realist is at all an empiricist in his 
epistemology, as am I, that failure to explain why our moral observa-
267. Id. at 63. 
268. See id. at 52. 
269. Id. at 63 (quoting BERNARD DEVOTO, THE YEAR OF DECISION: 1846, at 442 (1942)). 
270. Id. at 64. 
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tions are reliable indicators of reality should by itself incline him to 
doubt the existence of that reality. 
This is why I here eschew Sturgeon's historical examples where 
moral reality may enter into the best explanation of certain behaviors. 
If such examples succeed, they do give us reason to believe that moral 
qualities exist. Such existence still remains a puzzle to us, however, 
until we can also explain how we can come to "know it when we see 
it" (to paraphrase the late Justice Stewart on pornography).271 
The third explanandum is thus the existence of moral beliefs. 
Within the category of moral beliefs, we may usefully distinguish gen-
eral moral beliefs from particular moral beliefs. 272 The distinction lies 
in the objects of the belief. A general moral belief is about justice or 
rightness of actions in general. Particular moral beliefs, by contrast, 
concern the justice or injustice (goodness or badness, rightness or 
wrongness) of some particular act, actor, or institution. It is our par-
ticular moral beliefs that most urgently require explanation by moral 
reality if an explanationist defense of moral realism is to be persuasive. 
For, if such moral observations273 can be shown to connect in a relia-
ble way to moral features of the world, the rest of our moral beliefs 
can be justified through the familiar theory-building technique of re-
flective equilibrium.274 Focusing on particular moral beliefs has the 
added benefit of applying the empiricist requirement to those of our 
moral beliefs that seem most analogous to the particular perceptual 
beliefs given priority by empiricists in their explanationist justifications 
of scientific realism. 
Before we examine the competing realist and antirealist explana-
tions of moral beliefs, a fourth set of possible explananda deserves brief 
mention. These are the many features of our moral experience "in the 
large"275 that not only require some explanation but for which moral 
271. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1961) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
272. See Quinn, supra note 216, at 531. 
273. I call such particular moral beliefs moral observations because they fit all that can be 
asked of a definition of observation or observational belief: particular moral beliefs are often 
formed as a direct result of a perceptual experience. The experience of seeing two boys burning a 
cat can as immediately spark a judgment that the act is wrong as that the item is a black cat. 
What is an "observation" is strictly a question of psychology and should not be taken to beg the 
question of what exists to be observed. We might label such particular moral beliefs as spontane-
ous, particular beliefs or particular intuitions, but I prefer observations to keep up front the paral-
lel to physical perception. For discussions of "observations" in this context, see Lycan, supra 
note 11, at 86; Sayre-McCord, supra note 27, at 259. 
274. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE §§ 3, 9, 87 (1971); Norman Daniels, Wide 
Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 J. PHIL. 256 (1979); John Rawls, 
Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHIL. REV. 177 (1951). 
275. Sturgeon's distinction. See Sturgeon, supra note 27, at 49-50; Nicholas L. Sturgeon, 
Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts, 24 S.J. PHIL. 69, 69-70 (Supp. 1986). 
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realism promises a competitive account. These include: (1) all the 
anthropological facts to which Mackie's "argument from relativity" 
directs us, including the degree of consensus on moral matters, the 
convergence of beliefs over time in ethics vis-a-vis science, and so 
forth;276 (2) the psychological fact that we experience some moral di-
lemmas as insoluble yet continue to seek a reasoned solution to such 
dilemmas;277 (3) the linguistic facts that Mackie lumps together as a 
"claim to objectivity" implicit in our ethical discourse,278 features in-
cluding the apparent ability of ethical utterances to be inconsistent, the 
declarative mood of such utterances, the attribution of truth values to 
moral assertions and of validity-invalidity to ethical argument;279 (4) 
the fact that an individual may radically disagree with his culture's 
values at any time and may even disagree with all of his own former 
values over time;280 (5) the fact adverted to by Mackie's argument 
from queerness, namely, that moral beliefs are often experienced as 
motivational and not simply as cognitive states; (6) the fact that our 
desires are experienced in a way that demands that there be objects 
that are desirable;281 and (7) the fact most people experience their 
evaluations as though the values must be supported by objective rea-
sons not of the subject's creation.282 
To the extent that these are features of our moral experience, they 
require explanation. The debates on these matters are best seen as 
276. See Moore, supra note 8, at 1088-96. Contrary to Jeremy Waldron's characterization 
that I do not take the argument from disagreement seriously, Waldron, supra note 3, at 172, I 
have given the argument three more sophisticated interpretations in the just cited article. 
277. See Moore, supra note 8, at 1101-02, 1149-52. 
278. See MACKIE, supra note 61, at 30-35. 
279. See generally Carl Wellman, Emotivism and Ethical Objectivity, 5 AM. PHIL. Q. 90, 92 
(1968). Wellman counts at least 12 such features. Waldron discounts such features by what he 
takes to be the countervailing linguistic practices of "gum-chewing sophomores": 
[I]t is simply no longer true that ordinary moral discourse is characterized unambiguously 
by realist-sounding talk of truth and falsity, logic and argument, reasonable and unreasona-
ble positions. Some is and some isn't. For every stern preacher who talks about the reality 
·or obligation, there is a gum-chewing sophomore who says that all moral views are just 
matters of opinion and there's no ultimate standard. The ordinary talk one hears is infected 
as much with relativist idioms as with truth-claims .••. [O]rdinary moral discourse, as I 
hear it, is a meta-ethical Babel. 
Waldron, supra note 3, at 166 (footnote omitted). The phenomenon to be explained here is not 
the "metaethical Babel" that Waldron's undergraduate teaching forces him to listen to. What 
needs explaining by a metaethical theory is the moral - not explicitly metaethical - discourse 
of gum-chewing sophomores as well as stern preachers, namely, that certain institutions are un-
just, that there are six good arguments showing that they are unjust, and so forth. It is this moral 
discourse that uniformly presupposes realism. 
280. See Werner, Ethical Realism, supra note 27, at 653, 659, 666. 
281. Compare Platts, supra note 52, with David Zimmerman, Moral Realism and Explana-
tory Necessity, in MORALITY, REASON, AND TRUTH, supra note 27, at 79. 
282. Compare David Wiggins, Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life, in EssAYS ON 
MORAL REALISM, supra note 9, at 127, with David Zimmerman, Moral Realism and Explana-
tory Necessity, in MORALITY, REASON, AND TRUTH, supra note 27, at 79. 
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inference to the best-explanation debates. A full defense of either 
moral realism or moral antirealism would require the framing of com-
peting explanations for each of these explananda too. I put such ex-
plananda aside, thus, not because they are not also relevant, but 
because examination of all of them leads quickly into all the major 
issues in metaethics. Enough for the day to focus on one such issue, 
which I now propose to do. 
D. Moral Reality as the Best Explanation of 
Our Particular Moral Beliefs 
It is helpful in seeking the best explanation for our moral beliefs to 
keep an example before us. Mackie and Harman both consider an 
example of deliberate cruelty's JJeing wrong, which has been exten-
sively utilized in the recent literature.283 Two boys, seventeen years 
old, deliberately douse a cat with gasoline and set it afire. Their rea-
sons are sadistic: they simply knew they would enjoy the animal's suf-
fering. Most people would make a twofold moral judgment about 
such a case: (1) The act was wrong; and (2) the boys were culpable. 
A realist explanation of our beliefs would be that the wrongness of 
the act - a property it possesses - caused our belief that the act was 
wrong, and the culpability of the boys - a property that they possess 
- caused our belief that they are culpable.284 An antirealist explana-
tion would be that only the nonmoral properties of the act and actors, 
together with our general moral beliefs, caused us to observe, experi-
ence, or spontaneously believe that the act was wrong and the boys 
were culpable.285 If the realist explanation is best, wrongness and cul-
pability are among the things we must include in our ontological in-
ventories; if the antirealist explanation is best, only nonmoral features 
of the world and our subjective beliefs need be included in the 
inventory. 
One striking feature of the antirealist's explanation merits immedi-
ate attention. The antirealist uses more general moral beliefs to ex-
plain particular beliefs. This feature may lead one to think that the 
antirealist explanation cannot explain moral beliefs since it posits in its 
explanans the existence of just what it was seeking to explain. This is a 
harmless objection to the antirealist, for a more complete explication 
of his views would include an explanation of more general moral be-
283. See HARMAN, supra note 30, at 7-9; MACKIE, supra note 61, at 4; Moore, supra note 8, 
at 1125-28; Quinn, supra note 216, at 536-37; Sturgeon, supra note 27, at 52-53. 
284. See Moore, supra note 8, at 1126. 
285. See HARMAN, supra note 30, at 7; MACKIE, supra note 61, at 41; Quinn, supra note 216, 
at 529-31. 
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liefs not framed in terms of particular moral beliefs. For example, our 
education and upbringing, rather than moral reality, caused us to hold 
our more general moral beliefs. Thus, the antirealist explanation can-
not be charged with inadequacy on its face (although this is not to 
concede the truth of the antirealist's genetic explanations of our gen-
eral moral beliefs; these explanations compete with realist explanations 
of such beliefs, which are that such general beliefs are formed induc-
tively from more particular moral judgments of the kind we are now 
examining). 
In assessing the comparative power of other competing explana-
tions of our particular moral beliefs antirealists often tout the superior-
ity of their explanation in ways that trivialize their apparent victory. 
Warren Quinn, for example, acknowledges that we can and do men-
tion moral facts in explanations of moral beliefs, but: "[I]t seems plau-
sible to think that we never need to use them. An intelligent and 
reflective explainer can always replace them with nonmoral hypothe-
ses about the world together with psychological hypotheses about peo-
ple's moral beliefs and attitudes."286 In contrast, both Quinn and 
Harman287 think, we have no choice but to mention the proton to ex-
plain our belief, "there goes a proton"; for we could explain neither 
the vapor trail nor our belief in the vapor trail on the basis of our 
"psychological set" (our believed principles of physics) alone. 
Such an easy victory for antirealist explanations of moral belief 
will not do at all, for it would pave the way for an equally easy (and 
equally empty) victory for antirealist explanations of scientific beliefs 
too. 288 Contrary to Harman, we do not need to mention the proton to 
explain the physicist's beliefs either; assuming he has been educated in 
standard physics, we can explain the physicist's belief solely by certain 
natural facts (the vapor trail) combined with his general beliefs about 
physics (vapor trails are caused by protons) that are themselves ex-
plained by education. 
What makes it necessary to mention protons in any of this is our 
belief that the physicist's physics education is right on at least one 
point, i.e., that without protons there would be no vapor trails in cloud 
chambers. Assuming this, when we mention the uncontested fact that 
there was a vapor trail in the cloud chamber in our explanation, we 
have also committed ourselves to the existence of protons. But that 
exact move is allowable to the moral realist as well. If we assume our 
286. Quinn, supra note 216, at 529. 
287. See HARMAN, supra note 30, at 6-7. 
288. See Sturgeon, supra note 27. 
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moral theory is correct on at least one point, i.e., sadistically causing 
suffering is wrong, then when we mention the natural fact of the sadis-
tic cruelty of the boys in our explanation we will also be committed to 
the existence of wrongness: In such a case we can no more avoid 
wrongness in explaining our moral beliefs than we can avoid protons 
in explaining our scientific beliefs. 
We must disallow such easy "victories" for antirealist explana-
tions, smuggling in as they do asymmetrical assumptions about how 
much moral as opposed to scientific theory we are entitled to presume 
as we ask whether we must mention wrongness, protons, and so forth. 
To create a more genuine competition between realist and antirealist 
explanations, the antirealist might attempt to refine his education ex-
planation of moral principles so that it genuinely displaces the realist 
account. Genetic explanations of belief as such do not compete with 
realist explanations. Indeed, we give the thought that they do compete 
a special name, the genetic fallacy. 289 Only when the genetic explana-
tion is of a kind that we know from past experience leads to unreliable 
beliefs are we entitled to infer that the realist explanation is untrue. 
Explanation in terms of unreliable educational techniques such as 
rote-learning or brainwashing come to mind.290 But these are not 
what Harman, Mackie, or Quinn wish to use, for these depend on de-
tailed showings that certain origins for belief are unreliable in contrast 
to others that are more reliable. Wanted by the antirealists here is a 
simpler, across-the-board, knock-down argument to the effect that re-
alist explanations as such cannot compete successfully with antirealist 
explanations. 
It is here that Mackie's and Harman's "queerness" objection does 
its work. As Harman puts it, "there does not seem to be any way in 
which the actual rightness or wrongness of a given situation can have 
any effect on your perceptual apparatus."29 1 And again more recently: 
"it is obscure how the rightness or wrongness of an action can mani-
fest itself in the world in a way that can affect the sense organs of 
people."292 The lack of any account of moral perception, Mackie con-
cludes, leads moral realists who are "clearheaded" to resort to the 
nonnaturalist's "lame answer" that we all possess a special faculty of 
moral intuition. 293 
289. Moore, supra note 8, at 1098. 
290. See id. at 1089-101, 1126 n.154; see also Moore, supra note 96, at 198-208, for explora-
tion of various possibilities that our moral beliefs are hallucinations. 
291. HARMAN, supra note 30, at 8. 
292. Harman, Moral Explanations, supra note 216, at 66. 
293. MACKIE, supra note 61, at 39. 
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The Harman/Mackie position thus devolves around one point: 
there is no causal account of moral beliefs analogous to the causal 
theory of perception for factual beliefs. Lacking such an account, of 
course, explanations not positing such "queer" connections and 
"queer" modes of knowing are best. Yet the naturist realist has such 
an account of moral perception to render his explanations "non-
queer." To see this account, we should reconstruct the inferential 
chains of the moral observer in the Harman/Mackie example in 
greater detail. I do so in terms of sets of beliefs, ordered roughly by 
the degree of their inferential "distance" (inference-ladenness) from a 
possible sort of noninferential perceptual belief. 294 
Set A are the spontaneous or noninferential perceptual beliefs the 
observer is caused to have by his observation of the boys' behavior and 
its effect. Set A includes the beliefs: that there were two boys; that the 
two boys both doused the cat with gasoline and struck a match to 
ignite it; that the cat was burned to death, screaming and racing 
around while it lived; that the two boys stayed to watch the cat burn, 
and laughed at the spectacle. Such perceptual beliefs resulted in a set 
of inferred beliefs, set B: that the observed movements of the boys' 
bodies were willed movements on their part; that the boys' acts caused 
(in fact, and proximately, as the lawyers say) the cat's suffering and 
death; that there was no greater evil prevented by the cat's death or 
suffering or firing than the evil represented by these consequences; that 
such acts were intentional under the descriptions, cat-burning and cat-
suffering,- that the cat did suffer horribly; that the act was motivated by 
a sadistic desire on the boys' part to watch the cat suffer, and by no 
other motive; that the boys generally possessed the mental capacities 
typical of their age and were not diminished in those general capacities 
on this occasion by reason of alcohol, drugs, or other impairing influ-
ences; that the boys were not acting under the influence of some threat 
by another person, nor was there some internal analogue of such 
threat (such as an addictive craving or an emotional rage) other than 
their sadistic desire. 
This set of inferred beliefs, in tum, resulted in a set (C) of further 
beliefs: (1) this act was voluntary, unjustified, and causative of a bad 
state of affairs; and (2) these actors performed this intentionally, with 
unredeeming motivation, and without excuse. These beliefs, in tum, 
294. One should not take my chosen starting point in this set of inferences as inevitable. I 
take it that where an observer starts in his inferences is a matter of psychology, which differs 
among people. Some people's immediate, spontaneous, or noninferential beliefs no doubt start 
with the wrongness of the boys' acts without finer factual detail. This is also true of nonmoral 
facts. Some people see drunken behavior where others see dilated pupils and droopy eyelids. 
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resulted in a set (D) of moral judgments: (1) this act was wrong; and 
(2) these actors were culpable in doing that wrong act.295 
Such an explanation thus far makes no mention of the objective 
moral qualities of wrongness or culpability; but that is because we 
have not yet said what those qualities, as manifested in this situation, 
are. The wrongness of the boys' act lies in the facts that it was volun-
tary, unjustified, and causative of a bad state of affairs; that it was 
voluntary, unjustified, and causally relevant lies in the facts about its 
volitional character, its failure to cause beneficial effects, and its actual 
causation of harmful effects; the truth of the last of these facts lies in 
the fact that the cat did suffer and did die. Similarly, the culpability of 
the boys lies in the facts that they intentionally performed the wrong-
ful act and did so with unredeeming motivation and without excuse, 
and those facts in turn are constituted by all the facts believed in set 
(B), which in turn are evidenced by the facts believed in set (A). 
This is not to say that the wrongness of an act always lies in its 
production of unnecessary suffering nor even in the act's harmful ef-
fects, nor that culpability always is constituted, even in part, by inten-
tionality. There is no type-identity between wrongness and causation 
of suffering, nor between culpability and intentionality, such that 
wrongness of an action always consists of causation of needless suffer-
ing or that culpability always consists of intentionality or sadistic mo-
tivation. What we should say is that moral qualities like wrongness 
and culpability supervene on nonmoral qualities like suffering and in-
tentionality. Supervenience has been a much discussed relation by 
philosophers in this century, not only in the metaethical discussion 
that followed Moore but also in the philosophy of mind, the philoso-
phy of action, the philosophy of natural kinds in the physical sciences, 
and in the philosophical accounting for "secondary qualities" like 
color. For now, let me adopt a standard view of supervenience once 
proposed by Simon Blackbum: 
A property Mis supervenient upon properties N 1 ••• Nn if Mis not 
identical with any ofN1 ••• Nn nor with any truth function of them, and 
it is logically impossible that a thing should become M, or cease to be M, 
or become more or less M than before, without changing in respect of 
some member of N1 ••• Nn.296 
I shall in the succeeding section modify this characterization of super-
venience, both in terms of its antireductionist flavor ("nor with any 
truth function of them") and in terms of its modality ("logically im-
295. On the separation of wrongdoing from culpability, and particularly of the allocation of 
questions of justification to the former and questions of excuse to the latter, see Moore, supra 
note 157, at 140-44, 172-73. 
296. Blackburn, Moral Realism, supra note 110, at 106. 
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possible"). But the characterization serves the present purpose ade-
quately, for it introduce$ the presently important claim of the moral 
realist: moral properties depend on natural properties in the sense that 
the moral properties of a thing cannot change without some change in 
the natural properties possessed by a thing. This states at a minimum 
what is true of the relation between the properties of wrongness and 
culpability vis-a-vis the properties of causing suffering and intentional-
ity in the cat-burning example. 
Such covariance between moral and natural properties is, by itself, 
compatible with either naturalist or nonnaturalist moral realism. 
"One-worlders" like me nonetheless find moral properties unac-
counted for if all one says about them is that they supervene on natu-
ral properties, for covariance tells us nothing about the ontological 
status of moral properties. A naturalist-realist therefore should assert 
an identity to exist, not between properties, but between property-in-
stances297 or what some call concrete universals: The wrongness of 
the boys' act on this occasion consisted in (was identical to) the inflic-
tion of needless suffering, and the culpability of the boys on this occa-
sion consisted in the intentionality of their act and the sadistic 
motivation with which they acted. On the familiar labeling298 that 
distinguishes types from instances of types ("tokens"), the identity just 
asserted is often called a token-identity between moral property in-
stances and natural property instances. Such token-identity is not in 
any significant sense of the word reductionist, because such identity 
goes no distance toward licensing replacement of wrong or culpable 
with suffering-producing, intentional, sadistic, or with any combination 
of these or other terms labeling natural properties. 
Supervenience conjoined with token-identity is a well-known posi-
tion in the philosophy of mind as well as in metaethics. Donald Da-
vidson, as one well-known example, has held that mental states like 
intention both supervene on certain brain states and are token-identi-
cal to those brain states.299 Davidson calls his position anomalous 
monism, both because ontologically it is monistic - every mental 
state-token just is a brain state-token - and because is anomalous -
there are no general connections that hold between mental state-types 
and brain state-types. 
As we shall see, this very spare view of the relation between moral 
and mental properties, on the one hand, and natural and physical 
297. On the nature of property instances, see MOORE, supra note 233, ch. 4. 
298. See id. at ch. 5. 
299. DONALD DAVIDSON, EssAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 214-15 (1980). 
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properties, on the other, is too anomalous to be adopted, and I shall 
strengthen the supervenience/token-identity view toward reduction-
ism. But we can use even the spare view to give the prima facie answer 
to where moral properties fit in the causation and explanation of our 
particular moral beliefs. When we were perceiving the causation of 
needless suffering by the boys' act, we were perceiving that act's 
wrongness; when we were perceiving the intentionality and sadistic 
motivation of their act, we were perceiving their culpability. For on 
this occasion, again, the causation of needless suffering constituted the 
wrongness, and the intentionality and sadistic motivation constituted 
the culpability. 
Of course, we need not have been directly perceiving the wrongness 
or the culpability. But then, we need not have been directly perceiving 
the causal relation of their act to needless suffering, or the intentional-
ity or motivation of their acts, either. We inferred the presence of 
those properties (set "C") from the presence of other properties (set 
"B") on which they in turn supervened. And even these latter proper-
ties need not have been perceived to exist noninferentially, for they 
were evidenced by yet more basic properties (set "A"). So what we 
should say is that, when we watched the boys bum the cat and enjoy 
its suffering, we were watching an instance of wrongful action and of 
culpable actors. 
If, as most antirealists admit, we have no problem in countenanc-
ing a causal theory of perceptual belief, then we should have no prob-
lem in countenancing a causal theory of moral belief as well. For the 
account does not differ. The nonmoral fact that the act caused need-
less suffering causes us to believe that it caused needless suffering; the 
fact that the action was intentional causes us to believe that it was 
intentional; and the fact that the act was wrong, and the actors culpa-
ble, causes the corresponding beliefs in us as well. 
All of this is bound to disappoint the antirealist. For what he ex-
pects as a causal theory of moral belief is something like the causal 
theory of perception - with emotions, say, playing the role of the 
"sense organ" of morality except that these "sense-organs" access a 
special world of ghostly qualities. He wants to be shown something 
dramatic, such as how "the wrongness of the act affects the quality of 
the light reflected into Jane's eyes, causing her to react negatively,"300 
for example. Or he wants to be shown "that atmospheric moral 
quaverings" confirm moral opinions. 301 More, he wants something 
300. Hannan, Moral Explanations, supra note 216, at 63. 
301. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 2, at 80. 
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distinct from, but analogous to, sensory perception, something with 
which 
we can supplement the simple epistemology of "looking and seeing" with 
a whole apparatus which we agree on and which explains mistake, illu-
sion, and perspective - a whole paraphernalia which connects the epis-
temology to complicated procedures for distinguishing truth from 
falsity, accuracy from error, and which is rooted eventually in a physio-
logical and psychological account of [moral] perception.302 
Such "new data" expectations of what moral perception must be 
like are bound to be disappointed by an account that makes use of no 
sense organ except the normal five sense organs and no world except 
the natural world in which we live. The account just concluded allows 
us to perceive wrongness in the same way that we perceive the suffer-
ing of a cat and the causation of its suffering by an action: we perceive 
certain facts that in the circumstances that they occur constitute both 
a voluntary act-causing-needless suffering and an instance of wrong-
ness. As Richard Boyd coyly puts the rejoinder of the naturalist real-
ist here: "[Moral realism] is viable ... only if there is a satisfactory 
answer to the question: 'What plays, in moral reasoning, the role 
played in science by observation?' . . . I propose the answer: 
'Observation.' "303 
The naturalist-realist's rejoinder hinges, of course, on making out 
the relations between moral properties and nonmoral properties above 
labeled supervenience and token identity. For it is these relations that 
allow the naturalist realist to conclude that wrongness and culpability 
cause belief wherever the nonmoral facts on which they supervene 
cause beliefs. The antirealist thus must attack this relationship if he is 
to undercut the realist explanation of how our particular moral beliefs 
are caused by moral qualities. 
E. The Alleged "Queerness" of Supervenience 
The naturalist realist thus rejects the demand that he point to some 
"sixth sense" with the capacity to detect special, nonnatural, moral 
properties. Since the rejection depends on there being some such rela-
tions between moral and natural properties as were just described, one 
well-entrenched form of antirealist response has been to reject super-
venience and/ or token identities out of hand. This response is not the 
objection taken up in the next section, which is the legitimate demand 
to the realist that he support his particular claims, say, of the superve-
nience and token-identity of the culpability of the two boys with their 
302. Waldron, supra note 3, at 175 (footnote omitted). 
303. Boyd, supra note 27, at 206. 
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sadistic motivation. Rather, the antirealist response to be examined 
here is the more general one summarized by Mackie, 304 which finds 
these sorts of relations to be explanatorily suspect by their very nature. 
There are a number of different objections that have been meant by 
those voicing this Mackie-like objection. Perhaps Richard Hare's 
older, scornful dismissal of supervenient relations305 was aimed at 
what he saw as Moore's interactionist dualism about moral and natu-
ral properties. Against the "special realm" picture of Moore's non-
naturalist realism, the "queer relation" objection is much like the 
interactionist objection to dualistic theories of mind: given the dual-
ist's positing of two such distinct realms of being, how can there be 
any way to conceive of an interaction between them? But a naturalist 
moral realist can be stuck with no such picture. Wrongness may su-
pervene on cruelty just as cruelty may supervene on sadistic desire, but 
in neither case would a naturalist posit properties in different realms. 
His ontological commitments require only that there be different 
properties, not different realms. 
A second way to take the queer relation objection is as an objection 
to the modal status claimed for the supervenience relation. Mackie's 
worry sometimes seems to be that there is no sense of "necessity" 
available to make sense of the idea that cruel behavior, on occasion at 
least, is necessarily wrong behavior. Simon Blackburn's earlier defini-
tion of supervenience, as we have seen, suggests that the necessity 
claimed by the realist is a logical or semantic necessity, for Blackburn 
would commit the realist to believing that it would be logically impos-
sible that the boys act could be cruel on this occasion and not be 
wrong. 306 Yet, Mackie rightly suggests, such necessity "cannot be an 
entailment, a logical or semantic necessity,"3°7 for Mackie, like most 
post-Moorean philosophers, rejects analytic naturalism. Nor is there 
any necessity in the mere fact that "the two features occur together" in 
our world.3°8 Nor are supervening properties happily thought of as 
the effects of which the properties supervened upon are the causes -
cruelty doesn't cause wrongness - so the necessity characterizing the 
causal relation is unavailable. 309 
Yet the sense of necessity involved in supervenience claims is not a 
304. MACKIE, supra note 61, at 41. 
305. See HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS, supra note 26, at 80. 
306. See Blackbum, Moral Realism, supra note 110, at 105-07. 
307. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
308. Id. 
309. Jaegwon Kim, Causality, Identity, and Supervenience in the Mind-Body Problem, 4 Mm. 
STUD. IN PHIL. 31, 42-43 (Peter French et al. eds., 1979). 
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puzzle for the moral realist (although it reveals a puzzle, as we shall 
see). A naturalist realist should construe supervenience as a meta· 
physical necessity. In the analysis that Saul K.ripke has made famil· 
iar,310 to say that, necessarily, water is H20 is to say that this identity 
holds in all metaphysically possible worlds (that is, all worlds that 
obey the metaphysical truths of this world), for in light of those truths 
something could not be water if it were not H20. Water designates 
water "rigidly," that is, by the essential nature that water must possess 
in order to be water, which our best theory currently identifies as H20. 
Analogously, an action necessarily cannot become wrong, cease being 
wrong, or change from wrong to right, without causation of unneces-
sary animal suffering, or any number of other natural properties, also 
becoming present, or cease being present, or changing. 
Simon Blackburn, who has done his own revisiting of moral reality 
recently,311 reexamines the modal status of the moral realist's superve-
nience claim, and he too concludes that metaphysical necessity makes 
the claim nonqueer. Nonetheless, Blackburn seeks to generate anom-
aly for the claim by holding that we should also be committed to su-
pervenience of moral properties onto natural ones as a matter of 
conceptual or analytic necessity. As Blackburn says: 
It seems to be a conceptual matter that moral claims supervene upon 
natural ones. Anyone failing to realise this ... would indeed lack some-
thing constitutive of competence in the moral practice. And there is 
good reason for this: it would betray the whole purpose for which we 
moralise, which is to choose, commend, rank, approve, forbid things on 
the basis of their natural properties.312 
Yet I see nothing here that commits the realist to an analytical version 
of his supervenience claim. The competence that Blackburn's hypo-
thetical intuitionist (i.e., someone who made moral judgments without 
regard to natural properties) lacks would be a metaphysical incompe-
tence: he fundamentally does not understand the nature of wrongful-
ness, goodness, and so forth. Since the meaning of wrong and other 
moral words is given by the essential nature(s) of such things (just as 
the meaning of water is given by H20), we can describe the intuition-
ist's incompetence as a matter of "not knowing the meaning" of moral 
terms. This sort of realist semantics does not at all commit one to 
analytic or conceptual truths connecting wrong or any other moral 
term to natural properties. Metaphysically necessary supervenience is 
310. See KRIPKE, supra note 18. 
311. See Simon Blackburn, Supervenience Revisited, in EssAYS ON MORAL REALISM, supra 
note 9, at 59. 
312. Id. at 66. 
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the only modality the realist need use in fleshing out a nonqueer super-
venience claim. 
So construing the modality of the realist's supervenience claim 
reveals a much better "queerness" objection than either of the two we 
have just examined. The objection is this: if there is a necessary 
covariance between changes in moral properties and changes in non-
moral properties - which is what supervenience asserts - then there 
must be some other relation between the properties that explains this 
covariance. This is not a worry with water and H20, for these are one 
and the same substances, so of course "water-ness" and "H20-ness" 
will covary. But wrongness is not type-identical to causative-of-unnec-
essary-animal-suffering. So this explanation of covariance seems un-
available in the moral case. The same worry exists for functionalist 
accounts of mental states. A functionalist holds that mental states su-
pervene upon physical states although they are not type-identical to 
them. Functionalists thus also need to explain why mental states and 
physical states covary as they do. 
I used to believe that supplementing the supervenience claim with 
a token-identity claim was sufficient to answer this challenge in both 
ethics and the philosophy of mind,313 but now I do not think so. To 
begin with, I no longer understand what a purely token-identity would 
be. Insofar as Davidson urges that such token identities can be estab-
lished without there being any psychophysical laws connecting any 
types of mental states with any types of brain states, than his "anoma-
lous monism" is too anomalous for me. Unless we could specify some 
type identities -Jones' foot pain in old age with C-fibre stimulation of 
a certain type would do, we don't need identities as large as, pain-in-
humans with C-fibre stimulation - I don't see how we can even find a 
"token-identity." More strongly: what would it mean to say that this 
pain-token is identical to this physical state-token without being com-
mitted to there being an identity between some types of which these 
tokens are instances? 
So a pure token-token identity cannot explain the supervenience of 
one set of properties onto another for this identity is itself too much of 
a mystery to explain anything. There thus must be some type identi-
ties, such as: pain for Jones is physical state P, or wrong as applied to 
cat-burnings is deliberate cruelty causing unnecessary suffering, and so 
forth. Such limited type identities do not commit one to what pain for 
Smith is, nor to what wrong as applied to the telling of a lie might be; 
313. See Moore, supra note 8, at 1130-31 n.160. 
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there may well be other type identities for pains and wrongs on these 
other types of occasions. 
Saying this, unfortunately, does not get the naturalist realist out of 
the woods here. For the small type-identities (between moral proper-
ties and natural ones) thus far countenanced still allow for the follow-
ing possibility. It remains possible that, although the wrongness of the 
cat-burning act of the two boys consisted in its causing of unnecessary 
animal suffering, wrongness of actions in general may consist of an 
infinitely large number of other natural properties. Wrongness, in 
other words, even when restricted to actions (rather than, say, institu-
tions), is open-ended about the possible natural properties with which 
it may be type-identical. Although many natural properties are doubt-
lessly never the base properties on which wrongness supervenes - be-
cause such natural properties are always morally irrelevant -
nonetheless the disjunction of properties on which wrongness does su-
pervene is infinite. 
This open-endedness of possible base properties on which moral 
properties supervene leaves the covariance of the two sets of properties 
a mystery. Why must there be some change in such an open-ended set 
of natural properties whenever there is a change of a moral property? 
Presumably because each moral property in some suitably narrow con-
text is type-identical to some natural properties N1 ••• Nn. Yet we lose 
our grip on what type-identities mean if wrongness can be any of an 
infinite number of base properties. This is "alternative realizability" 
run rampant. It is like thinking that pain could be realized in different 
creatures in an infinite number of ways, not just a large number of 
different physical configurations. 
We should accordingly explain supervenience with a stronger sort 
of reductionist hypothesis.314 Not only are moral properties token-
identical to natural properties (and, accordingly, not only is each sub-
type of a moral property on each sort of situation type-identical to 
some natural properties), but the moral property as such must be type-
identical to a finite disjunction of natural properties. Then it is not at 
all mysterious why there must be a variation in the physical world if 
there is a change in moral status, for moral properties just are one or 
other of a set of physical properties. 
Just how reductionist this explanation of supervenience is is re-
vealed by a fourth construal of the queerness objection to superve-
nience. This is Simon Blackburn's old objection to supervenience, 
314. See Jaegwon Kim, Supenenience and Supenenient Causation, 22 S.J. PHIL. 45 (Supp. 
1984). 
August 1992] Moral Reality Revisited 2523 
which he himself has largely defanged.315 The objection was that the 
naturalist realist seemed to be committed to two propositions whose 
joint assertion seems very mysterious. The first is a natural extension 
of the supervenience claim: (1) that necessarily, if something had a 
moral property M because it also had natural properties Ni . . . NIP 
then anything that had Ni ... Nn must also have moral property M. 
(1) is plausible for supervenience-naturalists because of the universal-
izability of moral judgments. If Ni . . . Nn are the relevant natural 
properties making x be M then surely those same properties must 
make y be M as well. Even traditional noncognitivists would grant 
moral predicates this much "descriptive meaning."316 
Yet the antireductionist flavor of many supervenience theorists in-
clines them also to accept: (2) It is possible that something could have 
properties Ni • . . Nn and not be M. And Blackbum is right that the 
joint assertion of (1) and (2) would be a puzzle. 
The way out of the puzzle is to recognize just how reductionist the 
supervenience claim must be. We have already seen that a superve-
nience theorist should explain supervenience by a type-identity of 
moral properties with some finite disjunction of natural properties. 
That makes the disjunction of natural properties necessary for the 
presence of the moral property. Now we should also say that each 
disjunct is sufficient for the presence of the moral property. That is, 
we should deny (2): if we have the correct theory about the nature of 
wrongness, culpability, and so forth, captured by Ni . .. NIP then it is 
not metaphysically possible to have the presence of those properties 
without the presence of moral property M. 
Surely the only temptation of (2) for supervenience theorists stems 
from an epistemic worry, which is that there may be some other natu-
ral property Nn + i, that we do not now know about but if it were 
copresent with Ni ... Nn would relieve these properties of their normal 
sufficiency for M being present. In H.L.A. Hart's long familiar termi-
nology, 317 Nn + i would be a defeating property, making the cluster of 
properties Ni ... Nn defeasible. Yet if there is such a defeating prop-
erty, that just means that our set of properties Ni . .. Nn was not one of 
the disjuncts of natural properties with which M can be type identical. 
Rather, the set was (Ni ... Nm and not Nn + J. This possibility, while 
epistemically worrisome, does nothing to touch the reductionist expla-
315. Compare Blackbum, Moral Realism, supra note 110, with Blackbum, supra note 311. 
316. E.g .• HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON, supra note 26. 
317. See H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN 
SocY. 171 (1949). Simon Blackbum calls such defeating conditions "releasing fact[s]." Black-
burn, supra note 311, at 66. 
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nation of supervenience: that each moral property is type identical to 
a complex disjunction of natural properties the entire disjunction of 
which is necessary and each disjunct of which is sufficient, for the 
existence of the moral property. 
My fifth and sixth construals of the "queerness" objection to su-
pervenience are founded not so much on an objection to supervenience 
as to the reductionist relations that would identify natural properties 
with moral ones. The fifth objection arises from the familiar query 
about naturalist-realism, which is how the reason-giving nature of 
moral qualities can survive a reduction of those qualities to natural 
properties. The charge is that, however much reductionism may be 
necessary to make sense of supervenience, that same reductionism 
makes nonsense of the normative nature of moral qualities, the idea 
that such qualities give actors reasons to act in certain ways. The 
charge is based on the intuition that wrong prescribes in a way that 
inflicts needless suffering does not, so that any identity between the 
properties referred to by the expressions must be false. 
Yet this is not much of an objection for an externalist realist, who 
denies that there is any subjectively motivating nature to moral quali-
ties and who denies that the prescriptive or commendatory force of 
moral terms has anything to do with the meaning of those terms. This 
is a worry only for those moral realists who think that their realism 
has to account for these extra features of moral reality and our dis-
course about it.318 
The sixth construal of the "queerness" objection to supervenience 
stems not from the alleged normative nature of moral qualities but 
from their alleged nonobservability. The argument is that nonanalytic 
reductions are possible (or maybe even meaningful) only when we 
have an independent evidentiary base for each side of a proposed re-
duction. To use Warren Quinn's example, suppose we were to model 
the reduction of moral properties into natural properties on the super-
venience of ordinary properties like heat onto scientific properties like 
molecular energy. Quinn argues that we need to be able to locate the 
ordinary feature (heat) independently of our knowing the properties 
with which it is type-identical (molecular energy): 
We locate the presence of heat by the way it feels to us, a manner of 
identification that does not reveal anything of heat's fundamental struc-
ture. The parallel claim for moral badness would be that we recognize 
its presence by the way it feels or appears to us, its fundamental nature 
318. This worry about the "normativity" or "prescriptivity" of moral qualities motivates 
both Railton and Sayre-McCord to seek to give supplementary, non-explanationist justifications 
of moral realism. See Railton, Naturalism and Prescriptivity, supra note 27; Sayre-McCord, 
supra note 27, at 278-81. 
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lying elsewhere. But what could these phenomenal features of moral 
badness be?319 
On this view of nonanalytic reductions, we must have an epistemic 
handle with which we can grab on to goodness, rightness, and so forth, 
before we can be in a position to search out the more rechercbe proper-
ties with which it is identical. I don't see why this is true. Imagine 
three different ways in which Martians, who in their environment have 
had no way of knowing about pain, might have stumbled onto the 
existence of pain: (1) they cut up some human brains at the right time 
and see some of the thousand and one ways in which pain is realized in 
the human brain; (2) they observe human behavior, and notice an in-
put/ output regularity best explained by there being some common in-
ternal state that intervenes as effect of the inputs and cause of the 
outputs; or (3) they leave their pain-free Martian environment and 
come to Earth, where they feel pain for the first time. I see no neces-
sity to their discovering pain in the way we happen to have discovered 
it, namely by its phenomenal feel. Any way of stumbling across such 
natural kinds may suffice to discover the true nature of the kind. 
The same is true for moral properties. Nothing requires that we 
first discover their existence by some distinctive emotional experience 
(compassion for distributive justice, guilt and resentment for retribu-
tive justice, and so forth). We might discover them this way, or we 
might discover them via their causal roles, or we might discover them 
via one or more of the nonmoral properties on which they supervene. 
Whatever our discovery route might be, what we discover (if we get it 
right) will be the same: a moral property whose essential nature is 
given by the widely various natural properties with which it is identi-
cal, which natural properties are accompanied often (but not always 
-there are what used to be called psychopaths) by a characteristic set 
of emotional responses and tendencies to certain behaviors. 
I conclude that a properly constructed supervenience claim is in no 
sense "queer" or anomalous, either across the board or as asserted to 
exist with respect to moral qualities. Mackie's type of blunt objection 
to naturalist-realism on this general ground cannot be sustained. Say-
ing this, however, does not sustain the realist's assertion that moral 
properties are supervenient and type identical to natural properties. 
Even if such relations are not per se weird, it is not therefore obvious 
that such relations hold between moral properties and natural ones. 
319. Quinn, supra note 216, at 535-36. Quinn's argument resembles Peter Strawson's older 
argument that natural properties cannot be evidence for the existence of moral properties with-
out there being an independent means to verify the presence of moral properties. See Peter F. 
Strawson, Ethical Intuitionism, 24 PHIL. 23 (1949). 
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What I shall next examine are the reasons we have for supposing such 
relations to hold between moral and natural properties. 
F. Can Supervenient Moral Properties Better Explain Our Moral 
Belieft Than Can the Natural Properties Supervened Upon? 
Although I shall examine but a single answer to a single question 
here, that same answer is called for, and that same question arises, 
from a number of distinct concerns. I shall accordingly describe sev-
eral different routes to raising the question before tackling it on its 
merits. 
One such route is via a worry raised by Warren Quinn, Geoffrey 
Sayre-McCord, and Peter Railton in recent papers on the explanation-
ist defense of moral realism. 320 The common worry is the apparent 
triviality of explanationist defenses of moral realism if use is made of 
undefended reductionist hypotheses. For example, Railton imagines a 
"puckish naturalist" who stipulates an identity between moral good-
ness and cholesterol-ladenness, and then finds an explanatory role for 
goodness in causing, for example, heart disease. This kind of explana-
tory role for goodness provides no argument for the existence of good-
ness, given the obvious arbitrariness of the stipulated identity of 
goodness with cholesterol-ladenness. 321 
A second route is David Zimmerman's.322 Zimmerman recognizes 
the force of the analogy between supervenience-naturalism in 
metaethics and functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Still, Zim-
merman urges the analogy fails because the functionalist can specify 
the (functional) essence of a mental state without relying on physical 
properties. It is this independent functional specification of what a 
pain or a belief is that allows the functionalist then to talk of multiple 
physical realizations of pain or of belief. What, Zimmerman asks, is 
the analogous unity of wrongness that allows us to talk of multiple 
realization of it in nonmoral properties? If one answers that goodness 
320. See Quinn, supra note 216, at 535-36; Railton, Naturalism and Prescriptivity, supra note 
27, at 162; Sayre-McCord, supra note 27, at 277-81. 
321. See Railton, Naturalism and Prescriptivity, supra note 27, at 162. Railton's own way 
around this difficulty is not the substitution of the explanatory criterion for the causal criterion, 
as is mine. Rather, Railton appears to seek justification for reducing moral properties to certain 
natural properties in terms of linguistic fit (usage similarity between the moral term and the 
natural property terms) and in terms of motivational fit {do the base properties capture the inter-
est we feel in the moral property?). 
322. See David Zimmerman, Moral Realism and Explanatory Necessity, supra note 216, at 
86; see also GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1992). Bassham 
worries whether either Brink's or my realist semantics can be applied to moral terms because 
"normative language is often applied to objects that have little or nothing of significance in com-
mon." Id. at 79 n.88. 
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is necessarily reason giving in a certain way, that both forces the real-
ist to the otherwise unpalatable internalist moral realism and gives the 
realist the unenviable task of describing the unique sort of motivating 
force attaching to each moral property. If one answers, alternatively, 
just that all realizations of wrongness share no nature save that of 
wrongness itself, then one seems thrust toward some kind of non-
naturalist account of the unity of general moral qualities. 
If we hark back to functional specifications of pain, belief, and so 
forth, we may find the beginnings of an answer about the unity of 
goodness, rightness, and those other most general moral properties 
that seem to have many alternative physical realizations. A function-
alist analysis of pain locates the essence in the causal roles pain plays: 
it is the effect of various kinds of damage to the human body, and it is 
the cause of certain withdrawal and favoring behavior.323 What uni-
fies all of the physical states that may realize pain in various creatures 
at various times, and makes them all instances of pain, is that any of 
such physical states can play such causal roles. 
Prima facie, the same causal role specification may be given for 
goodness, rightness, and so forth. One causal role such properties play 
is that they tend to cause (not, necessarily cause) moral beliefs and 
hence, tend to give subjective reasons for action to many people. This 
cannot of course be their only causal role specification, else we become 
subject to Moliere's famous ridicule of the doctor who diagnosed the 
cause of his patient's lack of sleep to be due to dortimus dormitiva -
which translates as the cause of lack of sleep. One needs causal role 
specifications of pain other than its tendency to cause beliefs that one 
is in pain in order to use pain significantly as the explanation of why 
one believes that one is in pain. The same is true for goodness, just-
ness, and so forth. 
Here is where Sturgeon's and Railton's moral explanations of be-
havior (rather than belief) may do some work for us. That slavery was 
worse in North America than South America explains why opposition 
to it grew more rapidly in France and England than in Spain; that 
Hitler was wicked explains why so many Jews were killed in 1939-
1945.324 That societies are unjustly organized tends to explain why, 
even when people in such societies believe them to be just, nonetheless 
there is a tendency toward discontent and unrest and there is a ten-
dency toward certain religious or ideological doctrines, or toward cer-
323. Pain also plays other causal roles, in learning for example, but I shall ignore more com· 
plicated specifications. 
324. Sturgeon, supra note 27. 
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tain sorts of repressive apparatus. 325 
It is at this point that Zimmerman's true objection comes into the 
foreground. Since on the supervenience/reductionist account the dif-
ferential badness of North American versus South American slavery 
reduces to some finite set of natural differences between the two insti-
tutions, these same causal roles are occupied by these base, natural 
properties supervened upon as well as by the moral properties of bad-
ness or injustice that do the supervening. The same of course is true of 
Hitler's more particular, natural properties that constituted his wick-
edness and of the more particular properties different societies may 
have that makes them as unjust as they are. Moreover, since there are 
many other natural properties that can constitute badness, wickedness, 
or injustice of other institutions or characters, and since in each of 
these alternative realizations the base properties will play the same 
causal roles as the supervening properties, how can such functional 
specification of moral properties in terms of causal roles add any unity 
- beyond the obvious disunity of the very different base properties 
that occupy identical causal roles? The question thus recurs: what, if 
anything, gives goodness, wrongness, and so forth their unity as 
properties beyond simply a common symbol and a common com-
mendatory or condemnatory force? 
The third route to the same problem is Gilbert Harman's, although 
he calls it the epiphenomena problem for the naturalist realist. 
Harman's charge is that on the supervenient-naturalist account moral 
properties themselves do no causing - they are causally inert, mere 
epiphenomena. 326 Harman puts his epiphenomenalist point in what 
he regards as only "a slightly different way": "Features of acts that 
make the acts wrong" may explain our beliefs, but that does not mean 
that "[t]he fact that certain features make acts wrong" explains our 
beliefs. "The issue is not whether ... wrong-making features have 
observable manifestations. It is whether the wrongness of acts having 
those features has observable manifestations."327 
Take Harman's charge as he himself mainly frames it, as a charge 
of epiphenomenalism. True epiphenomena are causally inert, effects 
that do no causing. On the realist account herein developed of moral 
properties supervening on a complex disjunction of natural properties, 
the supervenience in turn explained because of an identity between the 
two sets of properties, it is simply not true that moral properties are 
325. Railton, Moral Realism, supra note 27, at 191-94. 
326. See Hannan, Moral Explanations, supra note 216, at 63. 
327. Id. at 63-64; see also Hannan, Is There a Single True Morality?, supra note 216, at 33-
34. 
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causally inert. Because the voluntary causation of needless suffering 
by the boys of this particular occasion was the wrongness, then the 
causation of our belief that the act was wrong by its being an act in-
flicting needless suffering is also the causation of that same belief by 
the wrongness of their act. 
True enough, the causing of our beliefs by the wrongness is not 
independent of the causing by the cruelty. There is no independent 
causal relation for moral properties over and above the causal relation 
of the nonmoral properties on which they supervene. But that does 
not mean that the moral properties are causally inert. They are as 
much the cause of particular beliefs on particular occasions as are the 
properties on which they supervene. 328 
The problem with this response to Harman's charge of moral 
epiphenomenalism is that it is so easy that it has to miss his real point. 
Harman's true objection cannot be epiphenomenalism, for it is too 
easy to show how wrongness of an act can cause belief when that 
wrongness is identical to a natural property that causes belief. Recall 
that Harman put his supposed epiphenomenalist point "in a slightly 
different way": this was to deny that "[t]he fact that certain features 
make acts wrong sometimes explains things" like our moral beliefs. 329 
This is not the epiphenomenalist objection, however much Harman 
may have thought that it was. Rather, it is an objection that can con-
cede that moral qualities like wrongness cause our moral beliefs on 
particular occasions but denies that wrongness explains those beliefs 
anyway. This denial is to there being any explanatory role to wrong-
ness, the denial being based on a denial that there are accurate causal 
generalizations about wrongness; the more perspicuous generaliza-
tions, this line of thought would continue, lie with the nonmoral 
properties upon which wrongness supervenes. What thus best ex-
plains our belief that the boys act was wrong is not the fact that their 
act was wrong but the nonmoral facts that their act was voluntary, 
causative of animal suffering, and not causative of some offsetting 
benefit. 
This gets us to our central question. No matter whether the issue 
is put in terms of a need for explanationist arguments that justify the 
reduction of moral properties to natural ones (and do not just use a 
stipulated reduction), or in terms of a need for some unitary specifica-
tion of what makes goodness be a single property, or in terms of al-
leged epiphenomena! status of moral properties, the real question is 
328. For a similar response to the charge of epiphenomenalism about the mental, see Kim, 
supra note 314, at 54-55. 
329. Harman, Moral Explanations, supra note 216, at 63. 
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what explanatory work is done by moral facts that cannot be done 
equally well or better by the nonmoral facts on which moral facts 
supervene. 
If that is the question, the answer lies in the fact that our causal 
generalizations often are more perspicuous when framed over descrip-
tions of supervening properties than when framed over descriptions of 
the properties supervened upon. It is this fact that gives us a func-
tional specification of the unity of each mental state and that helps to 
justify reductive hypotheses about mental to brain states. Take a 
mental state such as thinking of Vienna. 330 Imagine all the contexts in 
which a person can possess the mental state of thinking of Vienna -
he can be looking up from his reading of Wittgenstein, remembering 
his last summer's romance there, planning next year's vacation, and so 
forth. There must be innumerable ways in which that type of mental 
state can be realized in the brain of different persons at different times. 
Now imagine a travel brochure describing the lure of Vienna: "to 
think of Vienna is to take the first step towards going there." There is 
some truth to the causal generalization implicit in such travel chatter, 
namely, that people who think of Vienna a lot tend to go there more 
often than the base rate for the population. What similar generaliza-
tion can one imagine connecting discrete physical realizations of 
thinking of Vienna to the behavior of going there? If the answer is 
"none," then the best explanation of why someone went to Vienna is 
in terms of the fact that they were constantly thinking of Vienna, even 
if the physical realizations of those thinkings were causes of their go-
ing as much as were the thinkings themselves. 
Similarly with wrongness and culpability: there are many different 
realizations of each on different occasions, but the nonmoral proper-
ties that realize them on those occasions are not the subject of the 
most perspicuous causal generalizations.331 Consider the explanation 
of our moral belief that the cat-burning act of the two boys was wrong. 
The realist explanation of our belief is in terms of the fact that the act 
was wrong. This explanation is best because no other fact is, in gen-
eral, as perspicuous in explaining such beliefs. In particular, the facts 
about the base properties on which wrongness here supervenes do not 
adequately explain our belief. Those base properties might be thought 
to be: (1) that the boys' act was voluntary; (2) that the basic acts they 
330. Jaegwon Kim's example. See Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Nomo/ogica/ Incom-
mensurab/es, 15 AM. PHIL. Q. 149, 150 (1978). For a similar point about mind versus 
neurophysiological generalizations' explaining behavior, see BRINK, supra note 27, at 194. 
331. For examples other than that given in the text, see BRINK, supra note 27, at 194-97 and 
Sayre-McCord, supra note 27, at 276. 
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did caused a cat to suffer; and (3) that those basic acts did not cause 
human life to be saved or more cats to suffer, or any other offsetting 
benefit whose production could justify causing a cat to suffer. The 
enormously various alternatives of both (2) and (3) prevent these natu-
ral facts from adequately explaining our moral beliefs; for we would 
have believed the boys' acts wrong even if many other consequences 
were substituted for the suffering of the cat, and we would have be-
lieved their acts not wrong had they produced any of a large number 
of beneficial consequences. In short, the fact that the act was wrong 
best explains our belief, even though the wrongness supervenes on 
these three base properties. 
To the Zimmerman-like objection332 - that wrongness is not part 
of the best explanation precisely because the generality of its causal 
influence is purchased only by the disjunctive disunity of its base 
properties - the reply is twofold. First, as Jaegwon Kim shows, the 
fact that the base properties are disjunctive need not impugn the unity 
of the property that supervenes upon them. Kim's example: the prop-
erty of being less than one meter long can be thought of as an infinite 
disjunction (of, for example, all properties of the form, being less than 
n/n + 1 meters long, for every natural number) without becoming 
suspect as one property.333 Second, the case for thinking that wrong-
ness is one property is bolstered by the explanatory superiority of 
wrongness over voluntariness and the other base properties. That the 
base properties on each occasion also cause this phenomena, and that 
these base properties differ from occasion to occasion, does not detract 
from the explanatory power of the moral facts. Rather, the clustering 
of such base properties to act together as the cause of moral beliefs and 
other phenomena makes the moral explanation the more powerful 
one. The most powerful explanation for why we believe the boys' act 
was wrong is thus not that this act was causative of animal suffering; 
rather, it is that the act possessed that variously instantiated cluster of 
natural properties that constitute the moral property of wrongness. 334 
This clustering of various natural properties by virtue of their play-
ing a common causal role also justifies our belief that wrongness super-
venes on these properties. Such supervenience claims are not, in other 
words, the ad hoc posits of the realist, desperately running before the 
332. David Zimmerman, Moral Realism and Explanatory Necessity, in MORALITY, REASON, 
AND TRUTH, supra note 27, at 86; see supra text accompanying note 322. 
333. Jaegwon Kim, Concepts of Supervenience, 45 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 153, 
172 (1984). 
334. See Boyd, supra note 27, at 196-99. One can accept Boyd's cluster notion as accounting 
for the explanatory power of moral facts without subscribing to his idea that such clusters pro-
duce ineliminable vagueness. 
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epistemic objections to nonnaturalism. The recurrent clustering of 
such natural properties by virtue of their common causal role suggests 
the existence of a property playing such a causal role, and wrongness is 
as good a label as any for such a property.335 
By contrast, the antirealist's explanation of our belief must rely on 
our possession of a concept of wrongness such that we (rather than 
nature) are the alchemists that unify under the symbol wrongness dis-
parate natural properties that variously appear on different occasions. 
On the antirealist account, the presence of the base natural properties 
plus the presence of our concept of wrongness must explain our more 
particular moral beliefs. Yet the antirealist account does not explain 
the creativity of our particular moral judgments. It does not explain 
why we make judgments of wrongness in novel situations or in novel 
ways in familiar situations, judgments whose novelty prevents them 
from being antecedently covered by our existing concept of wrongness. 
Such judgments constitute a familiar part of our use of moral concepts 
like "wrongness," particularly with that fluid aspect of such judgments 
we call justification. 336 J.L. Austin's old admonition that "fact is 
richer than diction"337 applies with equal force to moral fact vis-a-vis 
our moral diction. 
The realist explanation is not only broader but deeper than the 
antirealist account of how unitary judgments of wrongness arise out of 
judgments of quite diverse natural properties. For the realist can eas-
ily explain why we have a concept of wrongness in terms of there be-
ing a property of wrongness playing a causal role. Why should people 
have a concept of wrongness if there were no property of wrongness, 
that is, if there were no natural clustering of base properties with com-
mon causal powers? The realist explanation of the presence of the 
concept is in terms of such natural grouping; the antirealist must 
scramble about for some nondescriptive language game that people 
find useful to play with moral concepts like "wrong." 
The explanationist defense of moral realism thus does not depend 
on undefended reductive hypotheses, an illusory unity to moral quali-
ties, or "epiphenomena!" moral qualities. The best explanation of our 
particular moral beliefs is that they are caused by moral qualities, and 
335. This also is to answer Harman's mislabeled "epiphenomenalist" charge, which reduces 
to the charge of an undefended reductionist hypothesis. 
336. I view (nonepistemic) justification as part and parcel of wrongness. To say that an act 
was justified is to say that an act that in most circumstances is wrong is, in these circumstances, 
not wrong. See MOORE, supra note 233, ch. 7, for a defense of this view of justification. I explore 
the difficult question of how a deontological view of morality can include the apparently open· 
ended notion of justification in Moore, supra note 121, at 327-32. 
337. J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOCY. 1, 21 (1956). 
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this fact gives us good reason to believe in the existence of such 
qualities. 
CONCLUSION 
Much criticism of moral realism stems from an inflation of what a 
moral realist need claim. If the label moral realist conjures up the 
image of a nonnaturalist metaphysics coupled with a foundationalist 
epistemology, then the resultant problems should scare most reason-
able people off. Special realms known only through special faculties of 
uncontrovertible intuition give rise to the two objections I have consid-
ered in this article: that the picture is so extravagant that it must be 
false and that it is in any event so removed from the empirical world in 
which we each live that it must be irrelevant. 
Yet moral realism need be saddled with no such pretensions. 
Modem naturalist-realism posits no world but the one in which we all 
live, no mode of knowing that world but our observations and the 
inferences we draw from them. Its nonfoundationalist epistemology 
makes no claims of delivering to us new evidence or modes of proof, 
unknown to the skeptics and the idealists. 
In the context of designing legal institutions, moral realist meta-
physics thus makes no claim that it alone can answer all the questions 
that any complete theory of legislation, of adjudication, or of law must 
answer. Making moral-realist ("natural-law") theories of adjudication 
competitors of democratic theory or of theories emphasizing the rule-
of-law virtues is as much a category mistake as making "legal-moral-
ist" or natural-law theories of legislation competitors of liberal theo-
ries of legislation. A moral realist might well think that democracy, 
the rule oflaw, tolerance, autonomy, and pluralism are real values too, 
so that his metaphysical realism about values in no way answers how 
he should balance these values with others, equally real, that compete 
to shape theories of both adjudication and legislation. 
Metaphysics is thus no panacea for the two perennial questions of 
substantive ethics: how we should live our individual lives; and how 
we should design our society. Our metaphysical beliefs do, however, 
represent what we think we are doing when we answer either question. 
Like all abstract reflection about our practices, how we answer the 
metaphysical questions colors the practices reflected upon. That is the 
power of thought, metaphysical thought included. 
